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Abstract 
In five experiments, interference paradigms were employed to investigate the role of 
awareness in determining the automatic nature of attentional biases to threat in anxiety.  To 
investigate whether attentional biases to threat occur outside of conscious awareness, 
participants were presented with masked and unmasked valanced stimuli.  In Experiment 2.2 
and 3.2 the presentation of masked and unmasked stimuli was intermixed. To investigate the 
role of priming in moderating these effects three experiments (Experiment 1, 2.1 and 3.1) 
blocked on the presentation order of exposure mode such that half of the participants received 
two blocks of masked trials first followed by two blocks of unmasked trials and half of the 
participants received the reverse order. In Experiment 1, 2.2 and 3.2, the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between the target and the mask was individually determined during the 
SOA threshold setting trials, whereas in Experiment 2.1 and 3.1, the SOAs between the target 
and the mask were set at 15 msec for all participants. SOA of 15 msec was chosen because 
previous studies have shown that shorter SOAs have demonstrated selective attention for 
masked face stimuli (e.g., 14 msec & 17 msec, Mogg & Bradley, 1999a, Experiment 1 & 
Experiment 3, respectively; 14 msec, Mogg et al., 1993a 14 msec, Harvey et al. 1996; 20 
msec, MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). Awareness checks were conducted across all 
experiments by way of forced-choice decision task and Study 3.1 and 3.2 included a 
additional digit classification task, to ensure that participants did not become aware of stimuli 
on masked trials over the course of the experiment. Participants’ data was excluded from 
analysis if they performed above criterion on the awareness check trials.  
To investigate the involuntary nature of the automaticity hypothesis, computerized 
versions of two interference paradigms were employed. On the emotional Stroop colour 
naming task (Experiment 1, 2.1 and 2.2) the central task and the distracting information were 
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an integrated feature of the same stimulus, whereas these stimuli were spatially separated on 
the Flanker task in Experiment 3.1 and 3.2. These paradigms have been shown to be an 
effective measure for the purpose of this investigation because they allow for competition of 
attention between two features by asking participants to ignore distracting information while 
attending to a central task. To investigate selective attention to threat, the following series of 
studies employed threat-related and neutral words as stimuli in Experiment 1 and emotionally 
toned schematic faces across four experiments (Experiment 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2).  
To investigate the separate effects of trait and state anxiety in moderating these 
effects, a sample of non-clinical high-trait anxious (HTA) and low-trait anxious (LTA) 
individuals was employed across all five experiments. Allocation to trait anxiety group was 
determined on the basis of questionnaire scores. To extend on previous research, Experiment 
1 included a clinically anxious sample for comparison. To investigate the role of state anxiety 
in moderating attentional allocation to threat, across all experiment, half of the HTA and half 
of the LTA participants performed under the immediate threat of an electric shock and half 
performed under shock safe conditions. In Experiment 1, the clinically anxious participants 
performed under shock safe conditions.  
 Study 1 employed the emotional Stroop colour naming task.  Clinically anxious and 
non-clinical HTA and LTA participants were presented with threat related and non-threat 
related words within and outside of conscious awareness. Mode of exposure presentation was 
blocked so that half the participant received the masked exposure mode first followed by the 
unmasked exposure mode, whereas others received the opposite exposure order. State anxiety 
was manipulated by exposing half of the HTA and half of the LTA participants to a threat of 
shock whereas the remaining half performed without the threat of shock. State anxiety was 
not manipulated in the clinically anxious group. The results indicated that irrespective of 
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exposure mode, presentation order or shock condition group all participants demonstrated an 
attentional bias toward threat related words relative to neutral words. These results suggest 
that priming or awareness of threat is not a necessary precondition to establish effects for 
verbal materials that are presented using backward masking procedures.   
Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 investigated attentional biases for pictorial stimuli using the 
emotional Stroop colour naming task. In Study 2.1, HTA and LTA participants performed a 
colour naming task with masked and unmasked angry, happy and neutral schematic faces 
under shock threat and shock safe conditions. Mode of exposure was blocked so that half the 
HTA and half of the LTA participant received two blocks of masked trails followed by two 
blocks of unmasked trials, whereas the other half of each group received the reverse exposure 
order.  The results indicated that irrespective of presentation order, on the unmasked trials 
there was no difference in RT for threat, happy or neutral schematic faces across participants.  
On the masked trials, there was no difference in RT for the LTA participants, whereas the 
HTA participants took longer to colour name threat related relative to happy schematic faces 
but only while performing in the shock safe condition.  These results suggest that HTA 
participants selectively attend to threat related relative to happy faces but only under stress 
free conditions. These results further suggest that priming is not a precursor for activating the 
mechanisms responsible for eliciting attentional biases to threat at preconscious levels. In 
Study 2.2, participants were presented with an intermixed sequence of masked and unmasked 
angry, happy and neutral schematic faces while performing under the threat of shock or in the 
absence of shock. The result failed to reveal any significant effects involving valence of 
pictorial stimuli. These results suggest that when the presentation of masked and unmasked 
trials was intermixed, attentional resources were not selectively recruited by either valence 
category in the HTA or LTA participants.   
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In Study 3.1 and 3.2 HTA and LTA individuals verbally identified a probe (either 
triangle or square) that was presented on the left or the right periphery of a computer screen 
while simultaneously, angry, happy or neutral schematic face pairs were displayed in the 
upper and lower centre of the computer screen.  In Study 3.1 HTA and LTA participants 
performed the flanker task with masked and unmasked angry, happy and neutral schematic 
faces under shock threat and shock safe conditions. Mode of exposure was blocked so that 
half the participant in each trait anxiety group received two block of masked trials followed 
by two blocks of unmasked trials, whereas the other half of each group received the opposite 
order. The results indicated that when mode of exposure was blocked, attentional resources 
were not influenced by the valence of stimuli in either the HTA or LTA participants.  In 
Study 3.2, HTA and LTA participants performed the flanker task under shock threat or shock 
safe conditions. Angry, happy and neutral face pairs were presented masked and unmasked in 
an intermixed sequence. On the unmasked trials, the result failed to reveal any differential 
attentional patterns as a function of valence between the HTA or LTA participants 
irrespective of shock conditions. On the masked trials, irrespective of trait anxiety group 
(both HTA and LTA) participants took longer to classify the probe when it was presented 
along with neutral compared to threat face pairs but only in the shock safe condition. 
Reaction times to classify the probe when presented with happy face pairs did not differ from 
either natural or threat stimuli. The results indicated that when mode of exposure was 
intermixed, there was no difference in threat processing between the HTA and LTA 
participants.  
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Chapter 1 
Automaticity of Selective Attention to Threat in Anxiety 
Overview 
Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent forms of psychopathology (Kessler, 
Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 
2005).  Studies of adult community samples in the Unites States report an estimated 18.1%, 
12-month prevalence (Kessler, Chiu et al., 2005) and 28.8 % estimated life prevalence 
(Kessler Berglund et al., 2005) of any anxiety disorder. Further, a 2007 National Survey of 
Mental Health and Wellbeing in Australia, reports a 11.8%, 12- month prevalence and 20.0% 
lifetime prevalence of anxiety disorders (McEvoy, Grove & Slade, 2011).  Given that anxious 
symptomology is associated with significant impairment in overall functioning and reduction 
in quality of life (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), research into the mechanisms that 
may underpin anxious pathology and/or maladaptive anxiety states is critical to aid in 
treatment consideration.    
The relationship between attention and anxiety has been investigated over the past 40 
years. Empirical findings suggest that anxious individuals selectively attend to emotionally-
related stimuli, mainly threat-related, relative to neutral stimuli (for reviews see Bar-Haim, 
2007; Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010;  Mogg & Bradley, 1998). On 
the basis of these findings, a number of theoretical models have attempted to explain the 
possible cognitive mechanisms that may sustain anxious pathology and/or maladaptive 
anxiety states (e.g., Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
These theoretical models share two common predictions: (1) anxiety is characterized by an 
attentional bias favouring threat information and (2) this bias is automatic in that it is 
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involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness.  Despite these similarities, the models 
place differential emphasis on the role of trait anxiety (predisposition), state anxiety (current) 
and awareness in moderating selective attention to threat in anxiety.  
 However, a number of methodological limitations associated with empirical data that 
have contributed to the development of these theoretical models have not allowed palpable 
support for the predictions they make. For example, most masked studies investigating 
attentional biases for threat outside of conscious awareness were associated with the 
following methodological limitations: (1) they did not employ individual stimulus onset 
asynchronies (SOAs) between the presentation of the target and the mask, and; (2) they did 
not implement a final awareness check procedure. Therefore, it is possible that participants 
may have become aware of stimuli on masked trials during the course of the experiment.  
Also,  when assessing for masked threat effects, most studies have presented unmasked and 
masked trials intermixed,  allowing for the possibility that unmasked trials may have primed 
threat responses on the masked trials (e.g., see Fox, 1996).  
A further concern for the predictions of these models is that they stem from empirical 
research that varies on the type of task demands they employed (e.g., visual search task, 
emotional Stroop colour naming task, dot probe task and other tasks). This can be 
problematic because different experimental paradigms are likely to measure different 
cognitive processes (see Chapter 2 for review). Therefore, the interpretational difficulties that 
arise from these data prove difficult for developing a coherent theory.  
A further limitation of previous research is that it is unclear how attentional biases to 
threat manifest as a function of stressor type. For example, MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) 
who manipulated state anxiety through examination stress in a sample of students provide 
data suggesting that attentional biases to threat may operate as a function of gradual, 
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naturalistic stressors. By contrast, only a few studies (e.g.,  Edwards et al.,2006, 2010a, 
2010b; Miller & Patrick, 2000) provide data to also suggest that these effects may be 
moderated by more short term, immediate and acute stress manipulations (i.e., threat of 
electric shock). In summary, the central assumptions of the existing models are based on 
empirical data that are potentially discordant and difficult to interpret. Therefore, in order to 
accept the assumptions that these models make, research with tight experimental controls is 
warranted.  
Structure of Thesis 
The current thesis aims to achieve the following: (1) to investigate differences in 
attention for verbal threat between clinically anxious and non-clinical, high trait anxious 
(HTA) and low trait anxious (LTA)  individuals; (2) to investigate the separate effects of state 
and trait anxiety on selective attention for emotional stimuli; (3) to investigate attentional 
patterns for emotionally toned schematic faces; (4) to investigate the role of awareness in 
moderating attentional biases for emotionally toned stimuli; (5) to compare responses for 
spatially integrated vs. spatially separate stimuli; (6) to provide more data for development of 
theory; (7) to identify limitations of current  research and to suggest recommendation for 
future research and; (8) to provide information that can aid in the treatment considerations of 
anxiety disorders. 
The following section of the current chapter will discuss three prominent theoretical 
perspectives on attentional biases in anxiety and will conclude with a discussion on the 
clinical implications derived from the predictions made by the models. In Chapter 2, a review 
and critical evaluation of the current empirical literature will be discussed and referenced 
with respect to the theoretical perspectives and will conclude with the limitations that are 
proposed to be addressed by the current series of studies. Chapter 3 will provide a description 
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of the general methodology employed in the current series of studies (e.g., participants, 
equipment, psychometric measures and stimuli). Current empirical studies are discussed in 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 7 includes the general discussion of findings from the present 
series of studies. The current data is matched to previous findings and theoretical models. 
This chapter further discusses the limitations associated with the current series of studies, 
treatment consideration of anxiety disorders and directions for future research.  
The central aim of the following studies is to investigate the role of awareness on 
selective processing of threat in clinically anxious (Chapter 4) and non-clinical, high trait 
anxious (HTA) and low trait anxious (LTA) individuals (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).  Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 employ the emotional Stroop colour naming task whereby the central task and the 
distracting information are integrated features of the same stimulus.  In Chapter 4 (Study 1), 
to investigate whether priming is necessary to activate selective processing of verbal threat at 
preattentive levels, blocked presentations of masked and unmasked, threat related and non-
threat related verbal stimuli are employed with a sample of clinically anxious and non-
clinical HTA and LTA participants. To investigate the role of awareness for pictorial threat, 
Chapter 5 reports blocked (Study 2.1) and intermixed (Study 2.2) presentations of masked 
and unmasked emotionally toned schematic faces with a sample of HTA and LTA 
individuals. Chapter 6 (Study 3.1 and 3.2) employs the Flanker task whereby the central task 
and distracting information are spatially separated. In this chapter emotionally toned 
schematic faces are presented blocked on exposure in Study 3.1, and 3.2 employs intermixed 
masked and unmasked stimuli with a sample of HTA and LTA participants. In all studies, the 
non-clinical, HTA and LTA participants are subjected to a state anxiety manipulation 
whereby half of the participants in each trait anxiety group are allocated to a shock safe or 
5 
 
shock threat condition.  The rationale for each study is described in the corresponding 
introductory section of each experimental chapter.  
Chapter 7 provides a general discussion of the current data with respect to previous 
empirical findings and theories and concludes with the limitations of the current set of 
studies, suggestions for future research and treatment considerations. The information 
obtained in the current studies may have important clinical implications for treatment of 
anxiety disorders.   
Theoretical Perspectives 
Cognitive Motivational Model (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) 
 Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) Cognitive Motivational Model (see Figure 1.1) proposes 
that there are two systems which determine the attentional allocation to threat in anxious 
individuals.  First, incoming information is evaluated for threat value by the valence 
evaluation system (VES). Stimulus input, situational context, state anxiety, prior learning and 
biological preparedness will determine the output of this system. The output of the VES feeds 
into the goal engagement system (GES) that determines the cognitive processes and allocation 
of attentional resources. If stimuli are evaluated as highly threatening, automatic interruption 
of current goals and attentional allocation to the source of threat results.  However, if the 
stimulus is evaluated as having low or no threat value, current task goals/activities are 
pursued free of interruption and low threat stimuli ignored. Further, trait anxiety will 
influence the VES reactivity to threat stimuli. That is, high trait anxious individuals will 
attend to stimuli that are evaluated as mild or high in threat value,  whereas low trait anxious 
individuals will only attend to stimuli evaluated as high in threat value and ignore mild/ no 
threat stimuli. Mogg and Bradley suggest that attentional biases to threat occur at an 
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automatic preconscious level. That is, both the VES and GES systems operate outside of 
conscious control. Mogg and Bradley also view attentional biases to threat as factors that 
maintain but not cause anxiety.  In sum, Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational 
model suggests that anxious individuals, compared to their non-anxious counterparts, are 
more attentive to aversive stimuli compared to non—aversive stimuli and that this attentional 
bias is automatic in that is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness (see Figure 
1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1. Mogg and Bradley (1998) cognitive-motivational model of anxiety representing 
the factors influencing vigilance or avoidance of threat. (Figure adapted from Mogg & 
Bradley (1998) a cognitive-motivational analysis of anxiety). 
Cognitive Model (Clark & Beck, 2010) 
  Clark and Beck (2010) propose a schema based cognitive model of anxiety (see 
figure1.2) that places emphasis on a heightened state of vulnerability in activating attentional 
biases to threat in anxious individuals. The concept of vulnerability is defined as “a person’s 
perception of himself as subject to internal or external dangers over which his control is 
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lacking or is insufficient to afford him a sense of safety. In clinical syndromes, the sense of 
vulnerability is magnified by certain dysfunctional cognitive processes” (Beck, Emery & 
Greenberg, 1985, pp. 67-68). Therefore, according to this model, anxious individuals possess 
a heightened vulnerability to demonstrate an exaggerated threat related bias toward neutral or 
innocuous stimuli, cues or situations.  
 According to this model, during the orienting mode, attention for incoming threat is 
automatic and preconscious, and results in the automatic activation of the schema driven 
primal threat mode. The primal threat mode is a rapid and efficient primary appraisal of 
threat driven by interrelated schemas essential for the survival and adaptation of organisms 
by minimising danger and maximising safety. During this stage four additional processes aid 
in the immediate fear response: increased autonomic arousal, cognitive processing bias and 
errors, immediate defensive inhibitory response and threat-orientated thoughts and images. 
The activation of these processes strengthens the primary threat appraisal. Although mainly 
automatic, the immediate fear response via the primal threat mode triggers the activation of 
the more strategic and controlled secondary elaborative reappraisal stage. During this stage, 
five cognitive processes occur: evaluation of coping resources, search for safety cues, 
constructive mode thinking, initiation of worry and reappraisal of threat. However, in 
anxious individuals, once the primal threat mode enables the immediate detection of threat, 
all strategic and controlled processes are blocked or serve to strengthen the pathological bias 
toward threat. In sum, Clark and Beck’s (2010) cognitive model suggests that anxious 
individuals are characterized by automatic selective attention toward threat and that this 
threat is automatic in that it is involuntary, occurs outside of conscious awareness and is 
impenetrable to conscious influence (see Figure 1.2).   
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Figure 1.2. Clark and Beck (2010) cognitive model of anxiety. Figure adopted from Clark 
and Beck (2010), Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders: Science and Practice.   
Evolved Fear Module (Öhman & Mineka, 2001) 
 Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) Evolved Fear Module is an extension of the original 
Fear Module proposed by Öhman (1993) (see Figure 1.2).  This model emphasises the 
automaticity of attention toward biological threat (e.g., snakes or angry faces) and the 
activation of fear.  This model proposes that feature detectors analyse all incoming 
information for threat value or biological preparedness at very early stages of processing, 
prior to conscious awareness of stimuli. If the input is evaluated as having high threat value 
or holding biological or evolutionary relevance, the autonomic arousal system is immediately 
activated by the feature detectors resulting in behavioural responses to threat (i.e., directing 
attention to threat).  If at initial registration the input is not evaluated as having biological 
relevance or high threat value by the feature detector system, it is passed on to a non-
conscious significance evaluator system that is responsible for evaluating the significance of 
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the output from the feature detector system . The information is then passed on to the 
conscious perceptions system that engages in a slow and deliberate evaluation of the input 
along with the meaningful memories stored in the expectancy system. If after conscious 
processing danger is perceived or stimuli are evaluated as threatening, the autonomic arousal 
system is activated by way of a slower, more conscious route. The autonomic arousal and 
expectancy systems influence the sensitivity of the significance evaluating system that primes 
prompt detection of other incoming stimuli associated with the expected danger.  Detection of 
threat and fear responses is more sensitive in fearful individuals (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 
2001). 
Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) Evolved Fear Module (see Figure 1.3) is an extension of 
Öhman’s (1993) Fear Module and incorporates four characteristics of this earlier model. 
First, it suggests that as a survival mechanism, we are primed to selectively attend either to or 
away from the source of threat.  Attention is sensitive to stimuli that are evolutionarily 
correlated with threat (e.g. snakes, spiders, angry faces).  Second, this selective attention to 
threat occurs at an automatic level, in that it is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious 
awareness.  Third, through Encapsulation, once the automatic, selective attention to threat is 
initiated, it is maintained over time and resistant to conscious influence.  Lastly, a functional 
relationship between ecological events and behaviour is seen to be moderated by a specific 
neural circuit.  From an evolutionary perspective, specific brain areas (i.e., subcortical and 
brainstem) are associated with fear and fear learning.   Specifically, this neural circulatory is 
seen to centre on the amygdala and also involves other brain regions (e.g., hypothalamus and 
thalamus).  
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Figure 1.3. Öhman’s (1993) information processing model of anxiety. Figure adopted from 
Öhman (1993), Fear and anxiety as emotional phenomena: Clinical phenomenology, 
evolutionary perspectives, and information-processing mechanisms. In M. Lewis & J. M. 
Haviland (Eds) Handbook of the Emotions (pp. 511-536). NY & London: The Guilford Press.  
Similarities and Differences between the Models 
 The models of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and Öhman and 
Mineka (2001) share a number of similarities regarding the mechanisms that underpin 
attentional processes in anxiety.  First, all models propose that anxiety and/or high arousal is 
characterized by an attentional bias favouring threatening stimuli. Second, attentional biases 
to threat are automatic in that they are involuntary. Third, attentional biases to threat are 
automatic in that they occur outside of conscious awareness.   
Despite these similarities the models differ in several ways. First, the aforementioned 
models differ on the emphasis for conscious awareness in activating selective attention 
toward threatening stimuli in anxious individuals. For example, Öhman (1993) places the 
importance on priming of threat during conscious processes to elicit selective attention at 
preattentive levels. Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Clark and Beck (2010) do not specify the 
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need for conscious awareness of stimuli in order to activate attentional biases toward threat 
when stimuli are presented outside of conscious awareness.  
Second, the models differ on their emphasis on state and trait anxiety in moderating 
attentional biases to threat.  Clark and Beck (2010) suggest that attentional biases favouring 
threatening information are most prominent in those with a predisposition to anxiety (trait 
anxiety), whereas Öhman and Mineka (2001) propose that it is the current levels of anxiety 
(state anxiety) that are most significant for this process to become activated. Mogg and 
Bradley (1998) on the other hand propose a hypothesis that stresses the importance of both 
trait and state anxiety.   They propose that with elevated state anxiety, high trait anxious 
(HTA) individuals will direct their attention toward the source of threat whereas low trait 
anxious (LTA) individuals will direct their attention away from the source of threat, but only 
for stimuli evaluated as low in threat value. As for high threat value stimuli, both HTA and 
LTA individuals are predicted to attend toward the source of threat. However, when state 
anxiety is low, no difference in threat processing is expected between the HTA and LTA 
individuals.  
Implications for the Treatment of Anxiety 
 Based on the aforementioned theories on attention and anxiety (Beck & Clark, 2010; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) it is suggested that anxiety is characterized 
by an attentional bias to threat and that this bias is automatic in that it is involuntary and 
occurs outside of conscious awareness.  According to McNally (1995) if attentional biases for 
threat really are automatic then current treatments utilizing verbal strategies that rely on 
conscious processing of information to correct for any maladaptive attentional responses 
would not be effective. 
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Clark and Beck (2010) address the above assertion by suggesting that verbal protocols 
are necessary but not sufficient in the intervention of anxiety disorders. Clark and Beck 
propose that the focus of cognitive therapy for anxiety should be on the elaborative strategic 
process during the secondary reappraisal stage. According to their model, attentional biases in 
anxiety are comprised of both automatic and strategic processes, that is, threat meaning is 
assigned at the automatic stage of processing and is followed by continuous anxious thinking 
at a conscious level.  However, the concern with driving treatment based on this model is the 
question of how to modify the automatic exaggerated threat appraisal without recourse to 
anxiolytic medications.  
Beck and Clark (1997) propose five ways that consciously moderated strategies (i.e., 
cognitive based therapies) can be effective in the treatment of anxiety. One way is to apply 
verbal strategies to deactivate the primal mode by employing more constructive and reflective 
modes of thinking to challenge the validity of anxious thoughts, in much the same way that a 
non-anxious individual would at an automatic level (e.g, challenging cognitive distortions). 
Second, exposure based protocols can be used to activate the threat mode while consciously 
challenging cognitive distortions rather than engaging in cognitive avoidance. Third, the 
benefits of verbally moderated protocols will not be affected by the involuntary component of 
the automaticity hypothesis because according to Beck and Clark, all psychological disorders 
most likely exhibit involuntary cognitive processing, but the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary is poorly defined in that it most likely varies in degree not kind and most 
cognitive processes involve both automatic and strategic processes.  Fourth, there is 
experimental evidence (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1994) to suggest that conscious processes 
can override automatic involuntary behaviours and processes. Lastly, cognitive therapy does 
not aim to suppress involuntary anxious thinking but rather to engage in more constructive 
thinking while minimizing the threat related cognitive avoidance.  In sum, Beck and Clark 
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(1997) argue that the rationale for cognitive therapy is not to abolish biases in thinking but 
rather to abolish negative threat related biases and increase an individual’s functioning, which 
may be a result of a construction of positive cognitive biases.  
 Mogg and Bradley (1998) also proposed a treatment based on their cognitive 
motivational model of anxiety. They suggest that that cognitive restructuring should be the 
focus of therapy by targeting the initial threat appraisal to reassess and restructure the 
negative threat related associations with stimuli. However, this proposed treatment laid out by 
Mogg and Bradley is puzzling in relation to their model which is based on automatic 
processes.  As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the initial stimulus appraisal occurs in the VES 
which feeds output to the GES prior to conscious awareness and is impenetrable to conscious 
influence.  Any consciously moderated attempts at cognitive restructuring of initial threat 
appraisals would be ineffective based on this model. Similar criticisms are attributed to 
Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) model which suggests that the fear module is encapsulated and 
thus impenetrable to conscious influence.  However, it may be that cognitive restructuring at 
the conscious level might affect subsequent exposures at the pre-conscious level. 
Nonetheless, cognitive behavioural treatments which utilize verbal protocols, exposure 
interventions and relaxation strategies have been shown to be effective in the treatment of 
anxiety disorders and thus are considered the chosen evidence based treatment among many 
clinicians (Otte, 2011). 
  In conclusion, the aforementioned theoretical models do not offer any effective basis 
on which to devise effective treatment strategies that rely on verbally moderated protocols. 
Given the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence for the automaticity of attentional 
biases to threat in anxiety, it would appear that treatment strategies would be most efficient if 
they were able to modify both the conscious and preconscious cognitive processes. Despite 
this limitation, verbally moderated treatments strategies (e.g., Cognitive Behavioural 
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Therapy), which rely on conscious awareness of threat appraisals, are the evidence based 
treatments of choice among psychologists and appear to provide significant reduction in 
anxious pathologies in a relatively minimal number of sessions. Therefore, it may be the case 
that the preconscious processes that are believed to be so impenetrable to conscious influence 
may be altered through consciously moderated strategies after all.   
Chapter Summary 
 In Chapter 1, four influential theoretical perspectives were introduced.  These models 
propose that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat and that this bias is 
automatic in that it is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness.  Differences 
among models were also discussed. On the basis of theoretical perspectives treatment 
implications for anxiety disorder were also discussed. Chapter 2 introduces the empirical 
literature that formed the foundation of the aforementioned theoretical perspectives.  
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Chapter 2 
Empirical Review of the Automaticity of Attentional Biases to Threat in Anxiety 
The present chapter reviews the empirical evidence for the automatic nature of 
attentional bias to threat in anxiety.  This chapter further reviews how these empirical 
findings have contributed to the development of the theoretical perspectives (i.e., Clark & 
Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) described in Chapter 1. The 
central focus of this chapter is to review and critically evaluate empirical literature 
investigating the following: (1) attentional biases for verbal and pictorial threat in clinical and 
non-clinical high trait anxious (HTA) and low trait anxious (LTA) samples; (2) automaticity 
of attentional biases to threat in anxiety, that is, the extent to which these processes occur 
without volition and without conscious awareness; (3) the role of priming in activating 
attentional biases to threat without awareness. This chapter will further evaluate 
methodological limitations and interpretational difficulties arising from these studies and will 
conclude with a rationale for the present research program.  
General Evidence – Attentional Bias to Verbal Threat 
According to the empirically driven theories of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and 
Beck (2010), and Öhman and Mineka (2001), anxiety is characterised by an attentional bias 
to threat. Attentional bias to threat is conceptualized as the preferential allocation of attention 
to threat related stimuli compared to non-threat stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Cisler and Koster 
(2010), who reviewed research investigating the mechanisms responsible for attentional 
biases to threat in anxiety, have proposed that the observable components of attentional bias 
can be measured by three characteristics: (1) facilitated attention, (2) difficulty in 
disengagement and (3) attentional avoidance.  Facilitated attention is evidenced by faster 
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detection of threat stimuli compared to non-threat stimuli and infers that attention is drawn to 
the threat related stimulus more quickly and easily than other stimuli (i.e., non-threat stimuli) 
(Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009). Difficulty in disengagement implies that it is harder to 
disengage from threat related stimuli or the location of threat related stimuli compared to 
non-threat related items, because attention has been captured by threat relative to other 
stimuli. Difficulty in disengagement is also referred to as “attentional interference” (Pineles, 
Shipherd, Welch & Yovel, 2007, p. 1905).   Attentional avoidance suggests the allocation of 
attentional resources towards locations away from the location of threat related stimuli (Cisler 
et al., 2009). Research suggests that anxious individuals demonstrate an attentional bias to 
threat related relative to neutral stimuli and that this attentional bias to threat is less apparent 
in non- anxious populations (for reviews see Bar-Haim, 2007; Cisler et al., 2009;  Cisler & 
Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
Selective allocation of attention to threat related stimuli is a robust phenomenon 
observed across various anxiety disorders such as  post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; for 
review see Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD;  for 
review see Mogg & Bradley, 2005), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; for review see 
Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998), social phobia (for reviews see Clark & McManus, 2002; 
Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001; Musa & Lepine, 2000) and panic disorder and phobias (for 
review see  McNally, 1999) and  across different experimental paradigms (for reviews see 
Bar-Haim et. al 2007, Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
Various experimental paradigms (i.e., visual search task, spatial cueing task, dot probe 
tasks, flanker task and emotional Stoop task) have been employed to investigate the 
attentional allocation to verbal threat in individuals with anxiety related disorders and non-
anxious samples by presenting participants with threat related and non-threat related verbal 
stimuli and asking them to perform various tasks capable of assessing attentional allocation.  
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The rationale for these methodologies was derived from experimental research showing that 
attentional allocation to threat in anxiety can be determined on the basis of reaction times to 
visual targets.  Across these paradigms, attentional biases to threat are observed when 
anxious individuals, compared to their non-anxious counterparts, selectively attend to the 
threat related relative to non-threat related stimuli by means of facilitated attention to threat 
or difficulty in disengaging from threat. Facilitated attention to threat in anxiety is a central 
prediction of all theoretical perspectives described in Chapter 1 (Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and is attributed to the early, automatic stages of 
processing, whereas only Clark and Beck (2010) propose that attentional biases to threat can 
also be attributed to difficulties in disengaging from threat, which is thought to occur in the 
later, more strategic stages of processing (for review see Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
Visual Search Task 
Attentional biases for threat related words relative to neutral words have been 
observed in studies employing the visual search task with clinically anxious samples 
diagnosed with GAD (Rinck, Becker, Kellermann & Roth, 2003), PTSD (Pineles, Shipherd, 
Mostoufi, Abramovitz & Yovel, 2009; Pineles, Shipherd, Welch & Yovel, 2007) and other 
anxious pathologies (for review see Cisler et al, 2009). The rationale for employing the visual 
search task is that it allows for the investigation of spatial attentional allocation to threat 
information (Cisler & Koster, 2010).   In a prototypical version of the visual search task, 
participants are presented with a target stimulus (i.e., threat stimulus or non-threat stimulus) 
that is embedded in a matrix (e.g., 3 rows X 3 columns) of distracting stimuli (i.e., threat or 
non-threat stimuli). Sometimes the target appears in the matrix of distractors (target present 
trials) and sometimes it does not (target absent trials). The participants’ task is to manually 
respond to the presence or absence of the target by pressing ‘Yes” if target is present among 
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the set of distractors (target present trials) or “No” if the target is absent in the set of 
distractors (target absent trials).  Target present trials are used to assess attentional allocation. 
This task allows for investigations of facilitated attention toward threat as well as difficulties 
in disengaging from threat. Specifically, facilitated attention to threat is associated with faster 
reaction times (RT) to identify a threat target in a matrix of neutral distractors compared to 
neutral targets in a set of neutral distractors because attention is seen to be “drawn” to the 
threat stimuli.  Difficulty in disengaging  from threat (threat interference) is associated with 
longer RT to identify a neutral target in a matrix of threat distractors compared to neutral 
targets among neutral distractors  because attention is seen to be “captured“ by the threat 
items (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
Rinck et al. (2003) employed a modified version of the visual search task by 
presenting participants diagnosed with GAD and non-anxious controls with GAD-related 
(e.g., anxious), neutral (e.g., apron) and positive words (e.g., dreamy). Participants were 
instructed to search for a single target word (GAD related, neutral or positive) embedded in 
an 8 X 3 matrix of distracter words.  The distracter words consisted of either other GAD-
related, neutral or positive words. The target was either present in the matrix, requiring a 
response of “YES”, or absent, requiring a response of “NO”.  Only data for target present 
trials were analysed. Rinck et al. (2003) found that GAD participants, compared to the non-
anxious controls, demonstrated an attentional bias for threat distractibility as evidenced by 
longer reaction times to identify a non-GAD related target among a set of GAD related 
distractor words compared to non-GAD related distractors.   
  In line with Rinck et al. (2003), similar results were found by Pineles et al. (2007) 
who employed the visual search paradigm with a clinical sample of Vietnam veterans 
diagnosed with PTSD. Participants were divided into a low and high PTSD group based on 
scores on the PTSD checklist and presented with four categories of word stimuli: threat-
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relevant words (e.g., helicopter, ambush), semantically-related neutral words (e.g., pencil, 
eraser) and unpronounceable letter strings (non-words). Pineles et al. found evidence for an 
attentional bias to threat words in the high but not low PTSD participants.  That is, the high 
PTSD participants took longer to identify non-threat related words that were embedded 
among threat related words relative to other semantically related non-threat words. In a 
follow up study, Pineles et al. (2009) found the same pattern of results in their high PTSD 
sample with an additional specificity effect (increased interference to detect a neutral word 
when it was embedded among trauma related threat words).  
Spatial Cueing Task 
When taken together, data from studies employing the visual search task suggest that 
PTSD may be characterized by an attentional bias for threat distractibility that is most 
apparent when the threat is in the participant’s domain of concern (PTSD relevant threat). 
Selective processing of threat words has also been found in socially anxious participants on 
spatial cueing tasks. In line with the visual search task, the spatial cueing task also allows for 
the investigation of spatial attentional allocation to threat information. In a prototypical 
version of the spatial cueing task (Posner, 1980), participants are presented with two 
rectangles, one  to the left and one to the right side of a fixation point on a computer screen 
and instructed to focus on the fixation point.  A cue is then presented in one of the two 
rectangles and replaced by a target (i.e., asterisk). The cues are either presented in the same 
rectangle (valid cues) or opposite rectangle (invalid cues) as the target.  The validity of the 
cues is determined by the ratio of targets replacing cued regions. The participants’ task is to 
respond to the position of the target.  Reaction times (RT) for responses are recorded. This 
task allows for investigations of facilitated attention toward threat and difficulties in 
disengaging from threat. Attentional bias to threat in anxious individual is noted by faster 
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responses to threat cues on valid trials (threat facilitation)  or slowed responses to threat cues 
on invalid trials (difficulty in disengaging from threat). 
Amir, Elias, Klumpp and Przewroski (2003) employed this paradigm with participants 
diagnosed with social phobia and non-anxious controls.  In this study, participants were 
instructed to focus on a fixation cue displayed between two rectangles positioned on the left 
and right side of the screen. A threat (e.g., stupid), positive (e.g. confident) or neutral (e.g. 
tile) word was then presented in one of the rectangles. At the offset of the word an asterisk 
was presented in one of the rectangles.  On valid cue trials, the asterisk was presented in the 
same rectangle as the cue, and in the opposite rectangle on the invalid cue trials.  The 
participants responded using a left or right button press to indicate the position of the asterisk 
(target).  Amir et al. found evidence for an attentional bias to threat in their social phobic 
participants compared to non-anxious controls as evidenced by longer reaction times to 
respond to the invalid cue on threat relative to non-threat word trials.  
Dot Probe Task 
Evidence for threat processing biases in samples with GAD (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews 
& Tata, 1986; Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule & Dalgleish, 1999) and OCD (e.g., 
Amir, Najmi & Morrison, 2009; Tata, Leibowitz, Punty, Cameron & Pickering, 1996) were 
also observed in studies employing dot probe reaction time tasks. In a prototypical version of 
this task, pairs of words (e.g., threat words and/or neutral words) are presented on a computer 
screen for a brief time (e.g., 500 msec). One word is displayed on the upper part of the screen 
while the other is displayed on the lower portion of the screen.  At the offset of the word, a 
probe (e.g., “*”) appears in the spot formerly occupied by one of the words.   The 
participants’ task is to quickly and accurately indicate whether the probe replaced the top or 
the bottom word by manually pressing a corresponding button.  Alternatively, participants 
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can be asked to classify the type of probe (e.g., square vs. circle) that replaced one of the 
words.   The manual RT to identify the probe is taken as a measure of attentional allocation to 
the attended rather than unattended part of the screen.  Attentional bias to threat is evidenced 
by faster RT to identify the probe that replaced the threatening word compared to the non-
threat word.  
MacLeod et al. (1986) presented participants with GAD and non-anxious controls 
with threat related and non-threat related word pairs. On each trial one word was presented on 
the upper area of a computer screen while the other was presented on the lower area of the 
screen.  Participants were instructed to read the upper word aloud.  On some trials a probe 
was presented in the area formerly occupied by one of the words.  The participants’ task was 
to press a hand held button as quickly and accurately as possible when they detected the 
probe.  The results indicated that GAD participants, compared to their non-anxious 
counterparts, were faster at identifying the probe when it replaced the threat related words 
compared to the neutral words, suggesting a facilitated attention to threat. Using the same 
paradigm, Taghavi et al. (1999) also found that GAD participants, relative to non-anxious 
controls, were faster at detecting probes that replaced threat related words compared to 
probes that replaced non-threat related words.  Amir et al. (2009) and Tata et al. (1996) found 
similar results with OCD participants. Similar findings have been reported by others (for 
reviews see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010)  and are in line 
with the aforementioned visual search and spatial cueing studies.  
Section Summary 
Studies employing the visual search, spatial cueing and dot probe paradigms as a 
means of assessing attentional allocation for verbal threat in clinically anxious participants 
have found an attentional bias toward verbal threat in clinically anxious individuals compared 
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to non-anxious controls.  When taken together the aforementioned findings provide support 
for the first prediction made by the models of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck 
(2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) described in Chapter 1. That is, they provide evidence 
for the prediction that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat.   
However, despite the effectiveness of these tasks to provide measures of attentional 
allocation (for reviews see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010), 
these experimental paradigms do not support the automatic nature of any disruptions in task 
performance because individuals may choose to allocate attentional resources toward threat 
stimuli before they are required to respond to the location or to classify the probe, or to detect 
a target among distractors. Despite extremely fast exposure duration, in the absence of 
attentional competition it is still possible that subjects might choose to direct their attentional 
resources toward one location over another. This methodological limitation is problematic for 
investigating the second prediction made by the theoretical models described in Chapter 1.  
To account for this limitation, others (for review see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 
2010; Cisler et al., 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996)  
have employed interference paradigms (e.g., emotional Stroop task). The rationale for 
employing interference paradigms was derived from experimental research showing that 
attentional bias to threat without volition can be determined on the basis of reaction times to 
visual targets when there is a competition for attention between tasks. 
Automaticity - Attentional Bias to Verbal Threat without Volition 
 The evidence for the automaticity hypothesis of selective attention to threat in 
anxiety has been largely obtained from studies that have employed interference paradigms 
(e.g., emotional Stroop task, flanker task) with anxious and non-anxious participants. In these 
paradigms participants are instructed to ignore distracting information (e.g., threat stimuli) 
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while performing a central task. On these tasks selective attention for emotional stimuli is 
evidenced by interference in task performance.  The following section presents evidence for 
the involuntary selective allocation of attention to threat words in clinical and non-clinical 
HTA and LTA participants.  
Emotional Stroop Colour Naming Task: Clinical Studies 
The emotional Stroop colour naming task, a modified version of the original Stroop 
colour naming task (Stroop, 1935), has been one of the more popular interference paradigms 
for the purpose of assessing automatic attentional biases to threat in anxiety (see reviews by  
Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010;  Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). This task is capable of assessing the involuntary 
aspect of the automaticity hypothesis because the ‘to-be-attended-to’ stimuli (i.e., colour) and 
the ‘to-be-ignored’ stimuli (i.e., words) are presented as integrated features of the same 
stimulus, thus promoting a competition for attention between two features. Therefore, any 
disruption in task performance is presumed to occur without volition.  
 In this paradigm, participants are instructed to respond to the colour (red, green, blue, 
yellow) of a word while ignoring the semantic content (threat related vs. neutral) of that 
word.  Longer reaction times to name a colour of a threat related word (e.g., hate, kill)  
relative to a non-threat related word (e.g., bath, pillow) are taken as an index of threat 
interference, whereas threat facilitation is observed by faster reaction times to name the 
colour of a threat related word relative to a non-threat related word. It is presumed that 
interference in colour naming for some word types occurs because the semantic nature of 
these items captures attentional resources. Therefore, if anxiety is characterised by an 
attentional bias to threat, then on the emotional Stroop colour naming task, anxious 
participants are expected to demonstrate interference for colour naming threat related relative 
to non-threat related words. 
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Bryant and Harvey (1995) and McNally, Kaspi, Riemann and Zeitlin (1990) 
investigated the relationship between attention and anxiety by employing one such task with 
clinically anxious participants. In these studies, clinically anxious participants with PTSD and 
non-clinical controls were presented with threat related (e.g., accident, crash) and non-threat 
related (e.g., desk, chair) words with the task being to name the colour (i.e., red, green, blue 
or yellow) of the words as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the semantic 
content of  the words. Bryant and Harvey (1995) and McNally et al. (1990) found an 
interference in colour naming of threat words in the PTSD group compared to their non-
anxious counterparts. That is, participants with PTSD displayed longer RT to colour name 
threat related relative to control words compared to their non-anxious counterparts, a stronger 
interference effect.  
These findings are taken as an index of the extent to which verbal threat has captured 
attentional resources. Similar patterns of colour naming have been found across different 
anxious pathologies such as panic disorder (e.g. Teachman, Smith-Janik & Saporito, 2007), 
OCD (e.g. Tata, Leibowitz, Prunty, Cameron & Pickering, 1996), GAD (e.g., Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985; Mogg & Bradley, 2005), spider phobia (e.g. Watts, McKenna, Sharrock & 
Treazise, 1986) and social phobia (e.g. Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mattia, 
Heinberg & Hope, 1993) (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 
2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998, for reviews). 
Flanker Task: Clinical Studies.  
The emotional Stroop colour naming task has been further modified into the flanker 
task whereby the ‘to–be-attended- to’ (e.g., colour) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (e.g., word) 
information is spatially separated. In the flanker task, participants are instructed to respond to 
a target (to- be-attended- to) stimulus (e.g., identify a word colour or identify a number as 
odd/even) while ignoring a flanker stimulus (e.g., threat or non-threat word). Reaction times 
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to respond to the target stimuli are recorded. Longer reaction times to identify the targets that 
are presented with threat related flankers compared to neutral flankers are taken as in index of 
threat interference. 
 In a prototypical version of the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), participants 
are presented with a letter (e.g., H or S) that is flanked by 4 congruent (HHHHH or SSSSS) 
or 4 incongruent (SSHSSS or HHSHH) letters (flankers). The participant’s task is to 
manually identify the central letter (i.e., left button press for “H” vs. right button press for 
“S”) as quickly and accurately as possible.  The RT for correct responses on the incongruent 
trials minus the RT for correct responses on the congruent trials is taken as an index of 
attentional allocation to the target stimulus. Positive scores reflect interference whereas 
negative scores indicate facilitation. This task has been modified for use with emotional 
stimuli. 
Mathews, May, Mogg and Eysenck (1990) employed a modified version of the 
original flanker task with individuals diagnosed with GAD, recovered GAD and non-anxious 
participants as a means of assessing attentional allocation to threat.  All participants were 
presented with one of two target words (e.g., left, right) along with two distracting words 
(distractor present condition) or in the absence of these distractors (distractor absent 
condition). Distractors consisted of neutral (e.g., horizon), positive (e.g., generous), physical 
threat (e.g., crippled) or social threat (e.g., ashamed) words.  The target was either presented 
in a location indicated by an asterisk (known location) or following three vertically placed 
asterisks of which one would be replaced by the target word (unknown location). Participants 
held a response button in their left and right hand and were instructed to press the 
corresponding button to the target word (left button for the target word left and right button 
for the target word right) while ignoring the distracting word. Mathews et al. (1990) found 
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that compared to non-anxious controls, GAD and recovered GAD participants were slower to 
identify the target when it was presented with threat related distractors (physical and social) 
relative to non-threat related distractors. These findings suggest an attentional bias to threat as 
a function of GAD. 
Based on these two paradigms, it is probable that the interference to colour name 
certain words (i.e., threat words), or identify a target flanked by threat words, is a result of 
captured attention or a difficulty in disengaging from the semantic content of these words. 
Furthermore, because participants are instructed to ignore the semantic content of the stimuli, 
the RT to identify the target stimulus can be taken as a measure of the extent to which 
attention is captured by or drawn to the meaning of the words counter to intention.   
In sum, research employing interference paradigms to assess the involuntary nature of 
attentional biases to threat with samples of clinically anxious participants (e.g., Bryant & 
Harvey, 1995; Mathews et al., 1990; McNally, Kaspin et al., 1990; for reviews see Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010) have found that despite instructions to 
ignore the semantic content of the words, clinically anxious  participants relative to their non-
anxious counterparts demonstrated an interference to colour name  threat related relative to 
non-threat related words (emotional Stroop task) or to identify a target flanked by threat 
related verbal stimuli.  Findings are taken as evidence of the involuntary nature of attentional 
bias to threat in anxiety and provide support for all theoretical perspectives described in 
Chapter 1.  
A limitation of the research studies presented to this point is that they investigated 
attentional allocation to threat words in clinically anxious participants and non-anxious 
controls.  However, because clinical anxiety is typically characterized by elevated levels of 
both state and trait anxiety (e.g., Spielberger et al., 1983) the relative contribution of these 
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variables in attentional biases to threat is difficult to determine. Therefore, in order to 
understand the separate influences of state and trait anxiety on selective attention to threat, 
some researchers have turned to using non-clinically anxious samples as participants. The 
rationale for including non-clinical samples is that they vary along trait anxiety levels, and 
state anxiety can be manipulated through various experimental procedures.  
The theoretical models described in Chapter 1 made several predictions regarding the 
relative influence of state and trait anxiety in moderating selective processing of threat. Clark 
and Beck (2010) place emphasis on the predisposition to anxiety (trait anxiety), whereas 
Öhman and Mineka, (2001) propose that it is the current level of anxiety (state anxiety) that 
is most significant in moderating attentional biases to threat.  Mogg and Bradley (1998) stress 
the importance of both trait and state anxiety for this process to occur.   They propose that 
with elevated state anxiety, HTA individuals will direct their attention toward the source of 
threat whereas LTA individuals will direct their attention away from the source of threat, but 
only for stimuli evaluated as low in threat value. As for high threat value stimuli, both HTA 
and LTA individuals are expected to attend toward the source of threat. However, when state 
anxiety is low, no difference in threat processing is expected between the HTA and LTA 
individuals.  
Emotional Stroop Colour Naming Task: Non-Clinical Studies 
To investigate the separated effects of state and trait anxiety on the involuntary nature 
of selective processing for verbal threat,  Russo, Whittuck, Roberson, Dutton, Georgiou, and 
Fox (2006) and  Fox (1993)  employed interference paradigms with a non-clinical sample of 
HTA and LTA participants. Russo et al. (2006) applied a card version of the modified 
emotional Stroop colour naming task with HTA and LTA participants. Allocation to trait 
anxiety group was determined on the basis of questionnaire scores (STAI; Spielberger, 
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Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). Participants were presented with threat related 
(e.g., failure, murder) and non-threat related (e.g., cupboard, lobster) words printed in various 
colours (red, blue, black, pink and green). The instructions were to name the colour of each 
word as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the semantic content of the items.  
Russo and colleagues found that the HTA relative to LTA participants demonstrated an 
attentional bias to threat related words relative to the neutral words as evidenced by longer 
RT to colour name threat relative to neutral words.   Similar results were found on the 
emotional Stroop and flanker tasks by Fox (1993) and others (for review see Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). 
Fox (1993) conducted two experiments using the traditional emotional Stroop colour 
naming task and a modified ‘separated’ version of this task.  On the emotional Stroop task, 
Fox presented HTA and LTA participants with colour (red, blue, green, brown, and yellow), 
neutral and threat related words in various colours (red, blue, and green, brown, yellow). 
Participants were asked to name the colour of each word as quickly and accurately as 
possible, while ignoring the semantic content of the word.  On the flanker task, Fox presented 
colour patches flanked by the same word above and below the patch (colour, neutral or threat 
word). Participants were instructed to name the colour of the patch as quickly and accurately 
as possible while ignoring the semantic content of the word.  In both experiments, Fox found 
that the HTA participants took longer to colour name threat related relative to neutral words 
and colour patches that were presented with threat related relative to neutral or colour 
(flanker task) words, whereas no difference in colour naming for the LTA group was found.  
Eysenck and Byrne (1992) found similar results on the flanker task and others (for review see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cister & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) on the emotional 
Stroop task.  
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The finding of Russo et al. (2006), Fox (1993) and others (e.g., Eysenck & Byrne, 
1992; for reviews see Bar-Haim et al, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) 
suggest that despite instructions to ignore the semantic content of the words, HTA relative to 
LTA participants demonstrated an interference to colour name threat related relative to non-
threat related words or identify colour patches flanked by threat words. In line with the 
theoretical models described in Chapter 1, these finding are taken as evidence for the 
attentional bias toward threat in HTA. In addition, because participants were instructed to 
respond to a target while ignoring distracting information (semantic content), these finding 
provide support for the involuntary nature of selective attention of threat in anxiety. 
However, a limitation of the aforementioned non-clinical studies is the absence of state 
anxiety manipulation which is central to the theories of Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman 
and Mineka (2001). Therefore, it is unclear whether increased state anxiety levels may have 
produced different attentional patterns in these studies (see Mogg & Bradley, 1998, for a 
review).   
Section Summary 
Longer colour naming reaction times on the emotional Stroop and flanker tasks are 
interpreted as attentional allocation toward the semantic content of the stimuli and therefore 
any colour naming interference is presumed to be involuntary because participants are 
explicitly instructed to ignore the semantic content of the words. According to Mogg and 
Bradley (1998) these findings may also be attributed the tasks’ difficulty in distinguishing 
between encoding bias and response bias and/or the possibility that the presence of 
threatening words may momentarily arouse HTA participants,  causing interference in colour 
naming threat related words. Despite these alternative interpretations, it appears that the 
emotional Stroop and flanker tasks are methodologically appropriate for assessing the 
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involuntary nature of selective attention to threat in anxiety, relative to alternative tasks that 
do not require competition for attentional resources.   
In sum, the findings of the above mentioned interference paradigms suggest that 
anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat and that this bias is automatic in that it 
occurs without volition, thus providing support for the first prediction and the first part of the 
automaticity hypothesis proposed by the theoretical perspectives described in Chapter 1. 
However, a limitation of the aforementioned studies is that they do not provide information 
for the second component of the automaticity hypothesis which states that attentional bias for 
threat occurs outside of conscious awareness, because participants were consciously aware of 
the semantic nature of the stimuli.  In an attempt to investigate the role of awareness on 
selective processing of threat some researchers have attempted to limit conscious awareness 
of  stimuli on a  dichotic listening task, limiting cognitive processing abilities, or by masking 
stimuli on the dot probe and emotional Stroop tasks to prevent conscious awareness of the 
stimuli.  
Automaticity - Attentional Bias to Verbal Threat without Awareness 
Dichotic Listening Task: Clinical Studies 
In attempting to investigate the role of awareness in the selective processing of threat 
words in anxiety, a number of earlier studies employed the dichotic listening task, a type of 
resource limited paradigm that requires participants to simultaneously process multiple 
inputs. Each individual input is capable of reaching consciousness, but the presentation of 
simultaneous multiple stimuli limits cognitive resources (McNally, 1995). In a prototypical 
version of this task, participants are presented with two verbal auditory stimuli 
simultaneously (one to each ear). Participants are instructed to attend to one of the passages 
by repeating it aloud (shadow) while being presented with input to the other channel.  A 
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further task demand is to either recall a number of target words that are presented to the 
unattended channel or to perform a secondary RT task requiring manual responses. The 
number of words recalled on the unattended channel or the RT to the secondary task are taken 
as an index of the degree to which participants process information presented outside of 
awareness. 
Burgess, Jones, Robertson, Radcliffe and Emerson (1981) employed this methodology 
with a sample of clinically phobic and non-phobic controls.  All clinical participants 
consisted of current or recovered social phobics, whereas sub-clinical agoraphobic, sub-
clinical social phobic and non-phobic controls made up three groups of non-clinical samples. 
Allocation to a group was based on responses to critical items on the Fear Survey Schedule 
(Wolpe & Lang, 1964). All participants were presented with two prose passages (one neutral, 
one phobic relevant) simultaneously (one to each channel).  Neutral passages included 
randomly embedded neutral target words (e.g., pick) and the phobia relevant passages 
included randomly embedded phobia related target words (e.g., failure). Participants were 
randomly presented with 10 target words in one channel and required to shadow a passage 
being presented in the opposite channel. The task requirements were to shadow the passage 
corresponding to their preferred hand while disregarding the second passage and to indicate 
whether the target word (phobia relevant or neutral) was detected in either channel. 
Shadowing errors were eliminated from analysis to control for the possibility of a potential 
switch in attention to the unattended channel message.  Burgess and colleagues found that 
clinically anxious participants recalled more phobic target words in the phobia relevant 
passage on the unattended channel compared to their sub-clinical phobic and non-anxious 
counterparts.  These findings suggested that compared to their non-anxious counterparts, 
clinically anxious participants process threat stimuli without conscious awareness. Similar 
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findings were observed with OCD participants (e.g., Foa & McNally, 1986) and those with 
GAD (Mathews & MacLeod, 1986).   
It should be noted that the data from dichotic listening studies should be interpreted 
with caution because the task has been criticized for being methodologically flawed and an 
unreliable measure for assessing preattentive processing of threat (Holender, 1986). Holender 
suggested that awareness of the critical items may have been a result of a momentary 
attentional shift from the attended to the unattended channel while participants were still 
accurately able to shadow the prose.  It is therefore possible that participants might have been 
aware of the critical items being presented to the unattended channel, and as such, the notion 
of subconscious threat processing is questionable.  
Given the methodological limitation with this task in assessing for attentional 
allocation outside of conscious awareness, others have employed visual backward masking 
procedures for this purpose. This procedure consisted of briefly (e.g., 15 msec) presenting 
participants with words which were replaced by a random string of letters. In addition, 
awareness checks, such as forced choice discrimination tasks (e.g., word/non word or word 
present/ word absent), were employed to ensure that participants remained unaware of 
masked items (e.g., Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2006; 2010a; 2010b).  Research has shown that 
despite being unaware of the item content, individuals selectively attended to threat related 
items (e.g., Edwards et al., 2006).  
Dot Probe Task: Clinical Studies 
Masked versions of the dot-probe task have been employed to account for the 
limitations of dichotic listening tasks with clinical (e.g., Mogg, Bradley & Williams, 1995) 
and non-clinical samples (e.g. Hunt, Keogh & French, 2006; Mogg, Bradley & Hallowell, 
1994). For example, Mogg et al. (1995) presented GAD participants with pairs of 
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neutral/negative and neutral/threat related words. One word pair was presented in the upper 
and one in the lower area of a computer screen. On the unmasked trials the word pairs 
remained on the screen for 1000 msec followed by a presentation of a probe in the area 
formerly occupied by one of the words. On the masked trials the word pairs were displayed 
for 14 msec and replaced by a 14 msec pattern mask. At the offset of the mask, a probe 
appeared in the area formerly occupied by one of the masks. Participants were instructed to 
indicate the location of the probe as quickly and accurately as possible.  RTs for probe 
detections were recorded. To ensure that participants did not become aware of masked stimuli 
throughout the experiment, an awareness check was carried out by way of a forced choice 
word absent/present discrimination task.  RTs for correct responses were analysed and the 
data indicated that GAD participants relative to non-anxious controls showed greater 
vigilance for negative relative to neutral words in both the masked and unmasked conditions. 
There were no differential processing effects for threat words. These findings suggest that 
clinical anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias for negative information and that this 
bias occurs outside of conscious awareness.  
Dot Probe Task: Non-Clinical Studies 
Others (e.g., Hunt et al. 2006; Mogg et al., 1994) have employed masked versions of 
the dot probe task with non-clinical samples of HTA and LTA participants. For example, 
Hunt et al (2006) presented low, moderate and high anxious participants with word pairs 
consisting of neutral words (e.g., lounge) matched with anxiety threat (e.g., afraid), social 
threat (e.g. alone), positive (e.g., admire) or other neutral words.  Half of the trials consisted 
of masked word pairs, whereas the other half consisted of unmasked word pairs.  On the 
unmasked condition participants were presented with a word pair for 500 msec; at the offset a 
probe (i.e., “*”) replaced one of the words.  On the masked exposure condition the word pair 
remained on the screen for 14 msec and was replaced by a mask consisting of a random string 
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of letters (e.g., trjnglsa) for 486 msec.  At the offset of the mask, a probe was presented in the 
area formerly occupied by one of the words. The probe remained on the screen until 
participants responded to its location on the screen. The participants were instructed to read 
each word that appeared on the screen and to manually indicate by pressing the “T” (top) 
button if the probe replaced the top word and “B” (bottom) if the probe replaced the bottom 
word.   Awareness checks were conducted to ensure that participants did not become aware 
of masked stimuli throughout the experiment. A threat processing index was calculated by 
subtracting the mean RT from probes in the same position as the threat word from mean RT 
when the probe in the opposite position of the threat word. Thus, a positive processing index 
reflected selective attention to the emotional word (vigilance) whereas a negative index 
reflected selective attention away from the emotional word (avoidance).   
Hunt and colleagues (2006) found that despite being unaware of the stimuli in the 
masked conditions the high anxiety group demonstrated attentional vigilance to threat words 
in both masked and unmasked exposure conditions relative to the non-threat items. They 
further found that on masked trials the high anxiety group demonstrated an avoidance effect 
for positive words but vigilance when these words were unmasked. In line with all theoretical 
perspectives described in Chapter 1, these findings provide support for the prediction that 
anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat and that this bias occurs outside of 
conscious awareness.  
Section Summary 
In line with the predictions of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and 
Öhman and Mineka (2001) the aforementioned empirical data provide support for the 
predictions that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat. On the basis of 
interference paradigms, the data further support the first component of the automaticity 
hypothesis suggesting that selective attention to threat in anxiety occurs counter to intention. 
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While the dichotic listening and dot probe data provide support for the second component of 
the automaticity hypothesis, which suggests that selective attention to threat in anxiety occurs 
outside of conscious awareness. It should be noted that the data from dichotic listening 
studies should be interpreted with caution because the task has been criticized for being 
methodologically flawed and an unreliable measure for assessing preattentive processing of 
threat (Holender, 1986). The following section will discuss evidence for attentional biases to 
verbal threat with respect to both components of the automaticity hypothesis by employing a 
masked version of the emotional Stroop colour naming task.  
Automaticity - Attentional Bias to Verbal Threat without Awareness and Volition 
In an attempt to investigate both the involuntary and outside of awareness aspects of 
attentional biases to threat in anxiety, masked versions of the emotional Stroop colour naming 
task have been employed with clinical (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Millar & White, 1995;  Harvey, 
Bryant & Rapee, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993) and non-clinical HTA 
and LTA participants (e.g. Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2006, 2010a, 2010b;  Macleod &  
Rutherford, 1992; Rutherford, MacLeod & Campbell, 2004).  
Clinical Studies 
Mogg et al. (1993) employed a masked version of the emotional Stroop colour 
naming task with clinically depressed, clinically anxious and normal controls. Participants 
were presented with masked and unmasked negative (e.g., anxiety relevant: embarrass; 
depression relevant: misery), positive (e.g. adorable) and neutral (e.g. carpet, geography) 
words on colour patches of red, green, blue and pink.  Participants were instructed to name 
the colour of the patch while ignoring the semantic content of the word as quickly and 
accurately as possible. In the unmasked exposure condition, the words remained on the 
screen until the participant’s vocal response to the colour was recorded. On the masked trials 
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the word remained on the screen for 14 msec and replaced by a mask consisting of a random 
string of upper case letters (e.g., WNJOKL). Mogg et al. (1993) found that relative to 
depressed and normal controls, anxious participants demonstrated slower colour naming for 
negative words in both exposure conditions. Similar findings were reported by Harvey et al. 
(1996) who also administered the colour naming task with masked (14 msec) and unmasked 
threat and non-threat related words to individuals diagnosed with PTSD who were motor 
vehicle accident (MVA) survivors, MVA survivors without PTSD and non-accident controls. 
Awareness checks were conducted between each block of trials to ensure that participants 
remained unaware of stimuli on the masked trials and consisted of a word / non-word lexical 
decision task.  The findings revealed that on the masked and unmasked trials the PTSD group 
showed significantly more colour naming interference for threat words than the other groups. 
Bradley et al (1995) also found that GAD participants compared to non-anxious controls 
demonstrated slower colour naming for negative words compared to neutral words in both 
masked and unmasked exposure conditions.  Taken together, these findings suggest that 
anxiety is characterized by an involuntary preattentive processing of threat.  
In sum, the evidence suggests that processing of threat in clinical anxiety might 
operate counter to intention and prior to conscious awareness of stimuli.  These finding 
provide support for all theoretical models described in Chapter 1. However, the relative 
contribution of state and trait anxiety is unknown because these studies examined clinically 
anxious participants. To investigate the separate effects of state and trait anxiety on 
attentional allocation to threat without awareness and volition, others (e.g. Edwards et al,  
2006; 2010a;  Macleod & Rutherford, 1992; Rutherford et al, 2004) have employed masked 
versions of the emotional Stroop task with non-clinical HTA and LTA participants 
performing under low and high stress conditions.   
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Non-Clinical Studies 
MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) investigated the attentional patterns of HTA and 
LTA participants under high and low stress conditions.  Stress conditions were manipulated 
by first testing participants one week prior to exams (high stress condition) followed by 
testing participants early in the semester, six weeks following the exam period (low stress 
condition). Participants were presented with an intermixed sequence of unmasked and 
masked general threat words (e.g., die, danger), non-threat words (e.g., table, chair), exam 
relevant threat words (e.g., fail, dumb) and exam relevant non-threat words (e.g., intelligent, 
knowledgeable) in various colours (i.e., red, green blue or yellow). The instructions were to 
indicate the colour of the words as quickly as possible while ignoring the semantic content of 
the words.  On the unmasked trials, the word remained on the screen until the participant’s 
response to the colour was recorded by the software. On the masked trials, the word remained 
on the screen for 20 msec and replaced by a pattern mask of the same colour which remained 
on the screen until the participant’s response to the colour was recorded by the software.   
The masked data indicated that in the high stress condition, despite instructions to 
ignore the semantic content of the word, HTA participants took longer to colour name 
masked threat words (exam threat and general threat) compared to the non-threat words, 
whereas the LTA participants demonstrated a non-significant facilitation to colour name 
masked threat words in the high stress condition. On the unmasked trials, there was no 
significant difference in threat processing between the HTA and LTA participants. There was 
however a non-significant trend in both groups for general threat interference and a facilitated 
attention for exam threat.  Although these data suggest that HTA individuals, when 
performing under elevated stress, process masked stimuli differently in terms of valence, 
ordering of state anxiety manipulation may have influenced the data because all participants 
performed under high stress conditions first followed by the low stress conditions. Therefore, 
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it is not clear whether a similar pattern of responding would be noted if the reverse order of 
state anxiety manipulation was implemented (see Rutherford MacLeod and Campbell, 2004).  
To investigate this possibility, Rutherford et al. (2004) tested participants using the 
emotional Stroop task but included a reverse stress condition order to that employed by 
MacLeod and Rutherford (1992). That is, they tested participants under the low stress 
condition first (early in the semester) followed by the high stress condition (close proximity 
to semester exams). Rutherford and colleagues presented HTA and LTA participants with 
positive (e.g., confident), neutral (e.g., desk), and threat related (e.g., violence) words in 
various colour lettering (red, green, blue or yellow).  On half of the trials the words were 
presented unmasked and on the other half they were replaced by a mask of the same colour.  
The participants’ task was to name the colour of the word as quickly as possible while 
ignoring the semantic content.  Rutherford et al. found that on both masked and unmasked 
exposure conditions, in the high stress relative to the low stress condition, HTA participants 
demonstrated interference for threat words compared to the facilitated colour naming for 
threat observed in the LTA participants. Taken together the findings of Macleod and 
Rutherford (1992) and Rutherford et al. (2004) suggest that HTA participants demonstrate 
similar processing of masked threat material to  clinically anxious individuals (e.g. Bradley et 
al., 1995;  Harvey et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1993). 
 Edwards et al. (2006) also employed the emotional Stroop task with a non-clinical 
sample of HTA and LTA participants. State anxiety was manipulated through the threat of an 
electric shock.  Participants were presented with masked and unmasked electric threat related 
(e.g., burn, cable) and general threat words (e.g., abuse, cancer) matched for average length 
and frequency to non-threat related control words (e.g., fence, sugars).  The task was to name 
the colour (red, green, blue or yellow) of the words as quickly and accurately as possible 
while ignoring the semantic content of those words. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
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shock threat or a shock safe condition based on their arrival to the laboratory. A threshold 
exposure setting was employed to determine the individual stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
for use on the masked trials between the word and the mask.  On the unmasked exposure 
trials, the word remained on the screen until the participant’s response to the colour was 
recorded by the software. On the masked trials the word remained on the screen for the SOA 
determined during the threshold exposure setting, and was replaced by a pattern mask of the 
same colour.  The mask remained on the screen until the participant’s response to the colour 
was recorded by the software. Awareness checks were employed to ensure that participants 
remained unaware of stimuli on the masked trials.  The result of this study indicated that, on 
the unmasked trials, the HTA group showed significant interference in colour naming threat 
words relative to the non-threat words but only while performing under the threat of shock.  
No difference in processing unmasked stimulus content was noted for the LTA group.  On the 
masked trials, despite being consciously unaware of stimulus content, HTA participants 
showed a facilitated colour naming for threat words relative to control words but only when 
performing under the threat of shock.  No difference in processing masked stimulus content 
was noted for the LTA group.  
In a follow up study, Edwards, Burt and Lipp (2010a) employed a similar procedure 
to that employed by Edwards et al.  (2006) but with two distinctions: (1) neutral words were 
replaced with positive words (e.g., wins, jokes) and; (2) shock condition was blocked so that 
half the participants received the shock condition in the first two blocks followed by two 
blocks of no shock, whereas the other half received the opposite order (no shock followed by 
shock). The results indicated that the blocking on the order of the state anxiety manipulation 
influenced masked and unmasked threat bias effects. Averaged over exposure mode, HTA 
relative to LTA participants demonstrated interference for threat, but this was limited to those 
who performed under the threat of shock in the later stages of the experiment. On the 
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unmasked trials, HTA relative to LTA in the shock threat condition demonstrated 
interference for threat irrespective of shock threat order. The masked stimuli were processed 
in similar fashion by both HTA and LTA participants irrespective of shock condition and 
order. Averaged over trait anxiety, shock condition and exposure mode, participants overall 
demonstrated interference for threat in the early stages relative to the facilitation for threat 
observed in the later stages of the experiment.  In sum, the results indicated that the direction 
of attention for masked and unmasked threat information changed over the course of testing, 
in that irrespective of exposure mode, threat interference was noted in the early stages of the 
experiment compared to the facilitation for threat in the later stages of the experiment.  
In summary, the data for the HTA participants on unmasked trials appears to be 
consistent across a number of studies (Edwards et al. 2006, 2010a; Rutherford et al., 2004) 
that reported interference for colour naming threat words in the HTA groups when 
performing under high stress conditions.  These processing patterns are similar to those 
reported for clinically anxious participants (e.g., Bradley et al. 1995; Bryant & Harvey, 1995; 
Mathews et al. 1990; McNally et al. 1990; Mogg et al., 1993). On masked exposure trials, 
although similar patterns of interference for  colour naming  threat words in the HTA groups 
in the high stress conditions were noted by MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) and Rutherford 
et al. (2004), Edwards et al. (2006) found a facilitated colour naming for masked threat words 
when performing under the threat of shock. Given the similarities of task demands (i.e., 
colour naming), stimuli (i.e., words) and participants (i.e., student samples) between the 
experiments, the inconsistent findings appear to have been influenced by the differential state 
anxiety manipulations. 
 Despite the considerable body of data demonstrating selective attention for masked 
threat words in anxiety, the aforementioned studies that reported masked threat effects have 
presented masked and unmasked stimuli in an intermixed sequence.  According to the 
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theoretical perspective of Öhman and Mineka (2001), access to consciously perceived threat 
can prime the mechanisms responsible for processing subliminal threat. Therefore, it is 
possible that when masked and unmasked stimuli are presented intermixed, conscious 
awareness of threat on unmasked trials may have primed threat detection on masked trials.  
Fox (1996) questioned the extent to which these processes operate outside of 
conscious awareness and suggested that conscious awareness of threat may affect responses 
on masked trials.  Fox employed three experiments using the Flanker task whereby 
participants were presented with a digit in the centre of a computer screen with the task being 
to identify the digit as odd or even as quickly and accurately as possible.  Along with the 
digit, a pair of distractors, threat related or neutral words (derived from Fox, 1994), were 
presented above and below the digit.  On half of the trials word pairs were presented 
unmasked, whereas on the other half of the trials the words were presented with a backward 
pattern mask. Fox hypothesised that the RT to identify the digit as odd or even may be 
influenced by the valence of the distracting word stimuli.  That is, longer RT to detect the 
status of the digit when embedded among threat related distractors would reflect selective 
attention to threat.  
Fox (1996), in Experiment 1, presented HTA and LTA participants with an 
intermixed sequence of masked and unmasked threat related and neutral words.  The results 
indicated that on masked trials, HTA participants took longer to identify the status of the digit 
on threat word trials relative to neutral word trials. These data are consistent with the 
interference to colour name masked threat related relative to masked neural words in non-
clinically anxious participants on the emotional Stroop colour naming task. (e.g., Edward et 
al., 2010a; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Rutherford et al., 2004).  To account for the 
possibility of priming for threat on masked trials, Fox, in Experiment 2, presented 
participants with a block of masked trials first followed by a block of unmasked trials. The 
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findings revealed a non-significant trend for longer RTs to classify a digit on masked threat 
word trials in the HTA participants. In Experiment 3, Fox presented half the participants with 
masked trials first followed by a block of unmasked trials, whereas the other half of 
participants received the opposite order.  Fox found that on the masked trials the data did not 
produce differential digit classification latencies between the masked threat and masked 
neutral words when participants were presented with a block of masked trials first followed 
by a block of unmasked trials. However, when unmasked trials were presented first, HTA 
participants took significantly longer to classify the digit on the masked threat trials 
compared to the masked neutral trials. The results were in line with the prediction made by 
Öhman and Mineka (2001). That is, a masked threat bias was only observed on trials when 
participants were presented with intermixed masked and unmasked trials (Experiment 1), or 
when the unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials (Experiment 3).  
In line with the predictions of Öhman (1993), Fox (1996) suggested that some 
conscious awareness of threat may be needed to prime selective attention for threat words 
that are presented outside of conscious awareness. However, a number of limitations of Fox’s 
work were noted. First, in Experiments 1 and 2, Fox included an experimental procedure to 
elevate state anxiety; this state anxiety manipulation was not mentioned for Experiment 3.  
Elevated state anxiety manipulation has been noted in non-clinical samples for producing 
masked threat effects (e.g., see Edwards et al., 2006; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; 
Rutherford et al., 2004); therefore, the absence of masked threat effects in the masked first 
exposure condition in Fox’s third experiment might be attributed to the absence of state 
anxiety manipulation. Second, the type of stressor employed in Fox’s first and second 
experiments (past stressor, Experiment 1, vs. future stressor, Experiment 2) may account for 
the lack of unmasked threat effects for the HTA group.   When considering the elevated 
‘current’ state anxiety reported by clinically anxious individuals, it is possible that state 
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anxiety manipulations reflecting a past and future orientated stressor were not sensitive 
enough to produce threat processing biases on unmasked trials. Others (e.g., Edwards et al. 
2006) have reported threat processing biases on unmasked trials on the emotional Stroop task 
when the manipulation of state anxiety reflected a current stressor (i.e., threat of an electric 
shock).  Therefore, the differential threat processing for non-clinical participants on the 
unmasked trials between Fox (1996) and Macleod and Rutherford (1992) as compared to 
Edwards et al. (2006) may be attributed to the differences in state anxiety manipulation. 
Edwards, Burt and Lipp (2010b) accounted for a number of limitations discussed in 
relation to the aforementioned work. First, Edwards et al. (2010b) employed a state anxiety 
manipulation reflecting a current stressor (i.e., threat of electric shock) which was 
administered to all participants.  Participants received two blocks of shock threat and two 
blocks of shock safe trials over four blocks.  Shock distribution was administered so that half 
the participants received shock threat (Block 1), shock safe (Block 2), shock threat (Block 3), 
shock safe (Block 4), whereas the other half received the opposite sequence (shock safe, 
shock threat, shock safe, shock threat).  Second,  in an attempt to investigate whether 
conscious awareness of threat is needed to produce masked threat biases in a non-clinical 
sample of HTA and LTA participants, Edwards et al. (2010b) employed the emotional Stroop 
task by blocking on presentation order; that is, they presented half their participants with 
blocks of masked trials first followed by blocks of unmasked trials, whereas the other half 
received the opposite sequence, unmasked blocks first followed by masked trials as a 
between subject variable. Trait anxiety groups were determined on the basis of questionnaires 
in accordance with previous work (Edwards et al., 2006; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). 
Individual threshold exposure settings were carried out prior to the experimental trials by 
implementing a word/non-word lexical decision task.  Awareness of word stimuli was 
manipulated by a backward masking procedure.  The SOA between the word and the mask 
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was determined during the initial lexical decision task. Half of the words were presented 
within conscious awareness (unmasked) and half were presented outside of conscious 
awareness (masked). All participants were presented with half neutral and half threat related 
words, masked and unmasked in various colours (red, green, blue or yellow). The instructions 
were to name the colour of the stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring 
the semantic content of the word.  Awareness check trials were conducted to ensure that 
participants remained unaware of stimuli on masked trials.  
The results revealed no difference in threat processing between the HTA and LTA 
participants when masked trials were presented first. However, when unmasked trials were 
presented first, for both masked and unmasked exposure conditions, the HTA relative to the 
LTA participants demonstrated an attentional bias to threat. There were no differential 
patterns of responding based on state anxiety manipulation.  When unmasked trials were 
presented first, the findings of this study provide support for theories of Clark and Beck 
(2010), Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001), which suggest that an 
attentional bias to threat is likely to be evidenced in the HTA relative to the LTA and that this 
bias occurs without volition and outside of conscious awareness.  However, because an 
attentional bias to masked threat was only detected when unmasked trials were presented 
first, these data give further support for Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis which states that 
conscious access to threat is needed to prime the mechanisms responsible for detecting 
subliminal threat.  
Summary – Verbal Stimuli 
In line with theoretical models described in Chapter 1 (i.e., Clark & Beck, 2010; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), when taken together, the data suggest that 
anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias for verbal threat and that this bias is automatic 
in that it is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness. In line with Öhman’s 
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(1993) priming hypothesis, these data suggest that priming is needed to establish selective 
processing of verbal threat that is presented outside of conscious awareness. However, word 
stimuli are relatively limited in threat value and evolutionary relevance (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998),  therefore the findings from studies employing words as stimuli cannot be used to 
make predictions about attention allocations for more ecologically valid, pictorial stimuli 
(e.g., snakes, threatening scenes , angry faces). Therefore, researchers have employed more 
ecologically valid experimental procedures to investigate selective attention to pictorial threat 
rather that words.  The following section will discuss attentional processing of pictorial 
stimuli. The findings are discussed in accordance to the predictions made by the theoretical 
models described in Chapter 1. 
General Evidence- Attentional Bias to Pictorial Threat 
Studies employing various experimental paradigms have found evidence for 
attentional biases for pictorial threat in anxious individuals. For example, to investigate 
selective attention to threatening pictures of snakes and spiders in non-clinical anxiety, 
Öhman, Flykt and Esteves (2001) conducted three visual search experiments. In their series 
of experiments, a non-selected sample (Experiments 1 and 2) and non-anxious high and low 
fearful participants (i.e., fearful of snakes or spiders) were presented with fear relevant 
(snakes and spiders) and fear-irrelevant (flowers and mushrooms) target pictures embedded 
in a matrix of fear relevant or fear irrelevant distractors. That is, participants were presented 
with either a fear relevant target embedded in a matrix of fear irrelevant distractors or vice 
versa.  A target was never presented in a matrix of the same valence category (e.g., fear 
relevant targets were never embedded among fear relevant distractors). In experiment 1, 
employing a 3 x 3 matrix, nine pictures were presented of the same valence category (target 
absent) or eight pictures of the same valence category with one picture (the target) of the 
opposite valence category (target present). In Experiment 2 and 3, the same procedure was 
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applied but participants were presented with an additional 2 x 2 matrix containing four 
pictorial stimuli.  The participant’s task was to indicate whether the target was present or 
absent among the set of distractors.  
The results indicated that overall, all participants were faster at detecting a fear 
relevant (snakes or spiders) target among fear irrelevant (flowers and mushrooms) distractors 
compared to fear irrelevant targets among fear relevant distractors. In addition, in Experiment 
3, results indicated that fear relevance was enhanced in fearful compared to non-fearful 
participants. Fearful participants and controls were faster at detecting a fear relevant target 
that they did not fear than fear irrelevant targets, with the fearful participants demonstrating 
even faster detection for fear relevant targets that they feared.  According to Öhman et al. 
(2001), an evolutionarily relevant threatening stimulus was effective in capturing attention 
especially if the stimulus was emotionally provocative.  Others (e.g., Flykt & Caldara, 2006; 
Pflugshaupt, Mosimann, von Wartburg, Schmitt, Nyffeler, & Muri, 2005) found evidence for 
selective processing of threat among individuals with spider phobias and in spider fearful 
individuals (e.g., Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Tripp & Weiss, 2004), those with social phobia 
(e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa & Amir, 1999) and in HTA participants (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995).  In line with all theoretical perspectives described in Chapter 1, these finding are 
consistent with the idea of preferential processing of threat in anxiety.  
Dot Probe Studies 
Attentional bias for pictorial threat in both HTA and LTA participants has also been 
observed across other paradigms such as the dot probe task.   For example, Mogg, 
McNamara, Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer and Bradley (2000) conducted two dot probe 
experiments with a non-clinical sample of participants. In Experiment1, below median and 
above median, trait anxious participants were presented with black and white pictorial stimuli 
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on a tachistoscope, whereas Experiment 2 employed a larger sample of preselected HTA and 
LTA participants, determined on the basis of questionnaire scores. Participants were 
presented with coloured pictorial stimuli on a computer in Experiment 3.  In both 
experiments, participants were presented with severe threat scenes (e.g., mutilated bodies, 
man attacking woman with knife) or mild threat scenes (e.g., soldiers holding a gun, soldiers 
with tanks) paired with neutral scenes (e.g., person playing a piano, healthy baby). One scene 
from each category appeared in the left and one in the right periphery for 500 msec. At the 
offset of the pictures, a dot probe was presented in the space formerly occupied by one of the 
pictures. Participants were required to identify the location (left or right) of the probe as 
quickly and accurately as possible by pressing one of two keys. RTs for identifying the probe 
were recorded by a stop watch.    
Despite the differences in samples and stimuli employed, the results of both 
experiments revealed an effect of stimulus threat value. The findings of Experiment 1 
revealed attentional bias for threat in both LTA and HTA groups, and the vigilance for threat 
increased as the threat value of stimuli increased. In Experiment 2, an additional effect of 
anxiety group was noted, revealing that LTA participants demonstrated attentional avoidance 
of mild threat but vigilance for high threat whereas the HTA participants demonstrated a 
general vigilance for threat and their vigilance increased as level of stimulus threat value 
increased. These findings are in line with others. For example, Koster, Crombez, Verschuere 
and Houwer (2006) also employed a dot probe task with mild and high threat scenes and 
found similar results to those observed in Experiment 2 of Mogg et al. (2000). That is, both 
HTA and LTA participants demonstrated vigilance for threat. The HTA demonstrated more 
vigilance for high compared to mild threat stimuli with overall greater vigilance compared to 
their LTA counterparts, whereas the LTA participants avoided mild threat but demonstrated 
vigilance for high threat stimuli. Thus, findings of both experiments revealed an effect of 
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stimulus threat value on selective attention.  If it is accepted that pictorial stimuli depicting 
threatening scenes carry greater threat value than verbal stimuli (e.g., threatening words) then 
these findings are in accord with the predictions set down by Mogg and Bradley (1998), who 
proposed that as intensity of threat increases, LTA individuals will orient to threat in similar 
ways to HTA individuals.  
In sum, the aforementioned findings suggest that when participants are presented with 
pictures of snakes, spiders and highly threatening scenes, attentional biases to threat are 
observed irrespective of trait anxiety. These findings provide further support for Mogg and 
Bradley’s (1998) theory. Attentional biases to threat in anxiety have also been observed in 
studies employing dot probe tasks with faces as stimuli (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Falla & 
Hamilton, 1998; Mogg, Garner & Bradley, 2007; Pishyar, Harris & Menzies, 2004; Wilson & 
MacLeod, 2003), which are thought to carry special significance for humans (Öhman, 
Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). 
Pishyar et al. (2004) conducted two dot probe experiments with a non-clinical sample 
of high and low socially anxious participants. In Experiment 1, participants were presented 
with positive (e.g., happy) or negative (e.g., disgusted/ judgemental) faces paired with a 
neutral face in a random order with one positioned in the upper portion of the screen and the 
other on the lower portion of the screen. The faces were acquired by taking photographs of 
100 random individuals displaying these expressions. In Experiment 2, participants were 
presented with neutral-neutral, positive-neutral and negative-neutral face pairs. On half of the 
trials the neutral face belonged to the participant.  All face pairs were presented for 500 msec.  
At the offset, a probe (“*”) was presented in the location formerly occupied by one of the 
faces.  The findings of Experiment 1 indicated that the high socially anxious participants 
demonstrated an attentional bias for negative faces and attended away from positive faces 
while the low socially anxious participants demonstrated an attentional bias for positive faces 
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and attended away from negative faces. In Experiment 2, when ecologically relevant faces 
were presented the findings replicated those of Experiment 1. These data provide evidence 
for selective processing of pictorial threat in social anxiety. The findings are also in line with 
those employing HTA samples.  
For example, Bradley et al. (1998) presented HTA and LTA participants with 
photographs of human facial expressions depicting one of three emotions (threat, sad, happy) 
paired with a neutral facial expression on a dot probe task. On each trial participants were 
presented with emotion-neutral face pairs displayed for 500 msec on half the trials and 1500 
msec on the remaining half of the trials.  One face was positioned on the left side of the 
screen while the other was on the right. At the offset of the face pairs, a probe (: or  ...) was 
presented in the location previously occupied by one of the faces.  Participants were 
instructed to manually identify the type of probe by pressing one of two keys as quickly and 
accurately as possible. The probe remained on the screen until the software detected a 
response.  Bradley et al., (1998) found attentional bias for threat in both groups. An 
investigation of the RTs revealed that the HTA participants were more vigilant for threat 
compared to their LTA counterparts as evidenced by faster RTs to identify the probe that 
replaced a threat related face compared to non-threat related faces.   
Attentional biases for threat faces were also observed in a study by Mogg, Garner and 
Bradley (2007) who employed the dot probe task with HTA and LTA participants. The 
stimuli employed were pictures of male and female facial expressions depicting angry, fearful 
and neutral faces.  Each emotional face (angry, fearful) was blended with a neutral face to 
create facial expressions depicting five intensities of that emotion. The intensities varied from 
0%, which reflected a neutral expression, to 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%, depicting the 
corresponding emotion. Across the experimental trials, each intensity of each emotional face 
(angry or fearful) was paired with a neutral face, one presented on the left periphery of a 
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computer screen and the other on the right for 500 msec, and replaced by a probe ( : or ..). 
The participant’s task was to use a button press to classify the probe. The findings indicated 
an attentional bias for the 100% negative face (angry or fearful) in the HTA group but not the 
LTA group.   
Although these findings provide support for selective processing of threat faces as a 
function of trait anxiety, they cannot provide information regarding the relative influence of 
state anxiety in moderating these effects because these studies did not employ a state anxiety 
manipulation. To address this limitation, Wilson and MacLeod (2003) investigated the effect 
of high state anxiety on pictorial threat processing in HTA and LTA individuals.  
Wilson and MacLeod (2003) employed the dot probe task with HTA and LTA 
participants and tested them one week prior to their end of semester exam, when state anxiety 
was elevated, to assess whether higher state anxiety would influence differential processing 
of threat between the groups.  Participants were presented with five possible pairs of neutral-
angry pictures of human faces on the left and right side of a screen for 500 msec. The angry 
faces varied in five intensities (very low anger, low anger, moderate anger, high anger, very 
high anger) and were proportionately presented across the trials and across left vs. right 
screen positions. At the offset of the face pairs, a probe (“/” or “\”) replaced one of the faces. 
Probe presentation was equally distributed on the left and right side of the screen across trials.  
The participant’s task was to identify the slope of the probe as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The results indicated that both HTA and LTA participants directed their attention 
away from faces depicting mild anger but attended toward more intensely angry faces.  The 
data also revealed that trait anxiety was associated with the intensity of threat required to 
produce vigilance toward threat stimuli.  That is, more anger was needed to produce vigilance 
in LTA and less anger to produce vigilance in HTA participants. In sum, if pictorial threat  
(e.g.,  angry faces) carries more threat value than verbal threat (e.g., threat related words) 
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then these findings support the predictions of Mogg and Bradley (1998) in that they suggest 
that as threat value increases LTA individuals will selectively attend to threat in similar ways 
as HTA individuals. Moreover, elevations in state anxiety may have contributed to the 
attentional avoidance of mild threat in the HTA group compared to the vigilance observed in 
previous studies. However, the overall relative influence of state anxiety in distinguishing the 
processing of threat faces between the HTA and LTA participants in unknown because the 
study did not include a low state anxiety condition for comparison. 
Section Summary 
Consistent with the theoretical models of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck 
(2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) the aforementioned findings provide evidence for the 
prediction that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat.  These findings are 
also in line with the more specific predictions proposed by Mogg and Bradley (1998) who 
suggested that as threat intensity increases, LTA individuals will attend to threat in similar 
ways as HTA individuals. However, a limitation of the aforementioned studies is that 
participants were presented with stimuli that they were consciously aware of, therefore these 
findings cannot provide information for the without awareness component of the automaticity 
hypothesis as proposed by the theoretical models described in Chapter 1.  The following 
section will discuss finding from studies that employed backward masking procedures as a 
way of preventing conscious awareness of pictorial stimuli.    
Automaticity - Attentional Bias to Pictorial Threat without Awareness 
Dot Probe Studies 
To assess whether attentional biases for pictorial threat operate prior to conscious 
awareness, Lee and Knight (2009) employed a masked version of the dot probe task with 
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young and older non-clinical samples with low, moderate and high trait anxiety. Participants 
were presented with pairs of angry-neutral, happy-neutral and sad–neutral faces as well as 
high threat–non-threat IAPS pictures (i.e., pictures depicting scenes) and negative-neutral 
word pairs. On the unmasked trials the stimuli were presented for 1500 msec at which point 
they were replaced by a probe, whereas on the masked trials the paired stimuli were presented 
for 20 msec (younger adults) and 50 msec (older adults)  and replaced by a mask for the same 
durations.  At the offset of the mask, a dot probe replaced one of the stimuli. Participants 
were instructed to manually respond to the position of the probe as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The results revealed that younger adults did not display any processing biases and 
across all participants there were no differences in processing the pictures of scenes versus 
words. Irrespective of trait anxiety older adults demonstrated vigilance for masked angry 
faces but avoidance of unmasked angry faces. The findings further indicated that masked 
vigilance and unmasked avoidance for sad faces was associated with moderate anxiety. For 
negative words however, the findings indicated avoidance of masked negative words and 
vigilance for unmasked negative words in the high anxiety groups. In considering the 
theoretical models described in Chapter 1, the vigilance for masked pictorial threat compared 
to the avoidance of masked verbal threat may suggest that faces (especially angry faces) may 
carry a greater threat value than threat words. However, in line with Öhman’s priming 
hypothesis, the difficulty with attributing automatic preconscious processing to threat when 
masked and unmasked trials are intermixed is that it is possible that the presentation of threat 
on unmasked trials may have primed the mechanisms responsible for detecting subliminal 
threat.  
Mogg and Bradley (2002) employed a masked only version of the dot probe task with 
pictorial face stimuli. A non-clinical sample of participants was assigned to a trait anxiety 
group (high trait anxiety vs. low trait anxiety) and a social anxiety group (high social anxiety 
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vs. low social anxiety) on the basis of questionnaire scores. Participants were presented with 
pairs of happy-neutral and threat-neutral faces for 17 msec which were replaced by a mask 
(defragmented neutral face features) for 68 msec. At the offset of the mask, a probe (: or  ...) 
appeared in the location formerly occupied by one of the masks. Participants were instructed 
to manually identify the probe as quickly and accurately as possible.  Awareness checks 
confirmed that participants were unaware of masked stimuli. The results failed to find any 
differential threat processing effects between the HTA and LTA participants. The data for the 
socially anxious participants revealed that high socially anxious participants were faster at 
detecting probes that replaced masked threat faces compared to masked neutral faces, 
whereas the low socially anxious participants took longer to respond to probes that replaced 
masked threat relative to neutral faces. The differential findings between the trait anxious and 
socially anxious participants may suggest that socially anxious individuals may have a lower 
perceptual threshold for masked threat faces. Alternatively, the non-significant finding in the 
trait anxious participants could be attributed to the lack of state anxiety manipulation, which 
has been associated with masked threat processing effects for verbal stimuli and is central to 
the theoretical models of Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001).  
To investigate whether attentional biases for pictorial threat operate prior to conscious 
awareness, Mogg and Bradley (1999a) conducted two masked versions of the dot probe task 
(Experiment 1 and Experiment 3) by presenting HTA and LTA participants with masked and 
unmasked picture pairs of angry-neutral, happy-neutral human faces. To control for possible 
priming effects, masked trials were always presented before the unmasked trials. All face 
pairs were presented briefly for 14 msec and at the offset they were replaced by a mask 
consisting of a face with randomly re-assembled facial images. Awareness checks were 
conducted by way of forced choice discrimination task (male face vs. female face). In 
Experiment 1, despite being unaware of the set of masked stimuli, participants, irrespective of 
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trait anxiety, were faster at detecting probes that replaced threatening faces relative to neutral 
and happy faces. In Experiment 3, similar findings emerged. However, selective attention to 
threat was greater in the HTA relative to the LTA participants. According to Mogg and 
Bradley, the differing results between Experiments 1 and 3 could be attributed to procedural 
differences. That is, in Experiment 1, a dot probe location task was employed, whereas 
Experiment 3 employed a probe classification task. Mogg and Bradley further noted that the 
LTA compared to the HTA group reported higher levels of state anxiety in Experiment 1 that 
were not evident in Experiment 3. Elevations in state anxiety in the LTA group in Experiment 
1 could be the moderating factor responsible for eliciting similar masked threat processing 
patterns as those evidenced in the HTA group. 
In summary  the data from Mogg and Bradley (1999a) and Lee and Knight (2009) 
provide evidence to suggest that without conscious awareness both HTA and LTA as well as  
high socially anxious but not  low socially anxious individuals display attentional bias toward 
masked threat faces. However, the findings of Mogg and Bradley’s (1999a) study, 
particularly in relation to the LTA participants, should be interpreted with caution because it 
is unclear whether state or trait anxiety moderated the attentional biases for masked threat 
faces. Nonetheless, these findings provide support for the without awareness component of 
the automaticity hypothesis proposed by all theoretical models described in Chapter 1.  In 
assessing attentional biases to pictorial threat all of the aforementioned studies employed the 
visual search and dot probe tasks.   Despite the effectiveness of these tasks to provide 
measures of attentional allocation (see Chapter 2) these experimental paradigms do not assess 
any disruptions in task performance because individuals may allocate attentional resources 
toward threat stimuli before they are required to respond to the location or to classify the 
probe, or to detect a target among distractors.  Further, because these tasks do not allow for 
assessment of competition for attention, they cannot provide an evaluation for the ‘without 
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volition’ component of automaticity which is central to all models described in Chapter 1. 
The following section will discuss findings from studies employing the emotional Stroop 
colour naming task, which is capable of a assessing for both components of the automaticity 
hypothesis.  
Automaticity - Attentional Bias to Pictorial Threat without Volition 
At this time, only four studies with adult samples could be found that employed the 
emotional Stroop interference task to assess for the involuntary nature of selective attention 
for pictorial threat in non-clinical anxiety, and only two are capable of providing information 
regarding the without awareness component of selective attention for pictorial threat. Avram, 
Balteş, Miclea and Miu (2010) employed a variant of the emotional Stroop colour naming 
task with extremely high and extremely low trait anxious (TA) individuals. Allocation to trait 
anxiety group was done on the basis of a Romanian version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Pitariu & Paleasa, 2007; Spielberger, 1983).  HTA and LTA participants were 
presented with Ekman pictures (Ekman & Friesen 1976) of human faces depicting happy, 
neutral or fearful expressions overlaid with a word (“happy”, “calm” or “fear”). Stimuli were 
either congruent (e.g., fear face overlaid by the word “fear”) or incongruent (e.g. happy face 
overlaid by the word “fear”).  Contrary to the traditional emotional Stroop task where 
participants are required to name the colour of the stimulus, in the Avram et al. experiment 
the participant’s task was to identify the emotion of the face while ignoring the semantic 
content of the word that overlaid the face as quickly and accurately as possible. In line with 
Williams, Mathews and MacLeod (1996) attentional bias scores were calculated for 
congruent and incongruent conditions by subtracting the mean RT for identifying neutral 
faces from mean RT for classifying fearful faces (aversive bias) and happy faces (appetitive 
bias). Positive RTs reflected threat facilitation whereas negative RTs reflected threat 
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interference.  The findings revealed that HTA relative to LTA participants demonstrated a 
facilitated attentional bias to fearful faces relative to happy faces. That is, HTA relative to 
LTA participants were faster to identify the fearful faces compared to the happy faces despite 
the presence of valence congruent and incongruent distracting information. These findings 
therefore suggest that anxiety is characterized by a facilitated attentional bias to fearful 
stimuli.  
In a similar experiment, Robson, Letkiewicz, Overstreet, Ernst and Grillon (2011) 
investigated the extent to which state anxiety moderated selective processing of threat in a 
non-selected sample of participants. Robson et al. (2011) employed a variant of the Stroop 
colour naming interference task.  In this task, participants were presented with Ekman 
pictures of human faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) depicting a happy or fearful expression 
overlaid with a word (“happy”/”fear”). Stimuli were either congruent (e.g., fear face overlaid 
by the word “fear”) or incongruent (e.g., happy face overlaid by the word “fear”).  On half of 
the trials participants performed under the threat of shock versus under shock safe conditions 
for the remaining trials.  Shock intensity was individually determined prior to the experiment 
to a level that was uncomfortable but not painful. The procedure consisted of a 1000 msec 
presentation of the stimuli followed by a 3000-5000 msec (mean of 4000 msec) ‘jitter’ of the 
stimuli  and replaced by a fixation cross. Participants were instructed to read the word that 
overlaid the face while ignoring the expression of the face.  Averaged over the congruent and 
incongruent conditions, the findings of this study revealed attentional bias toward threat faces 
in the shock threat condition.  That is, despite instructions to ignore the face, participants took 
longer to read a word that overlaid a threat related face compared to a neutral face when 
performing under the threat of shock. These findings suggest that the presence of threat faces 
interfere with the central task (word reading).  
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The findings of both studies revealed increased attentional bias in processing of threat 
faces relative to non-threat faces (Avram et al., 2010; Robson et al., 2011) as a function of 
increased anxiety. These findings suggest that the involuntary nature of selective processing 
of pictorial and verbal threat is moderated by anxiety. However, these data do not indicate 
how state and trait anxiety might interact to moderate these effects. Robson et al. (2011) did 
attribute the increase in state arousal (e.g., shock threat condition) as a partial representation 
of anxiety levels in those with GAD and panic disorder.   
In sum, these findings suggest that both state and trait anxiety moderate the selective 
attention for threat faces. Avram et al. (2010) found that HTA relative to LTA individuals 
selectively attended to threat faces relative to non-threat faces but they did not investigate the 
role of state anxiety in moderating these effects. Alternatively, Robson et al. (2011) 
manipulated state anxiety and found that selective attention for threat faces relative to non-
threat faces was noted in the high state anxious group relative to the low state anxiety group. 
However, Robson et al. could not provide any information regarding the influence of trait 
anxiety in moderating these effects. Further, despite the opposite task demands (e.g., name 
face vs. read word) the HTA or high state anxious participants’ attention was captured by the 
threat related face not the threat related words. These findings suggest that faces may carry 
more threat value than words, and an increase in either state or trait anxiety can elicit 
attentional bias for threat faces.  However, a limitation of the aforementioned studies is that 
they cannot assess for the ‘without awareness’ component of the automaticity hypothesis 
because all stimuli were presented within conscious awareness. Therefore, the following 
section will discuss studies that have employed masked faces on the emotional Stroop task. 
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Automaticity - Attentional Bias to Pictorial Threat without Volition and Awareness 
The pre-attentive processing of threat was investigated by van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, 
van den Hout and Stam (2001) who employed the emotional Stroop colour naming task with 
HTA and LTA participants by presenting them with masked and unmasked Ekman faces 
(Ekman & Friesen 1976) displaying neutral and threatening facial expressions in red, green, 
blue and yellow colouring. All masks consisted of faces with reassembled facial features 
which were presented in the same colour as the preceding face. The SOA between the target 
and the mask was 30 msec for all participants. An affective discrimination task (i.e. neutral 
vs. emotional expression) was used as an awareness check to ensure that masking procedures 
were effective in preventing awareness of stimuli. The participant’s task was to name the 
colour of the face as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the emotive content of 
the stimulus. The RT data failed to produce any significant evidence for selective attention to 
threat for either exposure mode or trait anxiety group. These finding are at odds with studies 
that found selective processing of threat on unmasked (Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 
1999; Bradley et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2006; Lee & Knight, 2009; Mogg et al., 2000; Mogg 
et al., 2007; Waters et al., 2004; Waters et al., 2008; Wilson & MacLeod, 2006) and masked 
trials (Bradley et al., 2004; Lee & Knight, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 1999a).  
Similar findings were obtained by Putman, Hermans and van Honk (2004) who also 
employed the emotional Stroop colour naming task with a non-selected sample of 
participants.  In their study, happy, angry and neutral faces were presented in various 
colouring (red, blue, yellow). Ekman faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) were employed for the 
happy and angry faces while the neutral faces were derived from Lundqvist, Flykt and 
Öhman (1998).  Participants received either masked (25 msec) trials first followed by 
unmasked trials or the reverse order.  Forced choice awareness checks (identify face as 
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happy, neutral or angry) were conducted to ensure that masking procedures were effective in 
preventing awareness of stimuli. The results also failed to reveal any significant selective 
processing of threat faces as a function of trait anxiety in either exposure mode.  The findings 
did reveal selective processing for masked angry faces compared to the masked neutral faces 
as a function of social anxiety.  
In summary, the findings of van Honk et al. (2001) and Putman et al., (2004) failed to 
provide evidence for selective processing of pictorial threat in trait anxious individuals.  
However, the findings of Putman et al. (2004) did reveal masked threat processing effects in 
the socially anxious group. Taking into consideration that these findings were observed 
irrespective of whether masked trials or unmasked trials were presented first, it may be that 
socially anxious participants do not rely on priming to elicit involuntary attentional bias for 
pictorial threat. These findings are at odds with Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis which 
suggests that priming is a precursor for eliciting selective processing of threat outside of 
conscious awareness.  
When taken together, these data provide conflicting support for the central predictions 
made by the models of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and  Öhman and 
Mineka (2001) who proposed that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat and 
this bias is automatic in that is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness. Of 
significance, the aforementioned studies were problematic for providing support for the 
without awareness component of the automaticity hypothesis due to a number of 
methodological limitations. First, von Honk et al. (2001) and Putman et al. (2004) employed 
backward masking procedures with HTA and LTA participants but they failed to produce any 
significant differences in processing of threat faces on both the masked and unmasked trials. 
These findings were surprising given that other studies employing the emotional Stroop task 
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have found vigilance for pictorial threat on unmasked trials as a function of trait anxiety 
(Avram et al., 2010) and state anxiety (Robson et al., 2011). Others have employed dot probe 
tasks and found vigilance for pictorial threat in non-anxious controls, and non-clinical trait 
anxious participants, on unmasked ( Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 1999; Koster et al., 
2006; Lee & Knight, 2009; Mogg et al., 2000; Mogg et al., 2007; Waters et al., 2004; Waters 
et al., 2008; Wilson & MacLeod, 2006) and masked trials (Bradley et al., 2004; Lee & 
Knight, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 1999a).  The findings from Putman et al. (2004) and Mogg 
and Bradley (2002) do provide some evidence of preconscious processing of pictorial threat 
in nonclinical socially anxious individuals and evidence against Öhmans’(1993) priming 
hypothesis.   
A number of methodological limitations with von Honk et al. (2001) and Putman et 
al. (2004) could have contributed to the discrepant findings.  The failure to find unmasked 
stimulus effects in both van Honk et al. (2001) and Putman et al.’s (2004) studies, in 
comparison to the selective processing of threat faces that were observed in Avram et al. 
(2010) as a function of extremely high trait anxiety, and in Robson et al. (2011) as a function 
of increased state anxiety, could be a result of the different stimuli used and differences in 
task demands employed.  Both Van Honk et al. and Putman et al. employed pictures of faces 
in various colours with the task being to identify the colour of the faces, whereas Avram et al. 
and Robson et al. employed pictures of faces overlaid with emotionally toned words with the 
task being to either identify the facial expression or to read the word. Perhaps when 
emotional words are presented with emotional faces such stimuli can activate increased 
arousal compared to when faces are simply presented in various colours. It could also be that 
if word reading and identifying a face are considered to be more complex tasks than 
identifying a colour, then the complexity of task could have contributed to an increase in 
arousal, making the outcomes in line with Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) theory which places 
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more emphasis on state anxiety than trait anxiety in moderating attentional biases to threat in 
anxiety. Given that state anxiety was not manipulated or even assessed in any of the studies 
with the exception of Robson et al. (2011), who found an effect of state anxiety, that 
possibility cannot be discounted. 
 Previous studies employing the emotional Stroop task with words (e.g., MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 1992)  and dot probe studies employing pictorial stimuli (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 
1999a; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) found that elevated levels of state anxiety may be 
necessary for  producing selective effects for threat processing. If the involuntary nature of 
attentional biases to threat faces is moderated by state anxiety then this could be a possible 
explanation for the lack of significant threat processing biases in the studies of van Honk et 
al. (2001) and Putman et al. (2004). Because they did not interpret their results on the basis of 
state anxiety, it is possible that their samples were characterized by lower state anxiety. 
Alternatively, as Avram et al. (2010) only found significant effects in their extremely high 
trait anxious sample, it could be possible that Avram et al., (2010) employed a sample 
characterized by higher state anxiety. Therefore, if selective processing of threat faces is a 
function of elevated state anxiety then this would provide support for Öhman and Mineka’s 
(2001), and partial support for Mogg and Bradley’s (1998), theoretical perspectives. Both 
theoretical models predict that elevated state anxiety moderates selective processing of threat 
in trait anxious individuals.  
Second, both studies implemented considerably long SOA of 30 msec and 25 msec on 
masked exposure trials. Experiments with shorter SOA have demonstrated selective attention 
for masked face stimuli (e.g., 14 msec, Harvey et al., 1996; 20 msec, MacLeod & Rutherford, 
1992; 14 msec & 17 msec, Mogg & Bradley, 1999a, Experiment 1 & Experiment 3, 
respectively; 14 msec, Mogg et al., 1993).  Interestingly, some findings suggest that pre-
conscious effects become less evident when stimuli are presented closer to awareness 
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threshold levels (Mogg & Bradley, 1999a). As such, the longer SOA employed by van Honk 
et al. (2001) and Putman et al. (2004) could have impeded any selective processing effects for 
masked pictorial threat stimuli. However, it should be noted that Lee and Knight (2009) 
employed 50 msec SOAs with older adults and found masked effects. 
On the emotional Stroop task van Honk et al. (2001) and Putman et al. (2004) did not 
find differential processing effects as a function of trait anxiety. However, Putman et al. 
(2004) did find attentional biases for masked threat faces compared to neutral faces in a non-
clinical socially anxious group. It could be the case that the involuntary nature of selective 
attention for subliminally presented faces is unique to social anxiety. Similarly, on the dot 
probe task, Mogg and Bradley (2002) also found selective processing of masked threat faces 
in their non-clinical socially anxious sample but not in their trait anxious sample. Perhaps 
socially anxious individuals are more sensitive to detecting threatening faces because facial 
features are a vital social signal (Öhman, 1986). Furthermore, perhaps the samples employed 
on the dot probe task by others (e.g., Bradley et al., 2004; Lee & Knight, 2009; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999a) who have found selective processing of masked threat faces had high social 
anxiety in addition to trait anxiety. This would be consistent with the notion that vigilance for 
emotional facial expressions played a critical role in the biological evolution of humans 
(Dimberg & Öhman, 1996) and the emotionally toned facial features may be prototypes of 
biologically prepared stimuli (Lundqvist, Esteves & Öhman, 1999).  However, given that 
only two studies could be found that have investigated involuntary and without awareness 
components of automaticity with pictorial stimuli while controlling for priming with trait 
anxious participants, the discrepancies between studies might  be explained by the previously 
mentioned limitations.  
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 Lastly, attentional biases for faces may be identified on more ecologically valid tasks, 
like the dot probe task. That is, although the emotional Stroop task has been a widely used 
paradigm for the purpose of investigating attentional patterns in anxiety (see Chapter 2), it is 
ecologically unlikely that a person will be required to ignore a threat stimulus when looking 
directly at it.  However, a limitation of the dot probe task is that is it not capable of 
investigating the involuntary nature of automaticity. Alternatively, the Flanker task corrects 
for this limitation by spatially separating the to-be-attended to and the to-be-ignored stimuli 
(see Chapter 2) while still being capable of assessing for the involuntary nature of 
automaticity.  
Summary – Pictorial Stimuli 
The aforementioned findings provide mixed support for the models described in 
Chapter 1. Although there is compelling evidence in support of the selective processing of 
pictorial threat as a function of anxiety, it is unclear whether these processes are in fact 
automatic in that they are involuntary and occur outside of conscious awareness. It is also 
unclear whether these biases to selectively process pictorial threat are moderated by trait or 
state anxiety. The findings are also mixed for Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis.  Given the 
limited number of studies that have employed stringent criteria to assess for these variables, 
research capable of employing such control is warranted.  
Further, the theoretical perspectives described in Chapter 1 have been devised on the 
basis of empirical studies that have employed methodologies that do not allow for a rigorous 
investigation of the mechanisms involved in the automaticity of threat appraisal.  For 
example, these models propose that attentional bias to threat is automatic in that it is 
involuntary and occurs outside of awareness; however, the pool of research that forms the 
basis of this work has not controlled for the possibility that participants may have been 
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primed for threat on masked trials when presented with an intermixed sequence of masked 
and unmasked trials. Therefore, if this is the case, attentional biases may not be completely 
automatic, but may rely on priming or some level of awareness to produce these effects.  
Further, these theories are largely based on methodologies that do not allow for an 
investigation of the volition component of automaticity.  Based on these gaps in empirical 
literature the following series of studies employed tight procedural controls focusing mainly 
on the automaticity of attentional biases to threat in anxiety.  
Introduction to the Research Program 
The objectives of the thesis were to employ interference paradigms to provide a 
systematic investigation of attentive and preattentive allocation for spatially integrated verbal 
threat (e.g., threat words) in clinically anxious and non-clinical HTA and LTA individuals on 
an emotional Stroop colour naming task with an emphasis on the role of priming in 
moderating preattentive processing of verbal threat.  Although there is considerable literature 
investigating selective processing for verbal threat in both clinical and non-clinically anxious 
samples, to date, no known study has employed interference paradigms with non-clinically 
anxious participants and included a clinical sample for comparison. Therefore, the current 
research programme includes one such study. The present investigation also extends to 
attentive and preattentive allocation of more ecologically valid, spatially integrated 
(emotional Stroop colour naming task) and spatially separated (Flanker task) threat stimuli 
(i.e., faces) in non-clinical HTA and LTA individuals with an emphasis on investigating the 
role of priming in moderating preattentive processing of pictorial threat.  In order to achieve 
this, care was taken to control for a number of potential limitations in the current body of 
research literature. 
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Task Demands 
The series of studies employed in the current thesis were restricted to interference 
paradigms. Interference paradigms were chosen because they are capable of assessing both 
the involuntary and without awareness components of automaticity in the selective 
processing of threat in anxiety. In studies 1, 2.1 and 2.2, an emotional Stroop colour naming 
task was employed, whereas the Flanker task was employed in studies 3.1 and 3.2.  The 
differential component of these two tasks is that while the emotional Stroop colour naming 
task presents the to-be-attended-to (colours) and the-to-be-ignored (faces) stimuli as an 
integration of two features into the same stimulus, the Flanker task spatially separates the to-
be-attended-to stimuli (probes) and the-to-be-ignored stimuli (faces). Because these stimuli 
are presented simultaneously and participants are asked to attend to one stimulus while 
ignoring the other, the structure of the task creates competition for attention and therefore is 
appropriated for assessing the involuntary component of automaticity. 
Stimuli 
Study 1 employed words as stimuli that varied in valence such that half the words 
were threat related and half were non-threat related control words, matched for average 
length and frequency. Masks for use in Study 1 consisted of a random string of upper case 
letters matched on average length.  Studies 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 employed schematic 
representations of happy, neutral and angry facial expressions.  Masks for use in pictorial 
studies consisted of a facial shape with a random application of facial features from all three 
valence groups displaced within the outline of the face. In studies 1, 2.1 and 2.2 employing 
the emotional Stroop colour naming task, words, faces and masks were presented in one of 
four colours (red, green blue or yellow). 
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Stimulus Exposure  
 To assess the hypothesis that selective processing of threat occurs outside of 
conscious awareness, in each study half of the stimuli were presented masked and half 
unmasked. In Study 2.2 and 3.2 the masked and unmasked stimuli were presented in an 
intermixed sequence. To assess the hypothesis that priming is needed to activate selective 
processing of threat on masked trials, Studies 1, 2.1 and 3.1 blocked on exposure by 
presenting half the participants with two blocks of masked trials first followed by two blocks 
of unmasked trials, while the other half of participants received the opposite order. On 
blocked studies (Studies 2.1 and 3.1 not including Study 1), in line with previous literature, 
the SOA was pre-determined at 15 msec to prevent the possibility of SOA priming responses 
on experimental trials. Previous studies have shown that short SOAs have demonstrated 
selective attention for masked face stimuli (e.g., 14 msec, Harvey et al. 1996; 20 msec, 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; 14 msec & 17 msec, Mogg & Bradley, 1999a, Experiment 1 
& Experiment 3, respectively; 14 msec, Mogg et al., 1993). To assess awareness, participants 
underwent an awareness check procedure which was implemented to exclude any participants 
who may have been aware of masked content throughout the experiment. In Study 1, 
awareness was assessed by way of a lexical decision task (word/non-word). For the 
remainder of the studies incorporating schematic faces as stimuli (Studies 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 
3.2) the awareness check procedure was an equivalent face/non-face discrimination task.  
Anxiety Groups 
 Clinically anxious participant were employed in Study 1. They were referred by 
various medical practices and had a current diagnosis of an anxiety related disorder, mainly 
GAD. The non-clinically anxious group employed across all studies included high trait 
anxious (HTA) and low trait anxious (LTA) participants.   Allocation to a trait anxiety group 
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was made on the basis of questionnaire scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait 
measure (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg & Jacobs, 1983).  Chapter 3 describes the psychometric properties of the STAI-T and 
trait anxiety group assignment criteria. In non-clinically anxious participants, state anxiety 
was manipulated through the threat of electric shock. This technique was chosen because it 
reflects a current stressor and has been shown to be an effective technique for altering current 
mood states (see Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2006, 2010a, 2010b).  
Initial Screening Criteria 
To adhere to the requirement of task demands, only participants who reported normal 
or corrected to normal vision, normal colour vision and English as their primary language 
(Study 1 only) were included in the series of experiments. Also, for ethical reasons, only 
those who reported no cardiac conditions, were aged between 18 and 65 years and reported 
within criterion on depression scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961, Study 1) and the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale 
(DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995, Study 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2) participated in the 
experimental phase of the series of studies. Further, only those who reported low social 
desirability on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Marlowe & Crown, 
1960; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) were included in the series of experiments. The inclusion and 
exclusion criteria and psychometric properties of all relevant measures will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
There is evidence to suggest that HTA individuals demonstrate an involuntary 
selective processing of masked threat.  However, a number of studies have failed to report 
such effects (e.g., van Honk et al. 2001; Putman et al. 2004). Although the reasons for the 
discordant findings are unknown, it is possible that person variables such as high levels of 
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depression and social desirability may be a moderating variable for these differential 
findings. For example, Bradley, Mogg, Miller and White (1995) employed the emotional 
Stroop colour naming task with a sample of GAD, mixed GAD and depression disordered 
(DEP) and non-anxious participants with masked and unmasked depression related and 
anxiety related words. The findings indicated that GAD participants relative to non-anxious 
controls demonstrated an attentional bias to masked and unmasked threat related words 
relative to non-threat related words. However, on masked trials, the GAD group relative to 
the mixed GAD/DEP group demonstrated an attentional bias for threat words relative to 
neutral words. Given the discrepant processing of threat words between the GAD and mixed 
GAD/DEP participants, it is plausible that depression masked the processing of subliminal 
threat information in the latter group. Given this possibility and the high comorbidity between 
anxiety and depression (Hirschfeld, 2001) in the community, the current series of studies 
controlled for depression scores. The inclusion of the social desirability screen in the current 
series of studies was deemed important because it has been suggested that low trait anxious 
participants who report high social desirability demonstrate similar selective threat processing 
patterns to highly anxious individuals (e.g, Dawkins & Furnham, 1989).  
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter evidence for attentional biases to verbal and pictorial threat in clinical 
and non-clinical anxiety was reviewed and critically evaluated. The main focus was to 
evaluate evidence for the automatic nature of threat processing; that is, the extent to which 
attentional biases to verbal and pictorial threat are involuntary and occur outside of conscious 
awareness with a particular focus on the role of priming. The influences of state and trait 
anxiety in moderating these effects was also reviewed. Based on this review a number of 
methodological limitations that contribute to interpretational difficulties were identified. The 
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chapter concluded with a proposed research programme tailored at addressing some of the 
limitations of previous work. Details on the general methodology employed throughout the 
series of studies are described in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
General Methodology 
Participants 
After meeting all screening criteria, data from 544 participants from Bond University 
and the wider Gold Coast community were included in the final analyses across five studies.  
As an incentive to participate, students received a credit point toward an introductory 
psychology class, community members received $ 25 AUD for participating and clinical 
participants were entered into a draw to win a $ 100 AUD gift voucher. All participants were 
tested individually on all measures and experimental tasks in a computer laboratory.  Testing 
time was between 45- 50 minutes for each participant.  Upon arrival to the laboratory, all 
participants completed a voluntary informed consent form. Participant eligibility screening 
criteria were reviewed with each participant 
 Screening for eligibility was structured on three levels.  Participants were invited to 
participate if they reported being between 18 and 65 years of age, English was the first 
language they learned as a child, they had normal or corrected to normal vision and normal 
colour vision, and if they had no history of a cardiac condition. Participants with cardiac 
dysfunction were excluded at the request of the local ethics committed given the exposure to 
shock implemented in the proposed series of studies.  Information about participants who 
were excluded on the basis of these criteria is described under the ‘Participants’ section in 
each empirical chapter (i.e., Chapters 4, 5 and 6).  Participants who met the initial screening 
criteria completed a series of questionnaires (see below) and the experimental tasks.  
Following previous work (i.e., Edwards, 2014), a number of participants whose scores on the 
questionnaires or performance on the tasks exceeded criteria were excluded. Exclusion details 
for those participants are described in the relevant chapters.  
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Facilities and Apparatus 
Facilities  
All testing and data collection was carried out in the Cognitive Psychology Lab 
housed in the School of Psychology at Bond University. 
Apparatus  
Experimental hardware. All word, face, digit and shape stimuli were presented on a 
Dell OptiPlex GX520 Pentium 4 computer running at 866 MHz, using a Video Stimulus 
Generator video card (VSG; 2-3 issue 4a) capable of refresh rates up to 500 Hz (2 msec) and 
a Hitachi Superscan 813 21-inch colour monitor with a vertical refresh rate of 200 Hz (5 
msec).  Responses on the threshold setting trials, awareness check trials and distracter tasks 
were done on a keyboard that was attached to the computer. This keyboard contained clearly 
labelled buttons for WORD, FACE and ODD digit (left arrow) and NON – WORD, NON-
FACE and EVEN digit (right arrow) stimuli. Details on word/non word trials are provided in 
Study 1 (Chapter 4). For details on face/non-face trials see Study 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 
(Chapters 5 & 6) and for details on Odd/Even trials see Study 3.1 and 3.2 (Chapter 6).  For 
collecting colour and probe response latencies, participants wore a headset microphone that 
was connected to the computer.  
 Experimental software. Purpose written experimental software controlled the 
presentation of stimuli on the SOA threshold setting trials, awareness check trials, practice 
trials and experimental trials. The software recorded colour naming reaction times, errors and 
microphone failures.  
 Electric hardware. A 200 msec electric shock was delivered by a Grass SD9 (0-90V) 
stimulator to the volar surface of the participant’s left arm through a 35 mm diameter 
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concentric stainless steel electrode which was secured by a velcro cloth strap. A sponge 
soaked in saline was secured on the electrode and used for the electrode to skin contact. The 
shock intensity varied from 0 volts to 90 volts and was set individually for each participant to 
a level that was uncomfortable but not painful.  
Stimulus Materials 
Word Stimuli  
The word stimuli used in Study 1 were derived from Edwards, Burt and Lipp (2006).  
However, no differentiation on the basis of threat specificity was made in the current 
experiment. Word stimuli were divided into two groups consisting of 80 threat related and 80 
neutral words matched for average length (M = 6.63 and M = 6.56 letters, respectively) and 
frequency of use (M = 21.81 and M = 22.23, respectively; both F < 1, ns).  The frequency 
counts were derived from the British National Corpus of approximately 89 million words 
(BNC; Kilgarriff, 1998).  For counterbalancing purposes, the threat related and neutral words 
were divided into two 80 words lists (A and B), and each list contained 40 threat related 
words and 40 control words matched for average length and frequency. Each word stimulus 
was presented in one of four colours (red, green, blue or yellow). Table 3.1 shows the word 
sets used in the colour naming trials.  
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Table 3.1 
Stimulus Words with Frequencies in Parentheses applied to Study 1 
Set A Set B 
Threat  Matched Controls  Threat  Matched Controls 
Burn (1559)  Fence (1502)  Burnt (1100)  Cups (1173) 
Cable (1863)  Bench (1869)  Charge (9528)  Glass (9369) 
Charred (185)  Ottoman (328)  Circuit (2552)  Ceiling (2184) 
Current (13599)  Computer (12964)  Danger (5709)  Coffee (5724) 
Electrical (2136)  Newspapers (3332)  Electricity (3476)  Comfortable (3718) 
Electrify (14)  Bedspread (62)  Electrocute (0)  Furnishings (404) 
Electrode (122)  Appliance (157)  Fear (8689)  Step (8313) 
Frightened (2408)  Photograph (2462)  Generator (401)  Cupboards (442) 
Hazard (829)  Illness (3118)  Hurt (4145)  Desk (4209) 
Intense (2303)  Crystal (2062)  Lethal (626)  Fridge (652) 
Lightening (480)  Typewriter (416)  Pain (6928)  Chair (6969) 
Painful (1823)  Washing (2070)  Polarity (116)  Crockery (121) 
Scar (411)  Taps (434)  Shocking (534)  Dwelling (538) 
Shocks (346)  Saucer (308)  Singed (45)  Laundry (52) 
Sparks (418)  Sponge (419)  Spasm (184)  Eaves (183) 
Sting (552)  Towel (794)  Stinging (504)  Cushion (435) 
Voltage (837)  Basement (792)  Volt (97)  Hinge (194) 
Wires (656)  Bowls (639)  Watts (450)  Apron (453) 
Wound (2062)  Cloth (1823)  Wiring (364)  Trough (305) 
Zapped (20)  Soaped (15)  Unpleasant (1255)  Apartment (1272) 
Abuse (3389)  Sugar (3365)  Amputate (11)  Latticework (13) 
Cancer (4023)  Bottle (3634)  Coffin (1317)  Carpet (2088) 
Dead (11643)  Wall (11180)  Deceit (205)  Blinds (269) 
Diseased (178)  Linoleum (117)  Disgraced (178)  Brickwork (266) 
Dumb (667)  Rack (696)  Embarrass (195)  Wardrobes (113) 
Evil (2745)  Beds (2038)  Fail (3238)  Bath (3318) 
Grief (1315)  Suite (1322)  Hate (2390)  Keys (2095) 
Hateful (105)  Archway (190)  Humiliate (112)  Fireplace (689) 
Illness (3118)  Bedroom (3674)  Inadequate (2263)  Furniture (3204) 
Incompetent (350)  Mantelpiece (298)  Infection  (2654)  Doorway (1619) 
Kill (4375)  Iron (4375)  Lacking (1479)  Blanket (1061) 
Lonely (1696)  Garage (1603)  Massacre (621)  Spacious (653) 
Murder (5781)  Cabinet (6347)  Mutilation (92)  Dishwasher (170) 
Pathetic (625)  Lavatory (549)  Peril (289)  Settee (244) 
Punishment (2211)  Decoration (914)  Sadness (754)  Shelves (1115) 
Satan (375)  Stair (339)  Snake (718)  Spoon (706) 
Stupid (2439)  Sheets (2127)  Starve (247)  Opener (263) 
Tumour (879)  Bucket (848)  Torture (863)  Curtain (1297) 
Violence (5350)  Pictures (5057)  Ugly (1252)  Hook (1303) 
Worry (4516)  Doors (4383)  Spider (1272)  Pillow (666) 
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SOA threshold trials presented  a set of 200 neutral English words, matched for 
average length and frequency with those used in the colour naming trials, in lowercase letter 
strings; in addition 200 non-words in English were presented consisting of a random sting of 
upper case letters.  Each word/non-word was in the range of 4 to 11 characters matched for 
average length within and between threshold setting blocks.  Forty word/non-word stimuli 
from the SOA threshold setting trials were used in the final awareness check trials. 
The practice trials used a set of 40 neutral words also matched for length and 
frequency with those stimuli used in the experimental trials.  All word and non-word stimuli 
were presented in characters approximately 1cm high.    
Face Stimuli 
All schematic representations of face, non-face and mask stimuli used in the SOA 
setting trials (Study 2.2 and 3.2 only), colour naming trials and final awareness check trials 
were developed in accordance with those used in the visual search paradigm by Öhman, 
Lundqvist and Esteves (2001). The face stimuli (happy, neutral and threat) are shown in 
Figure 3.1.  These stimuli were created using a 3 pixel line on a standard computerized paint 
program.  An oval approximately 60 mm high X 50 mm wide was created to represent the 
outline of the face. Two ears were drawn and positioned to each side of the face.  To create 
the happy face, two eyebrows slanted upwards in the centre, two semi-circle eyes, one 
triangle nose and one bottom curved mouth were drawn inside the face.   To ensure that the 
faces matched on features, the threat faces was created from the features of the happy face, 
specifically, by inverting the mouth and the eyes and by switching the left and right eyebrows 
so to slant down in the middle.  When designing the neutral face, the face outline, the triangle 
nose and the two ears were used as in the happy and threat faces, however, the eyebrows 
were replaced by two horizontal lines above the eyes (rather than two slanted lines), the eyes 
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were replaced with two horizontal ovals (rather than two semicircles) and the mouth was 
again a horizontal line (rather than a curved line).  All stimuli were matched for line thickness 
(3 pixels) and luminance.   
 
Figure 3.1.  Stimuli of happy, neutral and threat schematic faces used is the colour naming 
trials, probe classification trials, SOA setting trials and the final awareness check trials in 
Study 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2.  
Three scrambled faces (non-faces) were developed and used in the SOA setting trials 
and the final awareness check trials and are shown in Figure 3.2.  Each scrambled face 
consisted of randomly re-positioned features of the happy, neutral and threat faces.  In 
creating these scrambled faces, the same head outline and ear placement were used as with 
the faces.  The scrambled faces differed in the placement of features within the face outline.  
Specifically, the mouth was placed in the area formerly occupied by the eyebrows, the 
eyebrows in the area formerly occupied by the eyes, the eyes in the area formerly occupied 
by the nose and the nose in the area formerly occupied by the mouth.  
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Figure 3.2.  Three scrambled faces used in the SOA setting trials and in the final awareness 
check trials in Study 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2  
Four masks were developed to use in the SOA threshold setting trials, colour naming 
trials and final awareness check trials, and are shown below in Figure 3.3. The masks used a 
proportionate number of features from each face valence (happy, neutral & threat).  The 
masks used the same outline of the face and the same ear position as with the faces and non-
faces.  To reduce the likelihood of the subliminal content from penetrating through the mask, 
complex arrangements of features were developed.  Specifically, each mask contained three 
eyebrows, five eyes, three noses and three mouths, which were randomly positioned within 
the head. 
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Figure 3.3. Four masks used in the SOA setting trials, colour naming trials, probe 
classification trials and final awareness check trials to prevent awareness of subliminal 
stimuli.   
Each stimulus face, non-face and mask was presented in red, green, blue or yellow 
placed against a grey background in Study 2.1 and 2.1. In Study 3.1 and 3.2 face, non-face 
and mask stimuli were presented in black colouring against a grey background.  All faces 
were matched on size, line thickness and colour and were placed in the centre of the grey 
screen.   The details of stimulus counterbalancing are described in the relevant chapters.  
Psychometric Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory  
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 
1961) is a 21 item self-report measure designed to assess severity of depression symptoms in 
adolescence and adults across clinical and non-clinical populations. These items assess 
current (state), affective, somatic, behavioural and cognitive components of depression. 
Specifically, these items assess  attitudes about mood, pessimism, sense of failure, lack of 
satisfaction, guilt feelings, sense of punishment, self-dislike, self-accusations, suicidal 
wishes, crying, irritability, social withdrawal, indecisiveness, distortion of body image, work 
78 
 
inhibition, sleep disturbance, fatigability, loss of appetite, weight loss, somatic 
preoccupations and loss of libido (Beck, Ward, Mandelson Mock & Erbaugh, 1961; Beck & 
Steer,1984). The BDI is also useful in discriminating the symptoms of depression from those 
of clinical and non-clinical anxiety (Weeks & Heinberg, 2005). This measure was included to 
control for the comorbidity of depression, because depression and anxiety often co-occur 
(Hirschfeld, 2001). The BDI is attached as Appendix A.  
Reliability and validity. The BDI is reliable and valid for assessing the severity of 
depressive symptomology in both clinical and non-clinically anxious populations (Beck et al., 
1961; Blumberry, Oliver & McClure, 1978).  This instrument possesses high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93; Beck et al., 1961).   
Scoring and inclusion criteria. Participants respond to the items by choosing the 
response that best described how they were feeling that day, including right at that moment, 
as an index of their current (state) depressive symptomology.  Each item contains 4, 5 or 6 
statements ranging in severity from 0 to 3, where each statement is  assigned a numerical 
value of 0 (e.g., I don’t cry any more than usual), 1 (e.g., I cry more now than I used to), 2 
(e.g., I cry all the time now. I can’t stop it), or 3 (I used to be able to cry, but I can’t cry at all 
even though I want to).  On some items two or three alternative statements are presented and 
labelled “a”, “b” or “c” following the numerical value (e.g., 3a, 3b, 3c) which signifies that 
they are on the same level and thus given the same weight. (Beck et al., 1961). The 
depression severity index range from 0 to 63 and is calculated by summing up all numerical 
responses for all 21 items, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of self-reported 
depression. Scores of 0-9 reflect “minimal” depression, 10-19 “mild” depression, 17-29 
“moderate” depression and 30-63 reflect “severe” depression (Beck et al., 1961; Bumberry et 
al., 1978).  Given that the BDI was only employed in Study 1 with clinically anxious 
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participants, the inclusion criteria allowed for elevated levels of depression to be included as 
a covariate in the final RT data analysis. The BDI was chosen for use in Study 1 because it 
was a consistent measure used across other studies employing the emotional Stroop task with 
verbal stimuli (e.g., Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2006).   
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale  
The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a 
42 item self-report scale, divided into three 14 item subscales used to measure and 
discriminate between depression, anxiety and stress. The items on the depression scale assess 
low mood, motivation and self-esteem (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Parkitny & McAuley 
2010), such as: dysphoria, hopelessness, devaluation of life, self-depreciation, and lack of 
interest/involvement, anhedonia and inertia. Example items include “I couldn’t seem to 
experience any positive feeling at all” and “I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do 
things”.  The items on the Anxiety scale assess physiological arousal, perceived panic and 
fear (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Parkitny & McAuley 2010), such as, autonomic arousal, 
skeletal musculature effects, situational anxiety and subjective experience of anxiety. 
Example items include “I was aware of dryness of my mouth” and “I experienced breathing 
difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the absence of physical 
exertion)”. The final items make up the Stress scale and assess tension and irritability (see 
Parkitny & McAuley, 2010), such as difficulty relaxing, nervous arousal, easily 
upset/agitated, irritable/over-reactive and impatient. Example items include “I found it hard 
to wind down” and “I tend to over react to situations”. The DASS is designed to assess state 
rather than trait characteristics by asking participants to indicate how much each item applied 
to them over the past week.  To reduce the 45-50 minute testing time and to control for 
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possible fatigue effects the 21-Item version of the DASS was employed. The DASS is 
attached as Appendix B. 
Reliability and validity. The DASS is a reliable and valid measure for detecting 
levels of depression, anxiety and stress in clinical and non-clinical populations (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). In a sample of 124 in-patients diagnosed with primary depression, Page, 
Hooke and Morrison (2007) found the DASS to possess high internal consistency for the total 
scale (Cronbach’s  = .97), individual scales (Depression = .96; Anxiety = .92 and; Stress = 
.95) and between scales (Depression-Anxiety = 0.66; Anxiety-Stress = 0.75 and; Depression-
Stress = 0.74). The DASS is effective in discriminating normal from clinical populations with 
concurrent validity coefficients of .87 and .84, respectively (Atkin & Çetin, 2007). 
Cronbach’s internal consistency was reported by Atkin and Çetin, (2007), at .89 for the entire 
scale and item-total correlations ranged from .51 to .75. The test- retest reliability coefficients 
were reported at .99 and split-half reliability coefficients at .96 (Atkin & Çetin, 2007). It was 
considered that this is a valid and reliable measure for the intended purpose. The reliability 
and validity of the DASS extend to the DASS-21 which is deemed to be internally consistent 
with Cronbach’s  = .94 for Depression, .87 for Anxiety and .91 for Stress (Anthony, 
Bieling, Cox, Enns & Swinson, 1998). 
Scoring and inclusion criteria.  Participants indicated on a 4 point scale the degree 
to which the 21 items applied to them over the past week. Of the 21 items of the DASS-21, 
seven made up the Depression scale, seven the Anxiety scale and seven items made up the 
Stress scale.   The anchors for the responses on each scale are: (0) did not apply to me at all; 
(1) applied to me to some degree, or some of the time; (2) applied to me a considerable 
degree, or a good part of time; and (3) applied to me very much, or most of the time. The 
possible range of scores on the seven items of each scale was 0-21, with higher scores 
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representing increased severity of depression, anxiety and stress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995; Parkitny & McAulley, 2010).  On the DASS – 21 the severity index for each scale is 
calculated by summing the 4 point scale responses for all seven items on each scale and 
multiplying the sum by two. On the Depression scale scores of 0-9 represent “Normal” 
depression, 10-13 “Mild” depression, 14-20 “Moderate” depression, 21-27 “Severe” 
depression and 28+ “Extremely Severe” depression.  On the Anxiety scale scores of 0-7 
represent “Normal” anxiety, 8-9 “Mild” anxiety, 10-14 “Moderate” anxiety, 15-19 “Severe” 
anxiety and 20+ “Extremely Severe” anxiety. On the Stress scale scores of 0-14 represent 
“Normal” Stress, 15-18 “Mild” stress, 19-25 “Moderate” stress, 26-33 “Severe” stress and 
34+ “Extremely Severe” stress. To calculate the total score for each scale on the DASS 21, 
the total scores of each scale are multiplied by two.  For ethical considerations, participants 
who scored above 27 (Extremely Severe range) on the Depression scale were excluded from 
the study (see ‘participant’ in corresponding studies for exclusion rates).  The DASS-21 is 
attached as Appendix C. Scores from the depression scale only were included as covariates in 
the studies 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Form Y  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Form Y (STAI; Speilberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg & Jacobs, 1983) is a 40 item self-report measure of anxiety. The measure is comprised 
of two 20-item self-report scales designed to measure state and trait anxiety symptoms.  The 
20 items (items 1-20) on the STAI- S-Anxiety Scale (STAI Form Y-1) are designed to 
measure how participants feel ‘right now at this moment’.  This scale assesses feelings of 
apprehension, tension, nervousness and worry.  This scale is also useful in gauging the 
anticipated responses of participants in future situations or in hypothetical situations 
(Speilberger et al., 1983). The 20 items (items 21-40) on the STAI-T Anxiety Scale (STAI 
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Form Y-2) are a measure of how participants ‘generally’ feel.  This scale is used for 
identifying high levels of neurotic anxiety in clinical settings and when selecting participants 
for psychological experiments (Speilberger et al., 1983). The STAI-Form Y was revised from 
an earlier scale (STAI-Form X; Speilberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) to better 
discriminate between symptoms of anxiety from symptoms of depression (Speilberger et al., 
1983).   
Reliability and validity. The STAI is verified as being an appropriate measure for 
differentiating between state and trait anxiety in non-clinical samples (Spielberger et al., 
1983).  In a sample of 855 college students and 1838 working adults,  the instrument is 
reported to have high internal consistency with alpha coefficients greater than .90 across 
gender (male and female) and age groups (19-39 years, 40-49 years and 50-69 years) of 
college students and working adults on the Y-1 and Y-2 forms. According to the authors, due 
to the transient nature of state anxiety, on Form Y1 the test-retest reliability in college 
students at a 104 day interval was much lower (male, r = .33,  female, r = .31) than the test-
retest coefficients on Form Y2 (male, r = .73, female, r = .77).   
Speilberger et al (1983) demonstrated evidence of construct validity for Form Y with 
significantly higher mean scores on Form Y2 for psychiatric patients with anxiety disorders 
compared to a sample of age and sex matched controls. Construct validity was further 
established by reports of higher Y1 scores  in military recruits shortly after commencing a 
stressful training program compared to a sample of age and sex matched controls who were 
not exposed to highly stressful conditions.  Similarly, in a group of college students Y1 
scores were significantly higher during examinations and significantly lower after relaxation 
training compared to scores during regular class time times.  
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Scoring and inclusion criteria. As recommended by Speilberger et al. (1983) 
participants completed Form Y-1 (STAI-S) prior to completing Form Y-2 (STAI-T). 
Participants were asked to respond to each statement using a four point Likert scale.  A 
response of 1-4 was chosen depending on the degree to which each statement applied to 
them. On Form Y-1 (STAI-S) the anchors for the 20 items are: (1) not at all; (2) almost 
never; (3) very much so; and (4) almost always. Items 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19 and 20 on 
this scale are reversed score.  Example items are “I feel tense” and “I feel nervous”. On Form 
Y-2 (STAI-T) the anchors for the 20 items are: (1) almost never; (2) sometimes; (3) often; 
and (4) almost always.  The reverse scored items for this scale are 21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 
36 and 39. Example items are “I feel nervous and restless” and “I feel insecure”.   The final 
scores on each scale were calculated by summing the responses to all 20 items.  The scoring 
index for each scale (Form Y-1 and Form Y-2) ranges from 20-80 with higher scores 
reflecting higher levels of State (Form Y-1) and Trait (Form Y-2) anxiety.  
Cut off scores for STAI Form Y-2 (STAI-T) were determined based on the normative 
data reported by Speilberger et al. (1983) and for ease of comparisons across previous 
literature (e.g., Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2006, 2010a, 2010b; McLeod & Rutherford, 1992; 
Miller & Patrick, 2000).   In the non-clinical sample of participants across the current set of 
studies, those who scored 36 or below on Form Y-2 (STAI-T) were assigned to the low trait 
anxious (LTA) group and those who scored 37 or above were assigned to the high trait 
anxious (HTA) group.  To comply with the university ethics committee, any participant who 
scored above 65 on either scale of this measure was excluded from participating.  This 
decision was made for ethical reasons to reduce the possibility of highly anxious individuals 
being further exposed to anxiety inducing stimuli, such as electric shock, threatening faces 
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and threatening words. The STAI Form Y-1 (STAI-S) is attached as Appendix C1 and the 
STAI Form Y-2 (STAI-T) is attached as Appendix C2 
Marlowe – Crowne Social Desirability Scale - Form XI   
The original Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crown & Marlowe, 
1960) is a 33 item self-report measure assessing impression management with a True – False 
response format (Loo & Thorpe, 2000).  The items represent infrequently enacted behaviours 
that are perceived as exemplary in society and assess the extent to which individuals present 
themselves in a positive and socially desirable way in terms of temperament, demeanour and 
personality in an attempt to please (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  To reduce the 45-50 minute 
testing time and to control for possible fatigue effects the short form (Form XI) of the 
Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS – Form XI; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) 
was used in the current series of experiments.  The short form contains 10 of the original 33 
true and false items.  These items are seen to tap defensiveness, protection of self-esteem and 
affect inhibition (Eysenck, 1992). 
Reliability and validity. This MCSDS-Form XI is internally consistent (Cronbach’s 
 = .88; Fischer & Fick, 1993), generalizable (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972), and stable across 
socioeconomic status and sex (Barger, 2002; Fraboni & Cooper, 1989). Given that the Short 
Form XI is highly correlated with the original MCSDS (r = .96; Fischer & Fick, 1993; 
Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) and the original possesses strong test-retest reliability (r = .89; 
Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), it was established that this would be a valid and reliable measure 
of social desirability for the current purpose. The MCSDS Form XI is included as Appendix 
D.  
85 
 
Scoring and inclusion criteria. Participants were encouraged to carefully read each 
statement and answer as honestly as possible.  Using a True/False response format, 
participants were instructed to indicate whether the 10 statements applied to them (True) or 
did not apply to them (False).  To control for potential response bias, the measure contained 
positive and negative scored items.  “True” responses on the first 5 items (e.g., I am always 
willing to admit it when I make a mistake, I always try to practice what I preach) and “False” 
responses on the last five items (e.g., I like to gossip at times, there have been occasions 
when I took advantage of someone) suggest socially desirable responding. On this measure, 
lower scores reflect higher social desirability.  To date no general cut off ranges have been 
reported. Previous studies have employed cut off ranges of five or fewer socially desirable 
responses (Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 2010a).  In the current series of studies, participants were 
only retained if they answered six or fewer of 10 socially desirable responses.  Honest (non-
socially desirable ) response scores were used in the final analysis.  
The Arousal Rating Questionnaire (ARQ)  
The ARQ is a short self-report scale adapted from Edwards et al.  (2006) and was 
used to assess changes in participants’ state anxiety levels during the course of the 
experiment.  The dimensions representing state anxiety were nervousness, fearfulness and 
anxiousness.  This instrument was preferred over the conventional 20 item STAI-S (Form Y-
1) because it is a shorter alternative and less time consuming.  
Reliability and validity. The ARQ has been reported as a valid measure of state 
anxiety (Edwards et al., 2006). In constructing the ARQ as a measure of state anxiety, 
Edwards et al. considered only those items that loaded more than .50 for both females and 
males on Factor 1 (State Anxiety Present Symptoms) on the STAI Form Y1. Four items were 
found to meet these criteria.  Of those 4 items, two items (item 18- I feel confused, and item 
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13- I feel jittery) were removed because they were deemed not to be appropriate for assessing 
changes in state anxiety across relatively short intervals.  Item 9 (I feel frightened) with a 
loading of .50 for females and .57 for males, and item 12 (I feel nervous) with a loading of 
.69 for females and .60 for males on the State Anxiety Present Symptoms were included as 
anchors on the measure along with an additional dimension of a anxiousness which was 
appropriate for tapping the construct of state anxiety.  Further validation procedures 
confirmed significantly positive correlations between scores on the three dimensions of the 
ARQ and the STAI-S Form Y1: nervousness r(31) = .47, fearfulness r (31) = .49 and 
anxiousness r (31) = .40, all  p < .05. Thus, the three dimensions of the ARQ, nervousness, 
fearfulness and anxiousness, were deemed a valid measure of state anxiety. The measure was 
also shown to be sensitive in detecting changes in state anxiety levels in line with the 
experimental manipulation of that factor in the current thesis (i.e., threat of shock).   
Scoring. Participants were instructed to report how they felt “right now at this 
moment” on the dimensions of fearfulness, nervousness and anxiety.  Responses were 
collected on four occasions during the experimental session (once before every block of 
trials). Three bipolar states made up the scale: (1) nervous – calm; (2) fearful – fearless and; 
(3) anxious – relaxed.  The seven bipolar scale ranges were 3-2-1-0-1-2-3 with the anchors 
representing (3) very (2) quite (1) slightly or (0) neither/nor. Specifically, the anchors for the 
bipolar states of nervousness to calm were: (3) very nervous or very calm, (2) quite nervous 
or quite calm, (1) slightly nervous or slightly calm and (0) neither nervous nor calm; for 
fearfulness to fearless: (3) very fearful or very fearless, (2) quite fearful or quite fearless, (1) 
slightly fearful or slightly fearless and (0) neither fearful nor fearless;  and for anxious to 
relaxed: (3) very anxious or very relaxed (2),  quite anxious or quite relaxed,  (1) slightly 
anxious or slightly relaxed and (0) neither anxious nor relaxed. Negative values were 
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assigned to the nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness dimensions while positive scores 
were assigned to calmness, fearless and relaxed. The mean scores for each dimension across 
the four ARQs were calculated. Negative scores reflected more nervousness, fearfulness and 
anxiousness, while positive scores reflected the opposite.   The Arousal Rating Questionnaire 
is attached as Appendix E   
Data Cleaning & Analysis 
Data Reduction  
 The reaction time data were reduced in four stages prior to statistical analyses. First, 
data consisting of microphone failures were removed to ensure that data used in the statistical 
analyses represented actual responses to the tasks.  Second, any data that was not an accurate 
response to the colour of the stimulus or probe (e.g., stuttering or reporting the wrong probe 
or colour) was coded as errors and removed from statistical analysis. The error data was 
analysed separately to investigate speed vs. accuracy trade-offs.  Third, responses less than 
300 msec or more than 3000 msec on the experimental trials. Fourth, data more than 2 
standard deviations from each individual cell mean were deemed as outliers and were 
removed from the statistical analyses.  
Statistical Analyses  
IBM SPSS Statistics 21 was used for all statistical analyses.  Omnibus tests were 
computed using SPSS GLM REPEATED MEASURES. Univariate F ratios are reported. As 
an index of the relative magnitude of mean differences, the univariate partial eta squared 
statistics are reported. All tests for statistical significance were considered significant at  = 
.05. Follow up analyses were made using t tests and post-hoc comparisons were carried out 
with Bonferroni adjustment to control for the inflation of family wise error rates. The sample 
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size was determined on the basis of previous studies, for counterbalancing purposes and 
power of 0.8. 
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Chapter 4 
Automaticity of Attentional Biases for Verbal Threat in Anxiety  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a number of central assumptions proposed 
by the theoretical models described in Chapter 1 (Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Öhman and Mineka, 2001).  The models propose that anxiety is characterized by an 
attentional bias for threat and that this bias is automatic in that it is involuntary and occurs 
outside of conscious awareness. In addition, this chapter will further investigate the 
hypothesis proposed by Öhman (1993) who places emphasis on priming of threat during 
conscious processes to elicit selective attention at preattentive levels. The emotional Stroop 
colour naming task was used for the purpose of this investigation because it was considered 
to be the most appropriate paradigm in comparison to others (e.g., dot probe task) particularly 
for the investigating the automaticity of selective attention to threat in anxiety (see Chapter 2 
for a review).  
Attention to Verbal Threat without Awareness 
 In support of the theoretical models of  Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck 
(2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) there have been a number of accounts of selective 
attention  for  both masked and unmasked verbal threat in both clinically anxious and non-
clinical HTA and LTA individuals on the emotional Stroop and dot probe tasks. However, 
after accounting for a number of procedural limitations associated with those studies, others 
have found accounts of selective processing of unmasked verbal threat, but masked threat 
processing was only evident when masked and unmasked trials have been presented 
intermixed or when participants were exposed to unmasked verbal threat first. The latter 
accounts provide support for Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis.  However, these accounts 
are limited to non-clinical samples of HTA and LTA participants. To date, no known studies 
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have employed procedures capable of controlling for potential priming effects when 
investigating the role of awareness in selective processing of verbal threat at preattentive 
levels in clinically anxious individuals. Each of these accounts is summarized below. Perhaps 
if clinically anxious participants, relative to non-clinical HTA participants show preconscious 
threat bias in the absence of priming then this might represent a marker of clinically 
significant anxiety. 
In attempting to assess for the “without awareness’’ component of the automaticity 
hypothesis on selective processing of verbal threat in clinical and non-clinical anxiety,  most 
studies employing the dot probe or emotional Stroop methodology have employed intermixed 
presentations of masked and unmasked word stimuli. For example, selective processing of 
masked threat words was noted with clinically anxious groups (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Millar & 
White, 1995; Harvey, Bryant & Rapee, 1996; Mogg, Bradley & Williams, 1995; Mogg, 
Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993) and non-clinical groups (e.g., Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 
2006, 2010a; Macleod & Rutherford, 1992; Rutherford, MacLeod & Campbell, 2004). 
Despite the compelling data demonstrating selective attention for masked threat words in 
anxiety, it is unknown whether conscious awareness of threat on unmasked trials may have 
primed the mechanisms responsible for eliciting selective processing of threat at preattentive 
levels because the aforementioned studies presented masked and unmasked trials intermixed.   
In questioning the extent to which selective processing of threat operates outside of 
conscious awareness, in line with Öhman (1993), Fox (1996) suggested that post-conscious 
awareness of threat may affect responses on masked trials. Fox (1996) employed three 
experiments with HTA and LTA participants to assess the priming hypothesis. In Experiment 
1, participants were presented with masked and unmasked trials intermixed; in Experiment 2, 
a block of masked trials was presented first, followed by a block of unmasked trials; and in 
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Experiment 3, Fox blocked on exposure such that half the participants were presented with a 
block of masked trials first, followed by a block of unmasked trials, whereas the other half 
received the reverse order. The results indicated that when masked and unmasked trials were 
intermixed, HTA participants demonstrated an attentional bias for masked threat words 
relative to control words. When masked trials were presented before the unmasked trials there 
were no differences in masked threat processing. However, when unmasked trials preceded 
the masked trials, HTA participants demonstrated an attentional bias for masked threat 
relative to control words.  These data indicate that preattentive threat processing may rely on 
post-conscious priming effects.   
In attempting to further investigate the role of awareness in selective processing of 
threat in anxiety, Edwards, Burt and Lipp (2010b) questioned the effectiveness of the state 
anxiety manipulation employed by Fox (1996). Fox manipulated state anxiety via a past 
stressor in Experiment 1 and a future stressor in Experiment 2, whereas no state anxiety 
manipulation was mentioned for Experiment 3.  Given that elevations in state anxiety have 
been critical in producing masked threat processing effects (see Chapter 2; Edwards et al., 
2006; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Rutherford et al., 2004), Edwards et al. (2010b) 
employed the emotional Stroop colour naming task by blocking on exposure presentation and 
included a state anxiety manipulation that reflected a current stressor (threat of electric 
shock).  The results revealed that, when masked trials were presented first and irrespective of 
shock condition, there were no differences in processing masked or unmasked threat words in 
either HTA or LTA groups. However, when unmasked trials were presented first, HTA 
relative to the LTA participants were slower to colour-name masked and unmasked threat 
words relative to neutral words. These findings were in line with Fox (1996; Experiment 3). 
However, Fox (1996) and Edwards et al. (2010b) restricted their investigation into the role of 
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awareness on threat processing to non-clinical samples of HTA and LTA anxious 
participants.  Therefore, their findings do not provide information into the threat processing 
behaviours of clinically anxious individuals.  
Study 1 
Selective Attention for Verbal Threat Blocked on Exposure Mode in the Clinical and 
Non-Clinical HTA and LTA Participants on the Emotional Stroop Colour Naming Task  
Aim of Study 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether priming of threat is a 
necessary precondition to elicit preconscious threat biases in clinical vs. non-clinical 
participants.  The study further aimed to assess a number of central assumptions of the 
models described in Chapter 1 (Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998); Öhman & 
Mineka, (2001).  The models propose that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to 
threat and that this bias is automatic in that it is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious 
awareness. First, to investigate selective processing of threat in anxiety, threat related and 
non-threat related words were employed with a sample of clinically anxious and non-clinical 
HTA and LTA participants.  To investigate the ‘involuntary’ component of the automaticity 
hypothesis, the current study employed an interference paradigm (emotional Strop colour 
naming task). To investigate the ‘without awareness’ component of the automaticity 
hypothesis, the current study presented verbal stimuli within (unmasked) and outside 
(masked) of conscious awareness. To investigate the role of priming in moderating selective 
processing of masked threat, the current study blocked on exposure mode presentation order, 
such that half the participants within each anxiety group received masked trials followed by 
unmasked trials whereas the remaining half of the participants received the opposite order. 
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The study further aimed to investigate the relative influence of state and trait anxiety in 
moderating threat processing biases. To achieve this, non-clinically anxious participants were 
allocated to a trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA) based on questionnaire scores and half of 
the participants within each trait anxiety group performed under the threat of shock, whereas 
the remaining half performed under shock safe conditions.  
Hypotheses 
In considering all theoretical models of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck 
(2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) several specific predictions were made.  First, if 
priming is not needed to elicit preconscious threat processing effects, then in line with Clark 
and Beck and Mogg and Bradley it was predicted that the clinically anxious and HTA relative 
to LTA participants would be slower to colour name masked and unmasked threat words 
relative to neutral words irrespective of whether masked or unmasked trials were presented 
first, but only while performing under the threat of shock (HTA only). However, if priming is 
needed to elicit masked threat processing effects, then in line with Öhman (1993) it was 
predicted that HTA relative to LTA participants would be slower to colour name masked 
threat words relative to neutral words but only when performing under the threat of shock and 
only when unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials.  Alternatively, if 
selective processing of masked threat is a marker of clinical anxiety, then relative to non-
clinical participants, clinically anxious participants would be slower to colour name masked 
threat words relative to neutral words irrespective of whether masked trials or unmasked 
trials were presented first.   
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Method 
Participants 
A sample of 201 participants was recruited for the study.  Of those, 32 were clinically 
anxious volunteers recruited from various agencies on the Gold Coast, and 196 made up the 
non-clinical sample that included Bond University students, staff and Gold Coast community 
volunteers.  Chapter 3 details incentives to participate and initial screening criteria. Of those 
who met the initial screening criteria, four non-clinical participants were excluded due to high 
depression scores and 14 due to high social desirability scores. They were thanked, given 
their incentive and a handout detailing the nature of the study, then released.  Of those 
included in the experimental phase, data from a further two participants was excluded. One 
participant did not disclose a cardiac condition and another did not disclose that English was 
not her first language during the initial screening stage. A further five participants were 
excluded due to equipment failure, and data from a further 16 participants were excluded on 
the basis of their performance on the final awareness check trials. The final sample consisted 
of 160 participants, 32 males and 128 females, aged 18 years to 65 years (M = 24.14 years; 
SD = 7.66).  
The clinically anxious participants made up the clinical sample (n = 32) and the non-
clinical participants were allocated to a HTA group (shock safe, n = 32; shock threat, n = 32) 
and an LTA group (shock safe, n = 32; shock threat, n = 32) on the basis of scores on the 
STAI-T. In line with MacLeod and Rutherford (1992), and Edwards et al. (2006), participants 
who scored 36 and below on the STAI-T were assigned to the LTA group and those who 
scored 37 and above were assigned to the HTA group.  Based on their order of arrival to the 
laboratory, half of the non-clinical participants within each trait anxiety group were then 
randomly allocated to shock condition group, which resulted in 64 participants assigned to 
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the shock safe group and 64 to the shock threat group. On the basis of these procedures, five 
anxiety groups   (Clinical, n = 32; LTA, shock safe, n = 32; LTA, shock threat, n = 32; HTA, 
shock safe, n = 32; and HTA, shock threat, n = 32) were included in this study.  Half of the 
participants within each anxiety group completed two blocks of masked trials first followed 
by two blocks of unmasked trials, whereas the other half of the participants completed the 
opposite order.  
Apparatus  
Details for the Experimental Hardware, Software and Electric stimulus used in Study 
1 are described in Chapter 3 above.  
Materials 
Word stimuli. Details on the word and non-word stimuli used in the initial threshold 
setting trials, practice trials, colour naming trials and final awareness check trials in Study 1 
are described in Chapter 3 above.  
Psychometric Measures 
All Participants completed the STAI, BDI, MCSDS and ARQ. Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed description of each questionnaire including psychometric properties, scoring and 
inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
Design 
A 5 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design was used for the study. The within subjects factors 
were valence (threat words vs. neutral words) and exposure mode (masked vs. unmasked). 
The between subjects factors were anxiety group (clinical; LTA, shock safe; LTA,  shock 
threat;  HTA, shock safe; HTA, shock threat) and presentation order (unmasked first vs. 
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masked first). The dependent variables were colour naming reaction times and colour naming 
errors.  
Procedure 
After providing informed consent, answering eligibility questions, completing 
questionnaires and following the allocation to conditions, all groups underwent the stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA) threshold setting and shock intensity setting procedure followed by 
practice trials, experimental trials and final awareness check trials.  
 SOA threshold setting.  Each participant was presented with a series of word and 
non-word decision trials in which either a word in English or a non-word was briefly 
presented on the screen and quickly replaced by a pattern mask.  To ensure that the exposure 
thresholds were conservative, each word was presented in lower case letters ranging between 
4 and 11 characters in length while each non-word was presented as a random string of upper 
case letters also ranging in length from 4 to 11 characters. Each pattern mask consisted of a 
random string of 11 upper case letters.  Each block consisted of 10 trials with five words and 
five non-words randomly presented.  Participants were instructed to indicate whether a non-
word preceded the onset of the mask by pressing a clearly labelled left arrow on their 
keyboard for word and the right arrow for non-word. If participants were unsure of the 
stimulus status they were instructed to guess.   A potential for a response bias was controlled 
by reminding participants who reported seeing all words or all non-words of the experimental 
parameters. To ensure participants could discriminate between the items, participants were 
made familiar with the word / non-word exemplars via a printout prior to this task.  
On each trial, participants were presented with a row of three white crosses in the 
centre of the screen for 1 second.   These crosses served as a fixation point for the stimuli, 
and as a warning that the trial was about to commence. At the offset of the crosses, the screen 
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was then blanked for 250 msec and replaced by either a red, green, blue or yellow word or 
non-word in the location formerly occupied by the crosses.  A mask of the same colour 
replaced the word or non-word. In the first block of trials the SOA between the word/non-
word and the mask started at 80 msec and was systematically shortened to 60, 40, 30, 25, 20, 
15, 10, and 5 msec if an accuracy score of 5 or more of 10 was achieved. Participants were 
provided performance feedback at the end of each block.   On a given block where fewer than 
5 correct responses were achieved, participants were presented with a block of 20 trials with 
the same SOA to ensure that they remained unaware of the stimulus content.  Participants 
were informed that in a block of 20 trials, 10 trials would present words and 10 would present 
non-words.   On a block of 20 trials, when fewer than 10 correct responses were achieved the 
SOA was used as the participant’s subjective level of non-awareness and was applied to the 
practice and experimental blocks.  If 10 or more correct responses were achieved, the SOA 
was reduced to the next level and a block of 10 trials was presented.  This procedure was 
adapted from Dagenbach, Carr and Wilhelmsen (1989).  
 Shock intensity setting. After the SOA setting procedure participants who were 
assigned to the shock threat group underwent a procedure to set the shock intensity.  All 
participants were made aware that the shock intensity set during this procedure would remain 
fixed for the duration of the experiment. Using a velcro strap, the electrode was attached to 
the volar surface of the participant’s left arm.  A 200 msec electric shock was administered to 
the participant, starting at a base line of 0 volts. The shock intensity was increased in 
increments of 10 volts on each presentation to a maximum of 90 volts, until the participant 
indicated that the shock was “uncomfortable but not painful”. Once the shock intensity had 
been set, the electrode was removed and participants were informed that the electrode would 
be re-attached at a later stage in the experiment.  
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Practice trials. Prior to starting the practice block, all participants received standard 
instructions.  They were asked to name the colour of the stimuli as quickly and accurately as 
possible while ignoring the semantic content of the items. All participants completed a block 
of 40 practice trials to familiarize themselves with the experimental task. On each trial, 
participants were presented with a row of three white crosses in the centre of the screen for 
one second. The crosses served as a fixation point for the stimuli.  The screen was than 
blanked for 250 msec and replaced by either a red, green blue or yellow English word or then 
pattern mask in the location previously occupied by the three crosses. Half of the trials were 
unmasked and half were masked.  On the unmasked trials, the word remained on the screen 
until the participant’s first vocal response was recorded by the experimental software. On the 
masked trials, the word was presented for the duration determined during the SOA threshold 
setting procedure and at the offset was replaced by a mask of the same colour. The mask 
remained on the screen until the participant’s first vocal response was recorded, at which time 
the screen was blanked. The experimenter recorded the participant’s response on a separate 
computer.  Any initial responses that clearly indicated the colour of the stimulus were coded 
as “correct” or they were coded as “incorrect” if the initial response was not a clear 
identification of the colour of the stimulus (e.g., if the participant stuttered, said the wrong 
colour or named the word).  Any response that failed to be recorded by the experimental 
software was coded as a microphone failure. After the experimenter coded the responses the 
next trial was initiated, with an average of a two second inter-trial interval. 
All participants were presented with 20 masked and 20 unmasked practice trials. The 
presentation of masked and unmasked stimuli was randomised but governed by the following 
restrictions: the same exposure mode was never presented on more than four consecutive 
trials; each colour (red, green, blue and yellow) was presented an equal number of times in 
99 
 
masked and unmasked exposure modes; each colour was presented in each exposure mode 
five times; and the same colour did not appear on more than three consecutive trials in the 
block. 
All participants received a three minute rest period at the completion of the practice 
block.   Those in the shock threat group had the electrode re-attached, and were informed that 
the computer would deliver between five and seven electric shocks at random across the 
remaining four blocks of experimental colour naming trials. In reality, the experimenter 
delivered the electric shocks, and only five were administered for the remainder of the 
experiment. Shocks were delivered to maximize unpredictability and to control for possible 
habituation to the electric stimulus. The first electric shock was administered 15 seconds prior 
the first experimental colour naming trial.  This was done to ensure that participants believed 
the instructions given to them. The timing of the remaining four electric shocks is described 
below. All participants were informed that the delivery of the shocks was independent of 
their performance on the colour naming trials.  
Colour naming trials. Four blocks of 40 colour naming trials were administered. 
Participants who were assigned to the unmasked first condition received two blocks of 40 
unmasked trials first followed by two blocks of 40 masked trials.  The masked first group 
received the opposite presentation order.  On the unmasked trials the threat and neutral words 
were presented in the colours red, green, blue or yellow and remained on the screen until the 
participant’s first vocal response. On the masked trials, the word was presented and remained 
on the screen for the SOA duration previously set in the SOA threshold setting trials, after 
which the stimulus was replaced by a mask of the same colour.  
For counterbalancing reasons,  the threat related and control words were divided into 
two 80 words lists (A and B), and each list contained 40 threat related words and 40 control 
words matched for average length and frequency (see Chapter 3, Table 3.1). Word lists were 
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counterbalanced across presentation order (masked first vs. unmasked first), exposure mode 
(masked vs. unmasked), and anxiety group (clinical, HTA shock threat, HTA shock safe, 
LTA shock threat, LTA shock safe).  That is, within each of the five anxiety groups, half of 
the participants received two blocks of unmasked trials first followed by two blocks of 
masked trials, whereas the other half received the opposite order. Further, half of the 
participants received Set A words unmasked, and Set B words masked (see Chapter 3 for 
details) whereas the other half received the opposite order.  The randomization of stimuli was 
governed by the following parameters. First, 20 threat and 20 length and frequency matched 
control words were presented in a block of 40 trials. The same word type was never presented 
on more than four consecutive trials and each participant was presented with each of the 160 
stimuli once across the four blocks of 40 trials.  Each colour (red, green, blue and yellow) 
was assigned to each word valence five times and appeared 10 times in a block of 40 trials. 
The same colour was never presented on more than two consecutive trials within the block.  
 Prior to the first block of experimental colour naming trials, participants completed 
the ARQ for the first time.  A brief rest period followed before the colour naming trials 
commenced and 15 seconds prior to the initiation of the first trial in Block 1 those in the 
shock threat group received their first shock. On each experimental colour naming trial, 
participants were presented with a row of three white crosses in the centre of the screen for 
one second. The screen was then blanked for 250 msec and replaced by either a neutral or 
threat word in either red, green blue or yellow colouring, in the location formerly occupied by 
the crosses. The item remained on the screen until the first vocal response was recorded by 
the experimental software in unmasked trials.  On the masked trials, a mask of the same 
colour replaced the word at the same SOA as previously determined during the initial 
threshold setting phase, and remained on the screen until the software recorded the first vocal 
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response. Participants in the shock threat group received a second shock immediately 
following their final colour naming response in the first block. All participants completed the 
second ARQ during the rest time between Block 1 and Block 2 and those in the shock threat 
group received their third shock at this time. Block 2 commenced once participants 
completed the questionnaire. During the rest period between Block 2 and Block 3 participants 
filled out the third ARQ; 15 seconds prior to commencing Block 3 those in the shock threat 
group received their fourth electric shock.   The fifth and final eclectic shock was 
administered immediately following the participant’s vocal response for the final trial in 
Block 3.  At this stage participants were anticipating up to two more shocks until the 
competition of the experimental trials. Participants completed the final ARQ at this time, 
after which the final block of trials was initiated.  Once the final block was completed, those 
in the shock threat group had the electrode removed.   
 
 Awareness check trials.  Following the completion of the four blocks of 
experimental colour naming trials, each participant completed a block of 40 word/non-word 
awareness check trials to ensure that they remained unaware of the masked stimuli 
throughout the experiment. The parameters of this procedure were identical to those 
employed in the SOA threshold setting trials. Participant data was included in the final 
analysis only if they achieved a score of 24 or fewer correct responses on this task.  The data 
for those who scored 25 or more correct responses was not included in the final analysis. All 
participants were thanked, debriefed and released following the final awareness check trials.   
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Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Three manipulation checks were conducted to determine whether the anxiety groups 
were differentiated on STAI-T scores and the experimental manipulations prior to statistical 
analysis of the colour naming reaction time data.  First, the validity of anxiety group status 
was analysed to ensure that the clinically anxious and non-clinical HTA and LTA participants 
significantly differed on self-reported trait anxiety, to assess for group differences in self-
reported state anxiety and depression and age and gender distribution among the groups. The 
validity of state anxiety manipulation was also assessed to ensure that for the non-clinical 
participants, the threat of shock was an effective manipulation of state anxiety, as 
operationalized by responses on the ARQ. Third, the validity of the masking procedure was 
assessed to ensure that participants remained unaware of the content on the masked trials.  
Table 4.1 presents means and standard deviations for questionnaire and age variables. 
Validity of anxiety group status. To verify that the clinically anxious and non-
clinical HTA and LTA participants significantly differed on self-reported trait anxiety and 
that trait anxiety did not interact with presentation order condition,  the STAI-T scores were 
subjected to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with anxiety group (clinical; HTA, shock 
threat; HTA, shock safe; LTA, shock threat; LTA, shock safe) and presentation order 
(unmasked first vs masked first) as the between group variables and STAI-T scores as the 
dependent variable.  The results revealed a significant main effect of anxiety group, F (4, 
150) = 155.93, MSE = 23.96, p < .001, p
2 
= .81. A linear contrast showed that the clinically 
anxious participants (M = 55.25) reported significantly higher trait anxiety compared to their 
non-clinical HTA (shock threat, M = 46.16 and shock safe, M = 44.13) counterparts, t (155) = 
9.53, p < .001, and the HTA group reported significantly higher trait anxiety than their LTA 
103 
 
(shock threat, M = 30.99 and shock safe, M = 30.47) counterparts, t (155) = 17.12, p < .001. 
Importantly, there was no significant difference in self-reported trait anxiety between the 
shock threat and the shock safe conditions for the HTA group, t (155) = 1.66, p = .099, ns, 
and the LTA group, t (155) = .230, p = .819, ns. There were no other significant main effects 
or interactions, all F < 1.67, ns.  
To assess for differences in self-reported state anxiety, depression, social desirability 
and age, the data were subjected to the same statistical analysis with STAI-S, BDI, MCSDS 
scores and age of participants as the dependent variables. The analysis of the STAI-S scores 
revealed a significant difference in self-reported state anxiety scores between the anxiety 
groups, F (4, 150) = 48.89, MSE = 57.17, p < .001, p
2 
= .52. A linear contrast showed that 
the clinically anxious participants (M = 50.25) reported significantly higher state anxiety 
compared to their non-clinical HTA (shock threat, M = 42.53 and shock safe, M = 41.97) 
counterparts, t (155) = 4.92, p < .001, and the HTA group reported significantly higher state 
anxiety than their LTA (shock threat, M = 31.03 and shock safe, M = 30.00) counterparts, t 
(155) = 8.83, p < .001.  
There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all F < .78, ns. There was 
no significant difference in self-reported trait anxiety between the shock threat and the shock 
safe conditions for the HTA group, t (155) = .30, p = .765, ns, or the LTA group, t (155) = 
.55, p = .58, ns. The analysis of the BDI scores revealed a significant difference in self-
reported depression scores between the anxiety groups, F (4, 150) = 27.54, MSE = 32.38, p < 
.001, p
2 
= .40. A linear contrast showed that the clinically anxious participants reported 
significantly higher depression (M = 16.34) compared to their non-clinical HTA (shock 
threat, M = 11.59 and shock safe, M = 9.22) counterparts, t (155) = 4.87, p < .001, and the 
HTA group reported significantly more depression than their LTA (shock threat, M = 3.72 
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and shock safe, M = 4.22) counterparts, t (155) = 6.46, p < .001.  There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions, all F < .45 ns. There was no significant difference in 
self-reported depression between the shock threat and the shock safe conditions for the HTA 
group, t (155) = 1.69, p = .059 ns, or the LTA group, t (155) = .36, p = .723, ns.  
An analysis of the MCSDS scores revealed no difference in self-reported social 
desirability between the anxiety groups or presentation orders and no interactions involving 
these two variables, all F < 2.11, ns. An analysis of the age of participants revealed a 
significant main effect of anxiety group, F (4, 150) = 4.22, MSE = 54.39, p = .003, p
2 
= .10. 
A linear contrast showed that the clinically anxious participants were significantly older (M = 
27.78 years) than their non-clinical HTA (shock threat, M = 23.78 years and shock safe, M = 
24.47 years) counterparts, t (155) = 2.29, p = .023, with no differences in age between the 
HTA group and their LTA (shock threat, M = 20.25 years and shock safe, M = 24.41) 
counterparts, t (155) = 1.381, p = .169, ns.  There was no significant difference in age 
between the shock threat and the shock safe conditions for the HTA group, t (155) = .374, p = 
709, ns, whereas in the LTA group those in the shock safe condition were significantly older 
than those in the shock threat condition, t (155) = 2.26, p = .025.  A bivariate correlation 
revealed that age and RT were not significantly correlated, all r < .117, all p > .139. There 
were no other significant main effects or interactions, all F < 1.11, ns. A chi square analysis 
revealed that gender was not disproportionately distributed among the anxiety groups, 2 (4) 
= 6.48, p = .166, ns. These findings confirm that the sample of participants met the screening 
criteria and were appropriate for inclusion in the experimental trials.  
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Table 4.1. 
Study 1.  Means and Standard Variations for Questionnaire and Age Variables 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age (years) 22.44 (5.98)  26.37 (12.48)  20.88 (3.88)  19.63 (1.50) 
STAI-T 30.19 (3.47)  30.75 (3.04)  29.44 (4.72)  30.94 (3.92) 
STAI-S 28.81 (7.49)  31.19 (5.44)  30.19 (6.82)  31.88 (7.33) 
BDI 3.69 (3.88)  4.75 (3.91)  3.75 (3.00)  3.69 (2.82) 
MCSDS 5.93 (1.69)  6.63 (2.25)  4.94 (1.44)  5.81 (1.87) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age (years) 25.06 (7.79)  23.88 (6.71)  23.00 (4.97)  24.56 (7.50) 
STAI-T 42.94 (3.30)  45.31 (6.36)  45.06 (7.25)  47.25 (5.35) 
STAI-S 42.38 (9.51)  41.56 (8.12)  42.44 (8.79)  42.63 (8.11) 
BDI 8.50 (4.93)  9.34 (7.06)  11.00 (6.88)  12.19 (6.75) 
MCSDS 6.13 (1.78)  6.31 (1.74)  6.88 (1.78)  6.25 (1.61) 
 Clinically Anxious 
 Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Age (years) 29.31  (10.34)  26.25  (6.43) 
STAI-T 56.06  (5.69)  54.44  (3.97) 
STAI-S 52.06  (7.08)  48.44  (5.53) 
BDI 17.25  (8.24)  15.44  (6.46) 
MCSDS 6.31  (1.96)  6.50  (1.79) 
 
Validity of state anxiety manipulation. To validate that the shock intensity was 
comparable between HTA and LTA groups, the data were subjected to a 2 X 2 ANOVA with 
trait anxiety (HTA vs. LTA) and presentation order (unmasked first vs. masked first) as the 
independent variables and shock intensity (volts) as the dependent variable. The clinically 
anxious group was not included in this analysis because they were not exposed to electric 
shocks.  The results revealed comparable shock intensity between the LTA group (M = 20.86 
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V; SE = 3.15) and the HTA group (M = 22.97 V; SE = 3.15) and between the unmasked
 
first 
group (M = 21.56 V; SE = 3.15) and the masked first group (M = 22.27 V; SE = 3.15), with 
no significant interaction, all F < 1, ns.  The effectiveness of shock as a state anxiety 
induction method was validated by examining the HTA and LTA participants’ responses on 
the ARQ with and without the threat of shock.  The ARQ scores for the non-clinical sample 
were further compared to the ARQ scores for the clinically anxious sample.  A single index 
of each dimension (nervousness, fearfulness, anxiousness) of the ARQ was obtained by 
averaging responses over the blocks of trials for the dimensions.  Means and standard 
deviations of each scale on the ARQ for the HTA and LTA groups under the threat of shock 
and in the shock safe condition and for the clinically anxious group on the unmasked first and 
masked first presentation order conditions are reported in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2.  
Study 1.  Means and Standard Deviations of Responses in the Unmasked First  and Masked 
First Presentation Order for Clinical and  Non-Clinical, LTA and HTA Participants Under 
Shock Safe and Shock Threat Conditions on Three Dimensions of the Arousal Rating 
Questionnaire. 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 1.21 (1.32)  0.88 (1.54)  -0.10 (1.33)  -0.17 (0.34) 
Fearful – Fearless 1.50 (1.14)  1.63 (1.28)  -0.02 (1.30)  0.19 (1.20) 
Anxious – Relaxed 1.13 (1.38)  0.56 (1.57)  -0.38 (1.30)  -0.38 (1.42) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 0.52 (1.38)  0.44 (1.14)  -1.13 (1.00)  -1.40 (1.28) 
Fearful –Fearless 0.85 (1.26)  0.81 (1.14)  -1.00 (.93)  -1.10 (1.29) 
Anxious – Relaxed 0.17 (1.61)  0.44 (1.20)  -0.30 (1.00)  -1.38 (1.33) 
 Clinically Anxious 
 Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Nervous – Calm -0.60  (0.90)  -0.60  (1.04) 
Fearful – Fearless -0.35  (1.10)  -0.23  (1.07) 
Anxious – Relaxed -0.94  (1.01)  -0.75  (1.28) 
 
Note.  Negative scores reflect greater nervousness, fearfulness and anxiety, whereas positive 
scores reflect less nervousness, fearfulness and anxiety.   
The ARQ data were analysed using  5 X 2 ANOVAs with anxiety group (LTA, shock 
safe;  LTA, shock threat; HTA ,shock safe; HTA, shock threat; clinically anxious) and 
presentation order (unmasked first vs. masked first) as the between subject factors, and 
nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness dimensions as the dependent variables.   
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On the nervousness dimension, the only significant result to emerge was a significant 
main effect of anxiety group, F (4, 150) = 16.78, MSE = 1.34, p < .001, p
2 
= .31. A linear 
contrast showed that those in the shock threat group (HTA, M = -1.18; LTA, M = -0.03) 
reported comparable nervousness to the clinically anxious participants (M = -0.64), p = .89, 
ns, but significantly more nervousness than their shock safe counterparts (HTA, M = 0.33; 
LTA, M = 0.94), t (155) = 6.13, p < .001.  There were no other main effects or interaction, all 
F < 1, ns.  
On the fearfulness dimension, the only significant result to emerge was a main effect 
of anxiety group, F (4, 150) = 21.84, MSE = 1.2,   p < .001, p
2 
=.368.  A linear contrast 
showed that those in the shock threat group (HTA, M = -0.88; LTA, M = 0.18) reported 
comparable fearfulness to the clinically anxious participants (M = -0.27), p = .79, ns, but 
significantly more fearfulness than their shock safe counterparts (HTA, M = 0.78; LTA, M = 
1.45), t (155) = 7.68, p < .001.  There were no other main effects or interaction, all F < 1, ns.  
On the anxiousness dimension, the only significant result to emerge was a main effect 
of anxiety group, F (4, 150) = 13.18, MSE=1.51, p < .001, p
2 
=.260.  A linear contrast 
showed that those in the shock threat group (HTA, M = -1.20; LTA, M = -1.72) reported 
comparable anxiousness to the clinically anxious participants (M =-0.84), p = .57, ns, but 
significantly more anxiousness than their shock safe counterparts (HTA, M = 0.23; LTA, M = 
0.76), t (155) = 5.46, p < .001.  There were no other main effects or interaction, all F < 1, ns.  
Validity of masking procedure in preventing awareness.  To validate that the 
SOAs on masked trials were comparable between groups, the data were subject to a 5 X 2 
ANOVA with anxiety group and presentation order as the between group variables and SOAs 
as the dependent variable. The results revealed comparable SOAs between all groups, all F < 
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3.32, p > .071, ns. Table 4.3 presents SOA means and standard deviations for each group. 
The data therefore suggest that on the masked trials, all groups performed under comparable 
exposure durations.   
To ensure that participants remained unaware of stimuli on masked trials, the final 
awareness check data was subject to a 5 X 2 ANOVA with anxiety group and presentation 
order as the between subject variables and percent of correct responses as the dependent 
variable. Table 4.4 show the mean percentage of correct responses on the final awareness 
check trial for all groups.  The data suggest that the percentage of correct responses on the 
final awareness check for all anxiety groups in both presentation order conditions was 
comparable, all F < 2.26, p > .066, ns., and the performance of these groups as a whole (M = 
18.98; SD = 3.04)  did not differ from that expected by chance (20; i.e., 50%), z = .34, ns. The 
data suggest that participants were unaware of the stimuli on the masked trials.  
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Table 4.3.  
Study 1.  Means and Standard Deviations of SOAs (msec) on Masked Trials and Correct 
Responses (%) on the Final Awareness Check Trial for Five Anxiety Groups in the Unmasked 
First and Masked First Exposure Conditions.  
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
SOA (msec) 10.31 (6.70)  25.63 (24.21)  14.69 (14.69)  16.25 (16.78) 
Correct Responses (%)  44.69 (6.49)  46.10 (6.58)  45.16 (6.29)  46.88 (6.36) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
SOA (msec) 12.19 (13.41)  12.50 (15.06)  12.19 (12.19)  14.06 (15.83) 
Correct Responses (%) 47.81 (7.79)  47.97 (10.13)  48.33 (9.94)  46.09 (8.11) 
 Clinically Anxious 
 Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
SOA (msec) 11.25  (11.18)  14.38  (15.69) 
Correct Responses (%) 47.50  (7.68)  43.31  (7.59) 
 
Data Reduction 
 The colour naming reaction time data was reduced in four stages prior to statistical 
analysis. Trials containing the following were excluded from analysis:  (a) microphone 
failures (2.46 %); (b) colour naming errors (0.8 %); (c) responses less than 300 msec or more 
than 3000 msec (0.19 %); and (d) trials more than 2 SD from each cell mean (4.75 % of 
trials). 
Error data.  The percentage of errors in each experimental condition is shown in 
Table 4.4. Colour naming error data were analysed using a 5 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed ANCOVA 
with valence (neutral vs. threat) and exposure mode (masked vs. unmasked) as the within 
111 
 
subject variables, anxiety group (LTA, shock safe; LTA, shock threat; HTA, shock safe; 
HTA, shock threat) and presentation order (masked first vs. unmasked first) as the between 
subject variables. The BDI scores were entered as the covariate.  The dependent variable was 
colour naming errors.  The data did not reveal any significant main effects or interaction, all 
F < 1.89, ns.  
Reaction Time Data 
Mean RTs for each experimental condition were calculated and are shown in Table 
4.5.  The RT data were analysed using an equivalent design to the error data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
Table 4.4. 
Study 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Error Percentages in Colour Naming Masked 
and Unmasked Neutral and Threat words for 5 Experimental Groups When Presented with 
Unmasked First and Masked First Presentation Order.  
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Neutral Words 0.78 (1.51)  1.09 (1.82)  0.63 (1.44)  0.16 (0.63) 
Threat Words  0.78 (1.20)  0.36 (1.12)  0.63 (1.12)  0.31 (0.85) 
            
Unmasked             
Neutral Words 0.94 (1.25)  0.78 (1.20)  0.63 (1.44)  1.25 (2.74) 
Threat Words 0.47 (1.01)  0.31 (1.25)  1.09 (1.28)  0.31 (1.25) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Neutral Words 0.78 (1.20)  0.47 (1.01)  1.09 (2.03)  0.78 (1.20) 
Threat Words  0.78 (1.20)  1.09 (1.28)  0.94 (1.25)  0.63 (1.12) 
            
Unmasked             
Neutral Words 0.47 (1.36)  1.56 (1.55)  0.63 (1.44)  0.47 (1.01) 
Threat Words 1.03 (1.57)  1.25 (1.83)  1.56 (2.56)  1.88 (2.14) 
 Clinically Anxious 
 Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Masked        
Neutral Words 0.63  (1.71)  0.47  (1.01) 
Threat Words  0.47  (1.01)  0.31  (0.85) 
        
Unmasked         
Neutral Words 1.09  (1.82)  0.78  (1.20) 
Threat Words 1.41  (2.23)  0.78  (1.76) 
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Table 4. 5. 
Study 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Colour Naming Reaction Times in Milliseconds 
for Masked and Unmasked Neutral and Threat Words for 5 Anxiety Groups for the Unmasked 
First and Masked First Presentation Order. 
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Neutral Words 816 (67)  883 (105)  837 (67)  807 (59) 
Threat Words  816 (72)  878 (101)  841 (69)  811 (60) 
            
Unmasked             
Neutral Words 867 (83)  941 (127)  920 (93)  920 (108) 
Threat Words 874 (87)  941 (130)  921 (94)  929 (115) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Neutral Words 816 (72)  831 (76)  871 (88)  815 (75) 
Threat Words  816 (67)  841 (81)  894 (109)  812 (75) 
            
Unmasked             
Neutral Words 859 (81)  898 (96)  907 (104)  916 (113) 
Threat Words 868 (84)  910 (118)  923 (117)  916 (143) 
 Clinically Anxious 
 Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Masked        
Neutral Words 836  (68)  850  (64) 
Threat Words  853  (100)  848  (70) 
        
Unmasked         
Neutral Words 917  (107)  927  (99) 
Threat Words 918  (119)  950  (124) 
 
 The results revealed a significant main effect of Valence, F (1, 149) = 5.10, MSE = 
593.23, p = 025, p
2 
=.050, with longer colour naming RTs to threat words (M = 879 msec; 
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SE = 7.36) compared to the neutral words (M = 872 msec; SE = 6.57), and a significant main 
effect of exposure mode, F (1, 149) = 38.14, MSE = 4381.68,  p < .001, p
2 
= .200, with 
longer colour naming RTs on unmasked trials (M = 912 msec; SE = 6.12) compared to the 
masked trials (M = 839 msec; SE = 8.48). This main effect was further qualified by a 
significant Exposure Mode X Presentation Order Interaction, F (1, 149) = 8.34, MSE = 
4381.68, p =. 004, p
2 
=.050.  As can be seen in Figure 4.2, averaged over valence and 
anxiety group, the interaction reflects the fact that there was no difference in colour naming 
RTs on masked trials between the unmasked first (M = 839 msec; SE = 8.91) and masked 
first (M = 838 msec; SE = 8.91) presentation order, p = .89, ns whereas on the unmasked 
trials a marginally significant finding revealed longer colour naming RTs in the masked first 
condition (M = 926 msec; SE = 11.90) compared to the unmasked first condition (M = 897 
msec; SE = 11.90), F (1, 157) = 2.90, p = .090, p
2 
= .018. There were no other main effects 
or interactions, all F < 2.412, ns.  
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Figure 4.1. Study 1.  Mean colour naming reaction times in milliseconds for masked and 
unmasked words for the unmasked first and masked first presentation order averaged over 
valence and anxiety group. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine a number of central assumptions proposed 
by the theoretical models described in Chapter 1 (Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).  The models propose that anxiety is characterized by an 
attentional bias for threat and that this bias is automatic in that it is involuntary and occurs 
outside of conscious awareness. In addition, this chapter further aimed to investigate the 
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hypothesis proposed by Öhman (1993) who emphasised priming of threat during conscious 
processes to elicit attentional biases for threat at preattentive levels.  
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether priming of threat is a 
necessary precondition to elicit preconscious threat biases in clinical vs. non-clinical samples.  
To investigate selective processing of threat in anxiety, the present study employed threat 
related and non-threat related words with a sample of clinically anxious and non-clinical 
HTA and LTA participants.  To investigate the ‘involuntary’ component of the automaticity 
hypothesis, the current study employed an interference paradigm (emotional Stroop colour 
naming task), and to investigate the ‘without awareness’ component of the automaticity 
hypothesis, verbal stimuli were presented within (unmasked) and outside (masked) of 
conscious awareness. To investigate the role of priming in moderating selective processing of 
masked threat, the current study blocked on exposure mode presentation order, such that half 
of participants within each anxiety group received masked trials followed by unmasked trials, 
whereas the remaining half received the opposite order. The study further aimed to 
investigate the relative influence of state and trait anxiety in moderating threat processing 
biases. To achieve this, non-clinically anxious participants were allocated to a trait anxiety 
group (HTA vs. LTA), then half of the participants within each trait anxiety group performed 
under the threat of shock, whereas the remaining half performed under shock safe conditions.   
If priming is not needed to elicit preconscious threat processing effects, then in line 
with Clark and Beck (2010) and Mogg and Bradley (1998), it was predicted that clinically 
anxious and HTA relative to LTA participants would be slower to colour name masked and 
unmasked threat words relative to neutral words irrespective of whether masked or unmasked 
trials were presented first, but only while performing under the threat of shock (HTA group).  
On the other hand, if priming is needed to elicit masked threat processing effects, then in line 
with Öhman and Mineka (2001) it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA participants 
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would be slower to colour name masked threat words relative to neutral words but only when 
performing under the threat of shock and only when unmasked trials were presented before 
the masked trials. Further, if selective processing of masked threat is a marker of clinical 
anxiety, then it was predicted that clinically anxious relative to non-clinical participants 
would be slower to colour name masked threat words relative to neutral words irrespective of 
whether masked trials or unmasked trials are presented first.   
The data from the present study provided partial support for the first prediction. 
Irrespective  of shock condition (non-clinical groups only), and whether masked trials or 
unmasked trials were presented first,  all participants were slower at colour naming masked 
and unmasked threat words relative to non-threat words.  These findings were at odds with 
the prediction of all theoretical models described in Chapter 1. The findings were also in 
discord with studies (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Millar & White, 1995; Harvey, Bryant & Rapee, 
1996; Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993a) that employed the emotional Stroop 
colour naming task with intermixed presentations of masked and unmasked verbal stimuli 
and found that selective processing of masked and unmasked verbal threat was only 
evidenced in their clinically anxious participants relative to their non-anxious controls.  
However, the aforementioned studies did not assess for the role of priming in moderating 
these effects because masked and unmasked trials were presented intermixed, nor did they 
provide information regarding the relative influence of state and trait anxiety in their non-
clinical sample of participants.   
Nonetheless, data from studies that have accounted for these limitation,  ( Fox, 1996, 
Experiment 3; Edwards et al., 2010b) by manipulating state anxiety and blocking on exposure 
found that irrespective of state anxiety, and only when unmasked trials were presented first, 
HTA relative to the LTA participants selectively processed both masked and unmasked threat 
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relative to neutral words. In line with Öhman (1993) these findings suggest that priming of 
threat is a necessary precondition to elicit preconscious threat bias in clinically anxious and 
non-clinical HTA participants. In the current study, given that masked threat processing 
biases were observed under conditions that controlled for conscious awareness of threat 
items, these data suggest that masked threat processing effects were not moderated by 
priming.  To date no known studies have reported selective bias for verbal threat in anxiety 
when masked trials were presented before the unmasked trials. 
In an attempt to understand the discordant finding all manipulation checks were 
reviewed. Linear contrasts confirmed that clinically anxious participants reported 
significantly more trait anxiety, state anxiety and depression compared to the HTA group, 
and the HTA group reported significantly more trait anxiety, state anxiety and depression 
compared to the LTA group. Care was taken to control for depression during statistical 
analysis on the RT data, indicating the data cannot be accounted by depression. The findings 
further revealed that shock intensity was comparable between the HTA and LTA groups. The 
findings also revealed comparable and within criterion MCSDS scores between groups. 
These findings confirm effective experimental controls on the aforementioned variables.  
Investigation of the ARQ data revealed that clinically anxious participants reported 
similar levels of nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness to both HTA and LTA groups in 
the shock threat conditions but higher than the HTA and LTA participants in the shock safe 
groups. Therefore, if threat processing biases are moderated by state anxiety, then these 
findings could explain why there was no significant difference in threat processing between 
the clinically anxious and shock threat groups. However, given that threat processing biases 
were observed irrespective of shock threat condition, it is unlikely that this factor contributed 
to the discordant findings.    
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The data from the present study was mixed for the central assumptions proposed by 
the theoretical models described in Chapter 1 (Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Mineka, 2001).  Although the present study found evidence for the automatic nature of 
selective processing of threat, masked processing of threat was observed across all 
participants and irrespective of exposure order. Therefore on the basis of current findings, 
selective processing of masked threat was not moderated by state or trait anxiety. Further, 
given that masked threat effects were not reliant on priming of threat during conscious 
processes to elicit selective attention at preattentive levels, these data are in opposition to 
Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis and at discord with others (e.g., Edwards, Burt & Lipp, 
2010b; Fox, 1996, Experiment 3).  
A possible explanation for these puzzling finding is attributed to a possible 
discrepancy in perceptual threshold for threat stimuli between the HTA, LTA and clinical 
participants. That is, it may be that LTA participants may have a comparable awareness 
threshold for subliminal neutral stimuli to their HTA and clinical counterparts. They also may 
be characterised by lower perceptual threshold for detecting subliminal threat. LTA 
individuals may engage in increased threat processing similar to their HTA and clinically 
anxious counterparts but may just as quickly dismiss the threatening information. This 
interpretation however is speculative but remains to be tested.  
Further, although there is compelling evidence to suggest that anxiety is characterised 
by an automatic attentional bias to threat, word stimuli are relatively limited in threat value 
and evolutionary relevance (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), therefore the findings from studies 
employing words as stimuli cannot be used to make predictions about attention allocations 
for more ecologically valid, pictorial stimuli (e.g.,, snakes, threatening scenes, angry faces). 
Therefore, for the purpose of this investigation, the following series of studies employed 
schematic representations of happy, neutral and threat faces as stimuli. 
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Chapter 5 
Automaticity of Attentional Bias to Pictorial Threat in Anxiety: Emotional Stroop 
Colour Naming Task 
The purpose of the present chapter was to investigate the automaticity of selective 
attention for masked and unmasked pictorial threat in non-clinical, high trait anxious (HTA) 
and low trait anxious (LTA) participants in line with the theoretical models described in 
Chapter 1. The chapter will further aim to investigate the priming hypothesis proposed by 
Öhman (1993).  In line with Study 1, the studies reported in this chapter will employ the 
emotional Stroop colour naming task for the purpose of this investigation (See Chapters 2 and 
4).  The current methodology differed from Study 1 in the following ways: (1) stimuli 
consisted of happy, natural and threat schematic faces, and these stimuli have been 
effectively employed in previous research investigating selective processing of pictorial 
threat in anxiety (e.g., Öhman et al., 2001); (2) a clinically anxious sample was not included. 
The aim of the following series of studies was to investigate the relative influence of state and 
trait anxiety in moderating selective processing for pictorial threat and including a clinical 
sample was beyond the scope of the current investigation; (3) Study 2.2 employed masked 
and unmasked stimuli intermixed to compare the role of awareness in threat processing of 
pictorial stimuli against the block design employed in Study 2.1.  
This methodology therefore allowed for investigating (1) selective processing of 
pictorial threat in non-clinical HTA and LTA individuals; (2) attention to pictorial threat 
without volition; (3) attention to pictorial threat without awareness; (4) the role of priming in 
moderating attentional allocation to pictorial threat at preattentive levels; (5) the relative 
influence of state and trait anxiety on  selective processing of pictorial threat and;  (6) the 
nature of awareness in selective processing of threat faces compared to the selective 
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processing of words employed in Study 1. In Study 1, the findings revealed that priming was 
not a precursor for eliciting selective attention to threat words at preattentive levels.   
These investigations were deemed important because the current body of empirical 
literature investigating the role of awareness on selective processing of pictorial threat is 
limited in several ways. First, only a limited number of studies have employed interference 
paradigms with schematic faces. Thus, this investigation was deemed significant because 
interference paradigms are capable of assessing both the without awareness and without 
volition components of the automaticity hypothesis. Second, the current body of literature 
employing interference paradigms with masked pictorial stimuli is methodologically limited 
and did not find evidence for selective processing of pictorial threat at preattentive levels in 
their trait anxious individuals (see Chapter 2). Attentional biases for masked pictorial threat 
have been observed in studies employing dot probe paradigms, however, the findings were 
mixed and could not confirm the involuntary nature of the automaticity hypothesis (see 
Chapter 2). The following section will summarise the key elements under investigation.  
Summary of Literature 
According to theories of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and 
Öhman and Mineka (2001) anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat that is 
automatic in that it is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness.  Öhman (1993) 
further proposes that conscious processing of threat is required to prime the mechanism 
responsible for processing threat at preattentive levels. In relation to the relative influence of 
state and trait anxiety in moderating these effects, Clark and Beck (2010) place emphasis on 
the role of trait anxiety, whereas,  Öhman and Mineka (2001) place greater emphasis on state 
anxiety, on the other hand,  Mogg and Bradley (1998) place emphasis on both state and trait 
anxiety.   
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Although there is evidence in support of selective processing of pictorial threat in 
clinically anxious and non- clinical HTA and LTA individuals (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Fella & 
Hamilton, 1998; Bradley et al., 1998; Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Galboa-Schechtman et al., 
1999; Koster, Crombez, Verscuere & Houwer, 2006; Lee & Knight, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 
1999a;  Mogg, McNamara, Powys, Rawliston, Seiffer & Bradley, 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 
2003), the methodological nature of the tasks employed do not allow for investigation of the 
involuntary or without awareness component of the automaticity hypothesis, which are 
central to the models under investigation. Despite the limited number of studies investigating 
the “without volition” component of the automaticity hypothesis, there is some evidence for 
the involuntary nature of selective processing of threat faces as a function of high trait 
anxiety (Avram, Balteş, Miclea, Miu, 2010) and as a function of increased state anxiety 
(Robson, Letkiewicz, Overstreet, Ernst and Grillon, 2011). However, these studies were 
limited in several ways: (1) Robson et al. (2011) did not investigate the role of trait anxiety in 
moderating these effects; (2) Avram et al., (2010) did not provide information regarding the 
influence of state anxiety on selective processing for pictorial threat; (3) the studies varied on 
task demands (e.g., name face vs. read word), yet both  found that the HTA and high state 
anxious participants’ attention was captured by the threat related content relative to threat 
related words; (4) neither study was able to provide information on the role of awareness in 
threat processing because both studies presented stimuli unmasked.  
At this time only two studies capable of assessing the role of awareness in selective 
processing of pictorial threat on the emotional Stroop colour naming task could be located 
(Putman, Hermans & van Honk, 2004; van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout & Stam, 
2001), and both failed to find evidence for selective processing of masked or unmasked 
pictorial stimuli as a function of trait anxiety. These findings are puzzling given that others 
123 
 
employing the emotional Stroop with pictorial stimuli have found unmasked threat 
processing effects as a function of trait anxiety (Avram et al., 2010) and state anxiety 
(Robson et al., 2011). Studies employing the dot probe methodology also found unmasked 
(e.g., Mogg, Garner & Bradley, 2007) and masked (e.g., Lee & Knight, 2009) processing 
biases for pictorial threat as a function of trait anxiety. A number of limitations identified 
with von Honk et al. (2001) and Putman et al. (2004) could have contributed to the 
differential findings. First, the discrepancy in data for the unmasked trials on the emotional 
Stroop task could be attributed to the different types of stimuli employed and the variation in 
task demands. The discrepancy in data for the masked trials could be attributed to the lack of 
state anxiety manipulation, the relatively long SOA and differences in task demands 
employed.  It is also likely that person variables could have contributed to the lack of 
significant threat processing biases between the studies. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of these accounts.  
To control for a number of limitations associated with the aforementioned studies and 
in an attempt to overcome some of the interpretational difficulties associated with these tasks, 
the studies included in this chapter employed the emotional Stroop colour naming task with 
schematic representation of happy, neutral and threat faces. A non-clinical sample of HTA 
and LTA participants was employed, and half of each trait anxiety group were exposed to the 
threat of shock, whereas the other half were assigned to the shock safe condition. Masked and 
unmasked schematic faces were blocked on exposure (Study 2.1), such that half of the 
participants received masked trials first followed by unmasked trials, whereas the other half 
received the opposite order. In Study 2.2, masked and unmasked faces were presented 
intermixed. Awareness checks were conducted in both studies by way of a face/non-face 
discrimination task.  
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 Study 2.1 
Individual Differences in Attention for Blocked Masked and Unmasked Emotionally 
Toned Faces in Anxiety With and Without the Threat of Shock on the Emotional Stroop 
Colour Naming Task. 
Aim of Study 
The aims of the current study were to: (1) investigate whether the presentation of 
schematic faces would be associated with differential patterns in attentional allocation to 
threat faces between the HTA and LTA participants compared to the attentional bias for 
threat words observed across all participants in Study 1; (2) assess the role of awareness in 
moderating these effects; and (3) investigate whether priming is a precursor for threat 
processing at preattentive levels by presenting masked and unmasked trials blocked on 
exposure. 
Hypotheses 
Following the theoretical positions under investigation, several specific predictions 
were made.  First, if priming is not needed to elicit preconscious threat processing effects, 
then in line with Clark and Beck (2010) it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA 
participants would be slower to colour name masked and unmasked threat faces relative to 
non-threat faces irrespective of whether masked or unmasked trials were presented first, but 
only while performing under the threat of shock. However, if priming is needed to elicit 
masked threat processing effects, then in line with Öhman (1993) it was predicted that HTA 
relative to LTA participants would be slower to colour name masked threat faces relative to 
masked neutral faces, but only when performing under the threat of shock,  and only when 
unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials.  If the schematic threat faces do 
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carry more threat value than threat words then in line with Mogg and Bradley (1998) and 
Öhman and Mineka (2001), it was predicted that HTA and LTA participants would be slower 
to colour name masked and unmasked threat faces relative to neutral or happy faces but only 
when performing under the threat of shock and only when unmasked trials are presented 
before the masked trials. 
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 167 Bond University students, staff and Gold Coast community 
volunteers participated in this study. Chapter 3 details the incentives for participating and 
screening criteria. Of those who met initial screening criteria, one participant was excluded 
due to above criterion scores on the depression scale, and 10 participants were excluded due 
to high social desirability scores. These participants were thanked, given their incentive, a 
handout detailing the nature of the study, and released.  Of those included in the experimental 
phase, data from a further 28 participants was excluded due to their performance on the final 
awareness check.  
One hundred twenty eight participants, 44 male and 84 female, aged 18 years to 65 
years (M = 30.04 years; SD =14.5) made up the final sample.  Participants were allocated to 
the trait anxiety group (64 LTA, 64 HTA) following the same procedure used in Study 1. 
That is, those who scored 36 or below on the STAI-T were assigned to the LTA group and 
those who scored 37 and above were assigned to the HTA group. Based on their order of 
arrival at the laboratory, half of the participants within each anxiety group were randomly 
allocated to the shock threat (n = 64) and shock safe (n = 64) conditions, and half the 
participants in these groups were randomly allocated to the presentation order conditions 
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(masked first, n = 64; unmasked first, n = 64). The allocation to conditions resulted in 16 
participants being allocated to each experimental group.   
Apparatus  
 Details for the experimental hardware, software and shock stimulus used in Study 2.2 
are presented in Chapter 3 above. 
Materials 
 Face Stimuli. Details on the face, non-face and mask stimuli used in the practice 
trials, colour naming trials and final awareness check trials in Study 2.1 are presented in 
Chapter 3 above. 
Psychometric Measures 
 All participants completed the STAI, DASS-D, MCSDS and ARQ.  Chapter 3 
provides a detailed description of each questionnaire including psychometric properties, 
scoring and inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
Design 
A 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design was used for the study. The within subjects factors 
were valence (happy face vs. neutral face vs. threat face) and exposure mode (masked vs. 
unmasked). The between subjects factors were trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA), shock 
group (shock threat vs. shock safe) and presentation order (masked first vs. unmasked first). 
The dependent variables were colour naming reaction times and colour naming errors.  
Procedure 
The SOA threshold was pre-determined at 15 msec to prevent the possibility of SOA 
setting trials priming responses on experimental trials. SOA of 15 msec was chosen because 
previous studies have shown that SOAs have precluded awareness of  masked pictorial 
127 
 
stimuli (e.g., 14 msec, Harvey et al. 1996; 14 msec & 17 msec, Mogg & Bradley, 1999a, 
Experiment 1 & Experiment 3, respectively; 14 msec, Mogg et al., 1993a;  20 msec, 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). 
Shock intensity setting.  In line with study 1, participants who were assigned to the 
shock threat group underwent a procedure to set the shock intensity. Shock intensity was set 
individually for each participant (see Study 1 for procedural details).   
Practice trials. Prior to starting the practice block, all participants received standard 
instructions. They were informed to name the colour of the stimulus as quickly and 
accurately as possible while ignoring the emotional content of the stimulus. All participants 
completed a practice block of 24 trials to familiarize themselves with the experimental task. 
On each trial, they were presented with a row of three white crosses in the centre of the 
screen for one second.   The crosses served as a fixation point for the stimuli.  The screen was 
then blanked for 250 msec and replaced by either a red, green, blue or yellow non-face in the 
location formerly occupied by the crosses. Half of the stimuli were presented unmasked 
whereas the other half were presented masked. On the unmasked trials, the non-face would 
remain on the screen until the participants’ first vocal response was detected by the 
experimental software. On the masked trials, the stimulus was presented for 15 msec and was 
replaced by a mask of the same colour. The mask remained on the screen until the 
participant’s first vocal response was recorded. The experimenter coded accuracy of the 
participant’s response on a separate monitor. Any responses that indicated the colour of the 
stimulus were coded as “correct”, and “incorrect” if the initial response was not a clear 
identification of the colour of the stimulus (e.g., if the participant stuttered, or named the 
wrong colour).  Any responses that failed to be recorded by the experimental software were 
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coded as a “microphone failure”. After the experimenter coded the responses the next trial 
was initiated, with an average two second inter-trial interval.  
On the practice trials, half of the stimuli (non-faces) were presented unmasked and 
half were masked. The order of presentation was quasi-randomised but governed by the 
restriction that not more than two presentations of the same exposure, colour, or item 
occurred in succession. Each stimulus type was presented eight times in each block of 24 
trials, four times masked and four times unmasked, six times in each colour, and each 
stimulus was assigned to each mask once.  Each mask was presented three times across 12 
trials and appeared in the same colour across all presentations.  Across a block of 24 trials, 
each colour was presented six times and each colour was assigned to each mask six times 
(three times masked and three times unmasked). The combination of targets, colours and 
masks was such that none of these combinations occurred more than once within the block. 
Following the practice trials, all participants received a three minute rest period.  
Those in the shock threat group had the electrode re-attached, and were informed that the 
computer would randomly deliver between five and seven electric shocks across the four 
blocks of experimental colour naming trials. In reality, the experimenter delivered the electric 
shocks and only five electric shocks were administered for the remainder of the experiment. 
The first electric shock was delivered at the same intensity previously set during the shock 
intensity setting procedure and was administered approximately 15 seconds prior the first 
experimental colour naming trial.  This procedure was employed to increase the likelihood 
that participants believed the instructions given to them. 
Colour naming trials.  Four blocks of 24 colour naming trials were administered.  In 
each block three schematic faces (happy, neutral, threat) were presented in red, green, blue or 
yellow colouring, four times masked, and four times unmasked. On the unmasked trials, the 
face would remain on the screen until the participants’ first vocal response was recorded by 
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the experimental software.  On the masked trials, the face was presented for 15 msec and 
replaced by a mask of the same colour. Participants who were assigned to the unmasked first 
condition received two blocks of 24 unmasked trials first followed by two blocks of masked 
trials. The masked first group received the opposite presentation order.  The experimental 
procedure relating to participant standard task demands, instructions, recording and scoring 
of responses was the same as in the practice trials.  
In line with the practice trials, stimulus presentations were quasi-randomized with the 
restrictions that no more than two consecutive trials of the same face type and colour were 
presented in a block of 24 trials.  In a block of 24 trials, each face type was presented eight 
times and with each colour twice. Each face type was presented with each mask four times 
across two blocks of 24 trials.  Each mask was presented 6 times in a block of 24 trials. 
Across two blocks of 48 trials, each mask was presented with each face type four times, and 
in each colour three times.  Across a block of 24 trials, each colour appeared six times and 
twice with each face type, and three times with each mask across two blocks of 48 trials. To 
control for potential differences in valence between the masks, each was presented in only 
one colour for each participant, but the assignment of colours to masks was fully 
counterbalanced across participants. Across four versions of stimulus sequencing, each 
combination of face type, colour and mask was presented once.  
Prior to the first block of colour naming trials, participants completed the ARQ for the 
first time.  A brief rest period followed before the colour naming trials commenced, and 
approximately 15 seconds prior to the initiation of the first trial in Block 1 those in the shock 
threat group received their first shock. On each experimental colour naming trial, participants 
were presented with a row of three white crosses in the centre of the screen for one second, 
the screen was than blanked for 250 msec and a neutral, happy or threat face appeared in 
either red, green blue or yellow colouring, in the location formerly occupied by the crosses. 
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The item remained on the screen until the first vocal response was detected by the 
experimental software.  On the masked trials, a mask of the same colour replaced the 
schematic face after 15 msec and remained on the screen until the software recorded the first 
vocal response. Participants in the shock threat group received a second shock immediately 
after they indicated their final colour naming response in the first block. All participants 
completed the ARQ again during the rest time between Block 1 and 2 and those in the shock 
threat group received their third shock at this time. Block2 commenced once participants 
completed the questionnaire. During the rest period between Block 2 and 3participants filled 
out the third ARQ.  Approximately 15 seconds prior to commencing block 3 of trials, those in 
the shock threat group received their fourth shock.   The fifth and final eclectic shock was 
administered immediately following the participant’s vocal response for the final trial in 
Block 3.  At this stage participants were anticipating up to two more shocks, when in reality 
this was the final shock to be administered. Participants completed the final ARQ at this time, 
after which the final block of trials was initiated.  Once the final block was completed, those 
in the shock threat group had the electrode removed.  
Awareness check trials.  Following the completion of the four blocks of 
experimental colour naming trials, each participant completed a block of 48 awareness check 
trials to ensure that they remained unaware of the masked stimuli.  In each block, 24 trials 
were faces and 24 were non-faces. On each trial, participants were presented with a row of 
three white crosses in the centre of the screen for one second, the screen was then blanked for 
250 msec and replaced by either a red, green blue or yellow face or a non-face in the location 
formerly occupied by the crosses. After 15 msec the face/non-face was then replaced by one 
of four pattern masks of the same colour.  The participants’ task was to indicate whether a 
face or a non-face preceded the mask by pressing a corresponding button on a keyboard. 
Participants were instructed to guess if they were unsure of the stimulus status.   
131 
 
The order of presentation was quasi-randomised with restrictions such that no more 
than two items of the same status and colour occurred in succession. Each block of 48 trials 
consisted of 24 faces and 24 non-faces. Each face type and non-face appeared in the block 
eight times and in each colour twice. Each mask appeared in the block 12 times and twice in 
each colour. Each colour appeared in the block 12 times and assigned to each stimulus type 
twice. Only data from those participants who scored 24 or fewer correct responses was 
retained because they were considered to have remained unaware of the masked stimuli 
during the experimental colour naming trials.  The data for those who scored more than 25 
correct responses was not included in the final analysis. At the conclusion of the task, all 
participants were thanked, debriefed and released. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Following Study 1, validation that groups were differentiated on trait anxiety was 
sought, as was verification of the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, prior to 
statistical analysis of the colour naming reaction time data.   
Validity of trait anxiety group status.  To verify that the HTA and LTA participants 
significantly differed on self-reported trait anxiety, STAI-T scores were subjected to a 2 X 2 
X 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA), shock condition 
(shock save vs. shock threat) and presentation order (masked first vs. unmasked first) as the 
between subject variables and STAI-T scores as the dependent variable. The results revealed 
a significant main effect of trait anxiety, F (1, 120) = 231.16, MSE = 27.62, p < .001, p
2 
= 
658, with the LTA group (M = 30.61; SE = .66) reporting lower trait anxiety compared to 
132 
 
their HTA counterparts (M = 44.73; SE = .66). There were no other main effects or 
interactions, all F < 2.09, p > .151 ns.  
To assess for differences in self-reported state anxiety, depression, social desirability 
and age, the data for each were subject to separate ANOVAs of equivalent design to that 
above. On the STAI-S measure, the results revealed a significant main effect of trait anxiety, 
F (1, 120) = 72.51, MSE = 52.04, p < .001, p
2 
= .377, with the LTA group (M = 27.33; SE = 
.90) reporting lower state anxiety than the HTA group (M = 38.12; SE =. 90).   There were no 
other main effects or interactions, all F < 3.07, p > .082 ns. Assessment of the depression 
scale of the DASS measure also produced a significant main effect of trait anxiety, F (1, 120) 
= 32.11, MSE = 25.39, p < 001, p
2 
= .211, with the LTA group (M = 2.58; SE = .63) 
reporting lower depression than the HTA group (M = 7.63; SE = .63). The data also yielded, a 
significant main effect of presentation order which was further qualified by a higher order 
Shock Condition X Presentation Order interaction, F (1, 120) = 4.51, MSE = 25.39,  p = .036, 
p
2 
= .036.  Averaged over trait anxiety, the interaction reflects the fact that there was no 
difference in self-reported depression scores as a function of presentation order for those in 
the shock threat group, F (1, 124) = .01, MSE = 32, p = .930, p
2 
= 
 
000 ns, whereas in the 
shock safe group, higher self-reported depression was noted in the unmasked first condition 
(M = 7.59; SE = 1.00)  compared to the masked first condition (M = 3.69; SE = 1.00), F (1, 
124) = 7.63, MSE = 32, p = .007, p
2 
=.058.  
Analysis of honest responses on the MCSDS measure revealed a significant main 
effect of trait anxiety group, F (1, 120) = 11.77, MSE = 3.16, p = .001, p
2 
= .089, with the 
HTA counterparts (M = 7.25; SE = .22) responding more honestly with fewer socially 
desirable responses than their LTA group (M = 6.17; SE = .22).  There were no other main 
effects or interactions, all F < 3.03, p > .084 ns. Further analysis revealed no significant 
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difference in age of participants between conditions, all F < 2.17, all p > .143 ns. A chi 
square analysis revealed that gender was proportionately distributed among the anxiety 
groups, 2 (3) = 5.26, p = .153 ns.   Table 5.1 shows the means and standard deviations for the 
measures. 
Table 5.1 
Study 2.1 Means and Standard Variations for Questionnaire and Age Variables 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M  (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age  
(years) 
36.50 (16.56)  27.50 (11.06)  31.25 (17.33)  29.63 (14.89) 
STAI-T 31.25 (4.84)  30.81 (3.92)  30.88 (3.98)  29.50 (4.84) 
STAI-S 28.88 (5.23)  26.75 (7.24)  28.00 (4.69)  25.69 (4.66) 
DASS-D 4.19 (4.51)  1.63 (1.67)  3.38 (6.01)  1.13 (1.45) 
MCSDS 6.13 (1.82)  6.81 (1.72)  6.13 (1.63)  5.63 (1.41) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age  
(years) 
27.00 (13.12)  24.75 (6.82)  29.87 (15.43)  33.81 (17.22) 
STAI-T 46.81 (6.18)  44.25 (6.74)  43.00 (4.90)  44.88 (5.94) 
STAI-S 41.56 (7.14)  35.31 (7.09)  37.06 (9.38)  38.81 (10.19) 
DASS-D 11.00 (6.49)  5.75 (4.78)  5.88 (4.29)  7.88 (7.64) 
MCSDS 7.38 (1.59)  7.63 (2.03)  6.75 (1.77)  7.25 (2.14) 
 
 Validity of state anxiety manipulation. To verify that shock intensity was 
comparable between groups, a 2 X 2 ANOVA was employed with trait anxiety (HTA vs 
LTA) and presentation order (masked first vs. unmasked first) as the between subject 
variables and shock intensity as the dependent variable. The result revealed comparable 
shock intensity between all groups, all F < 2.17, p > .143 ns. The effectiveness of the threat 
of shock as an anxiety induction method was validated by examining effect of the threat of 
shock on the ARQ dimensions in the trait anxiety and presentation order conditions. A single 
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index on each dimension of the ARQ was obtained by averaging nervousness, fearfulness and 
anxiousness responses over the blocks of trials.  Means and SDs of each scale on the ARQ for 
HTA and LTA groups under the threat of shock and in the shock safe condition on masked 
first and unmasked first blocks are reported below in Table 5.2 
Table 5.2 
Study 2.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Responses for HTA and LTA Participants on 
Three Dimensions of the Arousal Rating Questionnaire under Shock Safe and Shock Threat 
Conditions in the Unmasked First and Masked First Presentation Order.  
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 1.23 (1.06)  1.36 (1.44)  0.58 (1.33)  0.67 (1.53) 
Fearful - Fearless 1.36 (1.24)  1.80 (1.23)  0.83 (1.23)  1.11 (1.25) 
Anxious – Relaxed 1.05 (0.98)  1.31 (1.39)  0.61 (1.35)  0.58 (1.58) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 0.92 (1.62)  0.52 (1.58)  0.25 (1.39)  0.52 (1.35) 
Fearful - Fearless 1.17 (1.40)  0.84 (1.57)  0.22 (1.34)  0.58 (1.30) 
Anxious – Relaxed 0.81 (1.39)  0.34 (1.68)  -0.03 (1.30)  0.47 (1.57) 
 
Note:  Negative Scores reflect greater nervousness, fearfulness and anxiety, whereas positive 
scores reflect the opposite.  
 The ARQ data was analysed in three separate 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs, with trait anxiety 
(LTA vs. HTA), shock condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) and presentation order 
(unmasked first vs. masked first) as the between groups factors and the  nervousness, 
fearfulness and anxiousness dimensions as the dependent variables.  On the nervousness 
dimension, a main effect of shock condition emerged, such that, those in the shock threat 
group (M = .50; SE = .18) reporting more nervousness than those in the shock safe group (M 
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= 1.01; SE = .18), F (1, 120) = 4.09, MSE = 2.03, p = .048, p
2 
= .032.  There were no other 
main effects or interactions, all F < 1 ns.  
On the fearfulness dimension a main effect of shock condition group was noted 
reflecting that fact that those in the shock threat group (M = .68; SE = .17) reported more 
fearfulness than those in the shock safe group (M = 1.29; SE = .17), F (1, 120) = 6.75, MSE = 
1.76, p = .011, p
2 
= .053.  A main effect of trait anxiety group was also found, reflecting the 
fact that the HTA participants (M = .70; SE = .17) reported more fearfulness that than their 
LTA counterparts (M = 1.27; SE = .17), F (1, 120) = 5.91, MSE = 1.76, p = .017, p
2 
= .047.  
There were no other main effects or interactions, all F < 1 ns.  
On the anxiousness dimension, a main effect of trait anxiety group emerged, F (1, 
120) = 3.79, MSE = 2.01, p = .044, p
2
= .053 with more anxiousness being reported by the 
HTA group (M = .40; SE = .18) than the LTA group (M = .89; SE = .18). A main effect of 
shock condition was also found, with the shock threat group (M = .41; SE = .18) reporting 
more anxiousness compared to the shock safe group (M = .88; SE = .18), F (1, 120) = 3.55, 
MSE = 2.01, p = .049, p
2 
= .029. There were no other main effects or interactions, all F < 1 
ns.  
 Validity of masking procedure in preventing awareness. The SOA of the masked 
stimuli was set to 15 msec for all participants.  The rationale for setting this duration was to 
avoid possible priming effects on the masked trials (see Chapter 2 for review).  The 
percentage of correct responses between all eight experimental groups is shown in Table 5.3. 
The groups were comparable on performance across the final awareness check trials.  
Performance of these groups as a whole (M = 23.44; SD = 3.69) did not differ from that 
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expected by chance (24; i.e., 50 %), z = .15 ns. The data suggests that participants were 
unaware of the stimuli in the masked condition.   
Table 5.3 
Study 2.1.  Means and Standard Deviations of Correct Responses (%) on the Final 
Awareness Check Trial in the HTA and LTA Group Performing Under Shock Safe and Shock 
Threat Conditions in the Unmasked First and Masked First Blocks. 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Correct Responses (%) 51.17 (3.23)  49.22 (4.16)  51.69 (16.58)  47.52 (5.8) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Correct Responses (%) 47.92 (6.85)  47.53 (5.06)  46.35 (6.52)  49.22 (5.80) 
Data Reduction 
Prior to statistical analysis, the colour naming reaction time data was reduced in the 
following stages:  (a) microphone failures (1.33%); (b) colour naming errors (0.71%); (c) 
responses less than 300 msec or more than 3000 msec (0.41%); and  (d) trials more than 2 SD 
from each cell mean (4.55% of trials). 
Error data. The percentage of errors in each experimental condition is shown in 
Table 5.4.  Colour naming error data was analysed using a 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design 
ANCOVA with valence (happy, neutral and threat faces) and exposure mode (masked vs. 
unmasked) as the within subject variables, and Trait Anxiety group (LTA vs. HTA), shock 
condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) and presentation order (unmasked first vs. masked 
first) as the between group variables. The depression scores were entered as a covariate and 
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colour naming errors as the dependent variable. The results revealed no significant main 
effects or interactions, all F < 1 ns.  
Reaction Time Data 
Mean reaction times for each experimental condition were calculated and are shown 
below in Table 5.5.  All reaction time data was analysed using an equivalent design to that 
used for the error data.  
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Table 5.4 
Study 2.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Error Percentages for Colour Naming Reaction 
Time Data for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for HTA and LTA 
Participants in the Shock Safe and Shock Threat Groups in Unmasked First and Masked First 
Presentation Order Conditions.  
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 0.39 (1.56)  0.39 (1.56)  0.39 (1.56)  0.78 (2.13) 
Neutral Faces 0.00 (0.00)  1.17 (2.52)  0.78 (2.13)  1.17 (2.52) 
Threat Faces 0.78 (2.13)  0.78 (2.13)  1.17 (2.52)  0.39 (1.56) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 0.78 (2.13)  0.78 (2.13)  0.00 (0.00)  0.78 (3.13) 
Neutral Faces 1.17 (2.52)  1.17 (2.52)  0.00 (0.00)  1.95 (3.76) 
Threat Faces 0.39 (1.56)  0.78 (3.13)  0.39 (1.56)  0.00 (0.00) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked 1
st
  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 0.78 (2.13)  1.17 (3.40)  0.78 (2.13)  0.39 (1.56) 
Neutral Faces 1.17 (2.52)  0.78 (2.13)  0.39 (1.56)  1.56 (3.61) 
Threat Faces 0.78 (2.13)  0.36 (1.56)  0.78 (2.13)  0.78 (2.13) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 0.39 (1.56)  0.78 (2.13)  0.78 (2.13)  1.95 (3.76) 
Neutral Faces 0.00 (0.00)  1.17 (2.52)  0.39 (1.56)  0.39 (1.56) 
Threat Faces 1.17 (2.52)  0.78 (3.13)  0.00 (0.00)  0.39 (1.56) 
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Table 5.5 
Study 2.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Colour Naming Reaction Times in Milliseconds 
for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for the LTA and HTA 
Participants in the Shock Safe and Threat of Shock Condition for the Unmasked First and 
Masked First Presentation Order Conditions.  
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked  First  Masked  First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 733 (88)  686 (96)  702 (114)  663 (84) 
Neutral Faces 743 (91)  691 (95)  702 (119)  657 (101) 
Threat Faces 742 (104)  682 (86)  717 (114)  667 (74) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 717 (80)  702 (106)  676 (92)  645 (88) 
Neutral Faces 711 (82)  693 (94)  679 (88)  660 (85) 
Threat Faces 705 (86)  708 (106)  664 (87)  654 (92) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 740 (71)  681 (133)  732 (98)  707 (120) 
Neutral Faces 742 (82)  696 (145)  706 (90)  706 (117) 
Threat Faces 758 (97)  707 (175)  715 (104)  695 (119) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 710 (84)  738 (176)  698 (108)  725 (118) 
Neutral Faces 721 (79)  720 (122)  693 (90)  725 (106) 
Threat Faces 708 (92)  704 (134)  686 (97)  719 (115) 
  
The results revealed a significant Exposure Mode X Presentation Order interaction, F 
(1, 119) = 28.74, MSE = 82007.90, p < .001, p
2 
= .195.  The interaction is shown below in 
Figure 5.1.  Averaged over valence, trait anxiety and shock condition  the interaction reflects 
the fact that when the unmasked stimuli were presented first,  longer colour naming reaction 
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times were associated with the masked stimuli (M = 727 msec; SE = 13.00) compared to the 
unmasked stimuli (M = 698 msec; SE = 12.66), F (1, 125) = 28.74, p < .001, p
2 
=.195,   
whereas when the masked stimuli were presented first, the opposite pattern emerged, with 
longer reaction times associated with the unmasked stimuli (M = 699 msec; SE = 12.66) 
compared to the masked stimuli (M = 686 msec; SE = 13.00), F (1, 125) = 5.83, p = 0.017, 
p
2 
= .045.  
 
Figure 5.1. Study 2.1.  Mean colour naming reaction times in milliseconds for HTA and LTA 
anxiety groups on the masked and unmasked exposure mode conditions averaged over 
valence and shock condition. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
A significant Exposure Mode X Valence X Trait Anxiety Group X Shock Condition 
interaction also emerged,  F (2, 238) = 3.29, MSE = 1040, p = .039, p
2 
= .027 and is shown 
below in Figure 5.2. To aid the interpretation of this interaction, the data were analysed 
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separately for masked and unmasked exposure modes.  As can be seen in the top left and 
right panels of Figure 5.2, averaged over presentation order, the data reflect the fact that there 
was no difference in colour naming latency on the unmasked trials on the basis of trait 
anxiety or shock condition status,  all F < 1.69 ns.  On the masked trials, a significant 
Valence X Trait Anxiety Group X Shock Condition interaction emerged, F (2, 246) = 3.25, 
MSE = 1043.94, p = .040, p
2 
=.026. To decompose this interaction, the data were analysed 
separately for the LTA and HTA groups. As can be seen in the bottom left panel of Figure 
5.3, for the LTA group, colour naming reaction time was not influenced by the valence of the 
stimuli, shock condition or the interactive effect of both these variables, all F < 1.09, p > .278 
ns. For the HTA group however, a marginally significant Valence X Shock Condition 
interaction emerged, F (2, 60) = 2.97, p = .059, p
2  
= .090.  A series of Bonferoni protected 
repeated measures t-tests revealed that colour naming latencies for the HTA participants in 
the shock threat condition were not influenced by the valence of stimuli, all t < 1.25, p > .222, 
ns, whereas in the shock safe condition, the HTA participants demonstrated significantly 
longer colour naming latency for masked threat stimuli (M = 732.54 msec) compared to the 
masked happy stimuli (M = 710 msec), t (31) = 2.08, p = 046. The colour naming latency for 
neutral faces (M = 719 msec) did not differ from either threat or happy faces, both t < 1.69, p 
>.1 02, ns.    
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Figure 5. 2.  Study 2.1: Mean colour naming reaction times in milliseconds for happy, neutral 
and threat faces in the LTA and HTA groups on masked and unmasked exposure mode 
conditions for the shock safe and threat of shock groups averaged over presentation order.  
Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was (1) to investigate the automaticity of selective 
attention for masked and unmasked pictorial threat in non-clinical, high trait anxious (HTA) 
and low trait anxious (LTA) participants and to investigate the priming hypothesis proposed 
by Öhman (1993). The central aims of the proposed study were: (1) to investigate whether the 
presentation of schematic faces would produce differential patterns in attentional allocation to 
threat faces between the HTA and LTA participants compared to the attentional bias for 
threat words observed across all participants in Study 1; (2) to assess the role of awareness in 
moderating these effects; and (3) to investigate whether priming is a precursor for threat 
processing at pre-attentive levels by presenting masked and unmasked trials blocked on 
exposure mode. 
Following Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and Öhman and Mineka 
(2001) the following predictions were made: (1) If priming is not needed to elicit 
preconscious threat processing effects, then in line with Clark and Beck (2010) it was 
predicted that HTA relative to LTA participants would be slower to colour name masked and 
unmasked threat faces relative to non-threat faces irrespective of whether masked or 
unmasked trials were presented first, but only while performing under the threat of shock; (2) 
If priming is needed to elicit masked threat processing effects, then in line with Öhman 
(1993) it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA participants would be slower to colour 
name masked threat faces relative to masked neutral faces but only while performing under 
the threat of shock and only when unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials; 
and (3) if the schematic threat faces do carry more threat value than threat words then 
following Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001), it was predicted that 
HTA and LTA participants would be slower to colour name masked and unmasked threat 
144 
 
faces relative to neutral or happy faces but only while performing under the threat of shock 
and only when unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials. 
The data from the present study partially supported the first prediction, such that HTA 
relative to LTA participants were slower to colour name masked threat faces relative to happy 
faces, irrespective of whether they were presented with a block of masked trials first or 
unmasked trials first. However, these processing biases were only observed under shock safe 
conditions and there was no evidence for selective attention to threat on unmasked trials. 
These data therefore suggest that HTA participants demonstrate an attentional bias to threat 
for stimuli that are presented outside of conscious awareness but this threat processing bias is 
not evidenced when conscious access to threat items is permitted. The data for the masked 
trials was consistent with results reported by Mogg and Bradley (1999a, Experiment 1 & 
Experiment 3), who also found vigilance for masked threat faces relative to masked happy 
faces.  In opposition to Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis, the present data revealed that 
priming was not a precursor for eliciting preconscious processing of threat. Therefore, these 
data may suggest that schematic faces hold some biologically prepared relevance.   
Further, in HTA shock safe participants, on the masked trials, longer colour naming 
reaction times were associated with the threat faces relative to the happy faces, whereas the 
reaction times to the neutral faces did not differ from either the threat or happy faces. The 
failure to detect significant differences between the threat and neutral faces in HTA 
participants on the emotional Stroop task is congruent with others (e.g., Putman et al., 2004; 
van Honk et al., 2001).   It is therefore possible that participants engaged in a comparison 
based evaluative process between threat and happy faces and threat and neutral faces and that 
this comparison may play an important role in the recruiting of selective attention for 
pictorial stimuli. Given that the findings of the current study revealed evidence for selective 
processing of threat faces relative to happy faces in anxious participants, this may suggest 
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that selective attention in anxious individuals is based on valence rather than emotionality. 
These date provide support for the models of Clark and Beck (2010),  Mogg and Bradley 
(1998) , Öhman (1993) and Öhman and  Mineka (2001), which propose that anxiety is 
characterized by an attentional bias to threat and that this bias is automatic in that it is 
involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness.   
In the current study, on the unmasked trials, there was no evidence to suggest that the 
threatening faces were processed differently from the happy or neutral faces in either the 
HTA or LTA participants. These findings are in accord with Putman et al. (2004) and van 
Honk et al. (2001) who also failed to find selective processing of threat faces on the 
emotional Stroop colour naming task. These finding are incongruent with the theoretical 
models described in Chapter 1, and in comparison the threat processing biases observed on 
the masked trials.  
The findings revealed that attentional biases to threat were only observed in the HTA 
participants on masked trials when performing under shock safe conditions, with no 
differences in attentional allocation observed in the shock threat conditions.  Others, 
employing verbal stimuli on this task, found masked effects under stress conditions (e.g., 
Edwards et al., 2010b). In comparing the finding of these studies, it may be that pictorial 
threat may carry greater threat value than verbal threat, and therefore HTA participants may 
not rely on increased state anxiety to moderate selective processing of pictorial threat.  This 
speculation is however problematic for reconciling attention patterns when anxiety is high. 
These finding are at odds with Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) theory that attentional biases to 
threat are moderated by current arousal. Further, if it is accepted that threat faces do carry 
more threat value than threat words, then these findings are also inconsistent with Mogg and 
Bradley’s (1998) model, which proposes that as the value of threat increases the attentional 
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biases should be observed in both HTA and LTA individuals irrespective of current levels of 
stress.  
Summary 
 The findings of Study 2.1 suggest that when stimuli are blocked on exposure, HTA 
individuals selectively attend to schematic pictures of threatening faces relative to happy 
faces but only when stimuli are presented masked and only under conditions of low arousal 
irrespective of blocking. These findings offer mixed support for the models under 
investigation. First, these finding support the theoretical position of Clark and Beck (2010) 
who place emphasis on trait anxiety in moderating attentional biases to threat in anxiety. 
However, these findings are at odds with Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) theoretical position, 
proposing that increases in state anxiety and stimulus threat value should be associated with 
selective attention for threat irrespective of trait anxiety. These findings are also inconsistent 
with Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) theoretical view which places emphasis on higher state 
anxiety in moderating these effects.  In the present study, selective processing of threat was 
only observed in the shock safe condition. The findings are also at odds with Öhman’s (1993) 
theoretical view proposing the need for priming of the mechanisms responsible for eliciting 
threat processing at preconscious levels. In the present study, selective processing of threat 
was observed on masked trials irrespective of whether masked or unmasked trials were 
presented first.   These data suggest that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to 
pictorial threat, and that this bias is automatic in that it is involuntary and occurs outside of 
conscious awareness within the attentional system, but is restricted to masked stimuli and 
under conditions of low stress.  
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Study 2.2 
Individual Differences in Attention for Intermixed Masked and Unmasked Emotionally 
Toned Faces in Anxiety with and without the Threat of Shock on the Emotional Stroop 
Task. 
Aim of Study 
The findings of Study 1 revealed evidence for attentional biases for verbal threat 
across all anxiety groups, irrespective of state anxiety manipulation, exposure mode and 
exposure mode presentation order.  In Study 2.1, HTA participants demonstrated an 
attentional bias toward masked threat faces irrespective of exposure mode presentation order, 
but only while performing under shock safe conditions.   The aim of the present study was to 
compare patterns of selective attention for threat faces in HTA and LTA individuals when 
masked and unmasked trials are intermixed. This comparison was considered important given 
that in Study 2.1, employing a block exposure design, the findings were puzzling in 
comparison to others (e.g., Avram et al., 2010; Putman et al., 2004; van Honk et al., 2001) 
and for theoretical models (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).   Specifically, 
Study 2.1 revealed selective processing of pictorial threat in the HTA participants irrespective 
of exposure mode presentation order but only on masked trials, with unmasked trials not 
eliciting any differences in processing of threat. Other emotional Stroop studies employing 
blocked designs with pictorial stimuli failed to produce any significant findings (e.g., Putman 
et al., 2004; van Honk et al., 2001) while others employing unmasked pictorial stimuli on this 
task found evidence for threat processing biases on unmasked trials (e.g., Avram et al., 2010).  
The current study employed a intermixed sequence of masked and unmasked trials. 
148 
 
Hypothesis 
In In accord with Clark and Beck (2010), Mogg and Bradley (1998), and Öhman and 
Mineka (2001), several specific predictions were made.  First, in line with Clark and Beck 
(2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001)  it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA 
participants would be slower to colour name masked and unmasked threat faces relative to 
non-threat faces but only while performing under the threat of shock. However, if the 
schematic threat faces do carry more threat valued than threat words then in line with Mogg 
and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) it was predicted that HTA and LTA 
participants would be slower to colour name masked and unmasked threat faces relative to 
neutral or happy faces but only while performing under the threat of shock. 
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 120 Bond University students, staff and Gold Coast community 
volunteers participated in this study.  Chapter 3 details the incentives for participating and 
screening criteria. Of those who met initial screening criteria, 6 participants were excluded 
due to high depression scores and 12 participants were excluded due to a high social 
desirability score. They were thanked, given their incentive, a handout detailing the nature of 
the study, and released.  Of those included in the experimental phase the data from a further 3 
participants was excluded from analysis, one disclosed being over 65 years old, one reported 
a heart condition and another reported being colour blind, after initially withholding this 
information.  Data from a further 35 participants was excluded on the basis of their 
performance on the final awareness check. 
Sixty-four participants, 18 male and 46 female, aged 18 years to 65 years (M = 32.41 
years; SD = 14.68) made up the final sample. Participants were allocated to a trait anxiety 
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group (32 LTA; 32 HTA) following the same criteria used in Study 1. That is, those who 
scored 36 and below on the STAI-T were assigned to the LTA group and those who scored 
37 and above were assigned to the HTA group.  Based on their order of arrival at the 
laboratory, half of the participants within each trait anxiety group were randomly allocated to 
either the shock safe or shock threat condition.   
Apparatus  
 Details for the Experimental Hardware, Software and Electric Shock stimulus used in 
Study 2.2 are provided in Chapter 3. 
Materials 
Face stimuli. Details on the face, non-face and mask stimuli used in the initial 
threshold setting trials, practice trials, colour naming trials and final awareness check trials in 
Study 2.2 are provided in Chapter 3.  
Psychometric Measures 
 All participants completed the STAI-T, STAI-S, Depression scale of the DASS, 
MCSDS and ARQ.  Chapter 3 details each questionnaire including psychometric properties, 
scoring and inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
Design 
A 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design was used for the study. The within subjects factors 
were valence (happy face, neutral face, threat face) and exposure mode (unmasked vs. 
masked). The between subjects factors were trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA) and shock 
condition (shock threat vs. shock safe). The dependent variables were colour naming reaction 
times and colour naming errors.  
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Procedure 
 All participants provided voluntary informed consent and answered eligibility related 
questions before completing the questionnaires. They were then allocated to conditions and 
underwent the initial stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) setting followed by the shock 
intensity setting (if in the shock threat group), practice trials and experimental procedure and 
the final awareness check trials.  
 SOA threshold setting. Each participant was presented with a series of face –non-
face decision trials in which a face or a scrambled face (non-face) was briefly presented on 
the screen and quickly replaced by one of four pattern masks. Each block consisted of 12 
trials with 6 faces and 6 non-faces randomly presented within each block.  Participants were 
instructed to indicate whether a face or a non-face preceded the onset of the mask by pressing 
a left arrow on their keyboard for face and the right arrow for non-face. If participants were 
unsure of the stimulus they were instructed to guess.   A potential for a response bias was 
controlled by reminding participants who reported seeing all faces or all non-faces of the 
experimental parameters. Participants were made familiar with the face/non-face exemplars 
via a printout prior to this task.  
The targets were presented in a quasi-randomised order governed by the parameter 
that items of the same status (i.e., face vs. scrambled-face) were not presented on more than 
two consecutive trials. Within a block of 12 trials, each stimulus was presented twice in each 
colour. Each colour was presented three times in a block of 12 trials and each colour was 
assigned to each stimulus twice in a block of 48 trials. Each mask was assigned to each 
stimulus twice across 48 trials and each mask was presented three times in each block of 12 
trials. Each mask was not assigned more than once to the same face within a block of 12 
trials. That is, each mask was assigned to each face across every two blocks of 12 trials. 
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Similarly, each mask was assigned to each of the scrambled-faces once every four blocks of 
12 trials, and the same mask was not presented on more than two consecutive trials.   
On each trial, participants were presented with a row of three white crosses in the 
centre of the screen for one second.  These served as a fixation point for the stimuli.  The 
screen was then blanked for 250 msec and replaced by either a red, green blue or yellow face 
or a non-face in the location formerly occupied by the crosses.  A mask of the same colour 
replaced the stimuli.  
In the first block, the SOA between the face/non-face and the mask started at 80 msec 
and was systematically reduced to 60, 40, 35, 30, 25, 20, 15, 10, and 5 msec, if a score of 6 or 
more correct classifications was achieved. Participants were informed of their performance at 
the end of each block.   On a block in which fewer than 6 correct responses were achieved, 
participants were presented with a block of 24 trials at the exposure duration to ensure that 
they were genuinely unaware of the stimuli.  Participants were informed that within a block 
of 24 trials, 12 trials would be faces and 12 non-faces. When fewer than 12 correct responses 
were achieved the SOA was set and applied to the practice and experimental trials.   If 12 or 
more correct responses were achieved, the SOA was reduced to the next level and a block of 
12 trials was presented.  This procedure continued until the participant achieved fewer than 
12 of 24 correct identifications.  At this stage the corresponding SOA was applied for the 
remainder of the experiment.   
Shock intensity setting Participants in the shock threat condition undertook the shock 
intensity setting procedure which was set individually for each participant following the 
procedure reported for Study 1. 
Practice trials.  The experimental procedures relating to participants’ task demands 
and instructions, recording and scoring of responses and stimuli counterbalancing on the 
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practice trials in Study 2.2 were governed by the same parameters as those employed in Study 
2.1 (See Study 2.1 for details).  
Experimental trials. The procedure and stimuli on the colour naming trials in Study 
2.2 were the same as in Study 2.1 with the exception that the current study employed 
individually set SOAs between the target and that mask, which were determined during the 
SOA threshold setting procedure, and the unmasked and masked trials were presented 
intermixed over the four blocks of 24 trials. 
Stimulus presentation was counterbalanced and governed by the following 
parameters. No more than two consecutive trials of the same face type, colour and mask were 
presented in a block of 24 trials.  In a block of 24 trials, each face type was presented eight 
times and with each colour twice. Each mask was presented three times in a block of 24 trials 
and with each faces type twice and always appeared in the same colour in the block. To 
control for potential differences in valence between the masks, each was presented in only 
one colour for each participant, but the assignment of colours to masks was fully 
counterbalanced across 64 participants.  Across a block of 24 trials, each colour appeared six 
times and twice with each face type, and three times with each mask across two blocks of 48 
trials.  For masked trials, the target and its mask always appeared in the same colour. Each 
exposure mode occurred an equal number of times within each block of 24 trials. 
Awareness check trials. Following the completion of the four blocks of experimental 
colour naming trials, each participant completed a block of 48 awareness check trials to 
ensure that they remained unaware of the content of the masked stimuli. The procedural and 
stimulus counterbalancing details were the same as for Study 2.1 with the exception that in 
the current study the SOAs between the target and the mask were determined during the SOA 
threshold setting procedure. Only data from those participants who scored 24 or fewer correct 
responses was retained because they were considered to have remained unaware of the 
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masked stimuli during the experimental colour naming trials.  At the conclusion of the task, 
all participants were thanked, debriefed and released.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 As with the previous studies in the present thesis, separate manipulations checks were 
conducted to confirm that groups were differentiated on trait anxiety and to validate the 
experimental manipulations prior to statistical analysis of the colour naming reaction time 
data.   
Validity of trait anxiety group status. In line with Study 2.1, validation was sought 
that the HTA and LTA participants significantly differed on self-reported trait anxiety. STAI-
T scores were subjected to a 2 X 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trait anxiety group 
(HTA vs. LTA) and shock condition group (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the between 
subject variables and STAI-T scores as the dependent variable. The results revealed a 
significant main effect of Trait Anxiety Group, F (1, 60) = 129.74, MSE = 21.96, p < .001, 
p
2 
= .684, with the LTA group (M = 31.03; SE = 0.83) reporting lower trait anxiety than the 
HTA group (M = 44.38; SE = 0.83).  There were no other main effects or interactions, all F < 
2.15, p > .148 ns.  
To assess for differences in self-reported state anxiety, depression, social desirability 
and age the data were subject to 4 separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs with trait anxiety group and 
shock condition group as the between subject variables and STAI-S, DASS-D, MCSDS 
scores and age of participants as the dependent variables.  On the STAI-S measure, the results 
revealed a significant main effect of trait anxiety group, F (1, 60) = 13.58, MSE = 51.23, p < 
.001, p
2 
=. 185, with the LTA group (M = 29.38; SE = 1.27) reporting lower state anxiety 
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than the HTA group (M = 35.97; SE = 1.27). There were no other main effects or interactions, 
all F < 1.37, p > .247 ns.  An analysis of the Depression scale on the DASS revealed a 
significant main effect of Trait Anxiety, F (1, 60) = 13.29, MSE = 18.97, p = .001, p
2 
= .181, 
with the LTA participants (M = 2.75; SE = .77) reporting lower depression than their HTA 
counterparts (M = 6.72; SE = .77). There were no other main effects or interactions, all F < 
2.31, p > .133 ns.  Further analysis revealed that MCSDS scores and age of participants were 
equally distributed among the groups, all F < 3.23, p > .078 ns.  A chi square analysis 
revealed that gender was proportionately distributed among the anxiety groups, 2   (3) = 
1.55, p = .672 ns. See Table 5.6 for means and standard deviations of questionnaire and age 
variables. 
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Table 5.6 
Study 2.2 Means and Standard Variations for Questionnaire and Age Variables 
  Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Age (years) 33.94  (15.69)  30.38  (14.28)  34.81  (16.2)  30.5  (13.26) 
STAI-T 30.87  (3.58)  31.19  (3.71)  42.81  (4.86)  45.94  (6.14) 
STAI-S 28.69  (7.78)  30.06  (5.01)  37.37  (9.38)  34.56  (5.60) 
DASS-D 2.00  (2.42)  3.50  (4.01)  5.81  (4.36)  7.62  (5.85) 
MCSDS 6.63  (1.93)  6.00  (1.86)  7.25  (1.57)  6.94  (1.57) 
  
Validity of state anxiety manipulation.  To verify that shock intensity was 
comparable between groups, the data for the HTA and LTA participants in the shock threat 
condition was analysed. The shock intensity for the LTA group (M = 16.88 V; SD= 19.58) 
and the HTA group (M = 20.31 V; SD = 23.07), was comparable, t < 1 ns.  The effectiveness 
of the threat of shock as an anxiety induction method was validated by examining the HTA 
and LTA participants’ responses on the ARQ with and without the threat of shock. A single 
index on each dimension of the ARQ was obtained by averaging nervousness, fearfulness and 
anxiousness responses over blocks of trials.  Means and standard deviations of each scale on 
the ARQ for HTA and LTA groups under the threat of shock and in the shock safe condition 
are reported in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 
Study 2.2.  Means and Standard Deviations of Responses for HTA and LTA Participants on 
Three Dimensions of the Arousal Rating Questionnaire Under Shock Safe and Shock Treat 
Conditions.  
 
 Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 1.70  (1.18)  0.78  (1.50)  1.47  (1.15)  -0.09  (1.10) 
Fearful - Fearless 1.89  (1.24)  0.83  (1.50)  1.75  (1.10)  0.14  (1.19) 
Anxious – Relaxed 1.67  (1.23)  0.59  (1.58)  1.50  (1.16)  -0.38  (1.10) 
 
Note:  Negative Scores reflect greater nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness, whereas 
positive scores reflect the opposite.  
The ARQ data were analysed by three separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs, with trait anxiety 
(LTA vs. HTA) and shock condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the between groups 
factors and the nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness dimensions as the dependent 
variables.  For all three dimensions the only significant result to emerge was a main effect of 
shock condition, with the shock threat group reporting more nervousness (M =.34; SE =.22), 
F (1, 60) = 16.00, MSE = 1.54, p <.001, p
2.
= .200, fearfulness  (M = .48;  SE = .22), F (1, 
60) = 17.88, MSE = 1.60, p <.001, p
2.
=.230, and anxiousness (M = .11; SE = .23), F (1, 60 ) 
= 20.89, MSE = 1.67, p <.001, p
2. 
= .258, than their shock safe counterparts (M = 1.59, SE = 
.22; M = 1.82; SE = .22; M = 1.59; SE = .23, respectively). There were no other main effects 
or interactions, all F < 1 ns.  
Validity of masking procedure in preventing awareness. To validate that the SOA 
on masked trials was comparable between groups, the data were subject to a 2 X 2 ANOVA 
with anxiety group (LTA vs. HTA) and shock condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the 
factors and SOA as the dependent variable. The results revealed comparable SOA between all 
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groups, all F < 2.07, p > .156 ns. See Table 5.2 for SOA means and standard deviation for 
each group. The data therefore suggest that on the masked trials, all groups performed under 
comparable exposure durations.   
To ensure that participants remained unaware of stimuli on masked trials, the final 
awareness check data was subject to a 2 X 2 ANOVA with anxiety group and shock 
condition  as the between subject variables and percent of correct responses as the dependent 
variable. Table 5.8 shows the mean percentage of correct response on the final awareness 
check trial for all groups.  The data revealed a significant main effect of anxiety group, F (1, 
60) = 7.26, MSE = 17.27, p = .009, p
2.
 =.108 with the HTA group making fewer errors than 
the (M = 48.37 %; SE = .74) LTA group (M = 51.17 %; SE = .74). There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions, all F < 2.08, p > .155 ns. However, the performance 
of these groups as a whole (M = 23.89 %; SD = 2.09) did not differ from that expected by 
chance (24; i.e., 50 %), z = .05 ns. The data thus suggest that participants were unaware of the 
stimuli on the masked trials.  
Table 5.8  
Study 2.2.  Means and Standard Deviations of SOA on Masked Trials and Correct Responses 
(%) on the Final Awareness Check Trial in the HTA and LTA Group Performing Under 
Shock Safe and Shock Threat Conditions.  
  Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
SOA (msec) 29.09 (26.22)  19.69 (16.28)  16.25 (14.43)  18.44 (19.21) 
Correct Responses (%)  50.26 (4.23)  52.08 (3.73)  49.00 (4.17)  47.79 (4.47) 
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Data Reduction 
Prior to statistical analysis, the colour naming data was reduced as follows.  Trials 
containing the following were excluded from analysis:  (a) microphone failures (3.92%); (b) 
colour naming errors (0.75%); (c) responses less than 300 msec or more than 3000 msec 
(0.54%) after stimulus; and (d) trials more than 2 SD from each individual’s cell means 
(4.56% of trials). 
Error data. The percentage of errors in each experimental condition is shown in 
Table 5.9. The error data were analysed using a 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design ANCOVA with 
valence (happy, neutral and threat faces) and exposure mode (masked vs. unmasked) as the 
within subject variables,  trait anxiety group (LTA vs. HTA) and shock condition (shock safe 
vs. shock threat) as the between group variables, and depression scores as the covariate.  The 
only significant finding to emerge was a main effect of trait anxiety, with fewer colour 
naming errors occurring in the HTA group (M = 0.39%; SD = 0.20) than the LTA group (M = 
1.07%; SD = .20), F (1, 59) = 4.95, MSE = 7.61, p = .030, p
2 
=. 077. All other main effects 
and interactions were non-significant, all F < 2.81 ns.  
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Table 5.9 
Study 2.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Error Percentages in Colour Naming Masked 
and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for High Trait Anxious and Low Trait 
Anxious Participants in The Shock Safe and Shock Threat Conditions.  
 
 Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
 Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Masked                
Happy Faces 1.17  (2.51)  0.78  (2.13)  0.00  (0.00)  0.39  (1.56) 
Neutral Faces 0.78  (2.13)  0.39  (1.56)  0.78  (2.13)  0.00  (0.00) 
Threat Faces 2.34  (5.04)  0.01  (0.02)  0.00  (0.00)  0.77  (3.06) 
                
Unmasked                
Happy Faces 0.39  (1.56)  1.55  (3.56)  0.00  (0.00)  0.39  (1.56) 
Neutral Faces 1.55  (3.56)  1.56  (2.80)  1.17  (2.52)  0.39  (1.56) 
Threat Faces 1.17  (2.52)  1.17  (2.52)  0.39  (1.56)  0.39  (1.56) 
 
Reaction Time Data  
Mean reaction times for each experimental condition were calculated and are shown 
in Table 5.10.  The reaction time data were analysed using an equivalent design to the error 
data.  
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Table 5.10 
Study 2.2.  Means and Standard Deviations of Colour Naming Reaction Times in 
Milliseconds for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for LTA and HTA 
Participants in the Shock Safe and Threat of Shock Condition. 
 
 Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
 Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Masked                
Happy Faces 639  (137)  630  (106)  618  (84)  624  (102) 
Neutral Faces 640  (126)  646  (89)  628  (85)  637  (104) 
Threat Faces 643  (146)  633  (101)  622  (86)  640  (94) 
                
Unmasked                
Happy Faces 618  (108)  631  (108)  615  (84)  632  (98) 
Neutral Faces 602  (103)  624  (101)  613  (104)  620  (90) 
Threat Faces 605  (119)  606  (101)  609  (90)  617  (94) 
 
The only significant result to emerge was a Trait Anxiety X Exposure Mode 
Interaction, F (1, 59) = 4.07, MSE =1567.18, p = .048, p
2 
= .64.   The interaction is shown 
below in Figure 5.3. Averaged over valence and shock condition, the interaction reflects the 
fact that there was no significant difference in colour naming for masked (M = 635 msec; SE 
= 19.41) and unmasked (M = 627 msec; SE = 17.73) faces in the HTA group, F (1, 61) = 
2.06, p = .156, p
2
=.033, whereas the LTA group took longer to colour name masked (M = 
635 msec; SE = 19.09) relative to unmasked (M = 605 msec; SE = 17.73) faces, F (1, 61) = 
18.34,  p <.001, p
2
=.231. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all F < 
3.86, p > .054 ns.   
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Figure 5.3. Study 2.2.  Mean colour naming reaction times in milliseconds for HTA and LTA 
anxiety groups on the masked and unmasked exposure mode conditions averaged over 
valence and shock condition. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 Discussion  
The present study was designed to compare patterns of selective attention for threat 
faces in HTA and LTA individuals when masked and unmasked trials were intermixed.  
Following Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) 
several specific predictions were made.  First, in line with Beck and Clark (2010) and Öhman 
and Mineka (2001)  it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA participants would be slower 
to colour name masked and unmasked threat faces relative to non-threat faces but only while 
performing under the threat of shock. However, if the schematic threat faces do carry more 
threat valued than threat words, then in line with Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and 
Mineka (2001) it was predicted that HTA and LTA participants would be slower to colour 
600
610
620
630
640
HTA LTA
M
ea
n
 R
ea
ct
io
n
 T
im
e 
in
 M
ill
is
e
co
n
d
s 
Trait Anxiety Groups 
Masked
Unmasked
162 
 
name masked and unmasked threat faces relative to neutral or happy faces but only when 
performing under the threat of shock. 
The data from the present study failed to provide support for these predictions. The 
current data did not reveal any significant masked or unmasked threat processing biases in 
either HTA or LTA participants irrespective of shock condition and presentation order.  
These findings suggest that on the emotional Stroop colour naming task, when schematic 
faces are used as stimuli and masked and unmasked trials are intermixed, anxiety was not 
characterized by an automatic attentional bias toward threat. Therefore, when taken together, 
the data from Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 suggest that attentional biases for pictorial threat 
operate differently when exposure modes are blocked versus when they are presented in an 
intermixed order. The absence of significant findings in the current study was consistent with 
those of van Honk et al. (2001) and Putman (2004).  
The present findings were incompatible with others employing the dot probe 
paradigms. For example, selective processing of pictorial threat was observed in both HTA 
(e.g., Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 1998) and LTA participants (e.g., Bradley, Wilson & 
MacLeod, 2003). The discrepant findings between the current study and those mentioned 
above could be attributed to a number of factors.  First, the above mentioned studies 
employed a paradigm that was not capable of assessing for the involuntary aspect of the 
automaticity hypothesis (see Chapter 2). Therefore, it is possible that when masked and 
unmasked pictorial stimuli are presented intermixed, attentional biases for threat in anxious 
individuals do not occur counter to intent. Second, the above studies employed pictures of 
human faces as stimuli, whereas the current study employed schematic representations of 
human faces. It may be that schematic representations of human faces do not carry as much 
threat value as photographs of human faces depicting angry expressions.  This possibility can 
be argued on the basis of Mogg et al. (2007) and Wilson and MacLeod’s (2003) studies, 
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which varied the degree of threat stimuli and found that anxiety was associated with the 
intensity of threat.  That is, more anger/threat was needed for vigilance to threat to occur in 
both HTA (Mogg et al. 2007) and LTA individuals (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003).  Third, the 
current study failed to find evidence for the “without awareness” component of the 
automaticity hypothesis. These findings are discordant with those observed by Lee and 
Knight (2009) who presented participants with an intermixed sequence of masked and 
unmasked trials on a dot probe task and found evidence for vigilance to threat at pre-attentive 
levels.   
The findings of the present study did not support the first prediction made by the 
theoretical positions described in Chapter 1. That is, the data did not provide evidence for 
selective processing of pictorial threat in anxiety. Second, the data did not provide evidence 
for the automaticity hypothesis proposed by all models described in Chapter 1. That is, the 
data failed to produce evidence for the involuntary and without awareness component of 
selective attention to threat in anxiety.   When taken together, it would appear that when 
masked and unmasked schematic faces are presented intermixed there is no evidence of 
selective processing of threat as a function of anxiety, at least under the conditions reported 
here. These findings may also suggest that although selective processing for pictorial threat 
was observed on dot probe studies when masked and unmasked stimuli were intermixed, 
these biases may not operate involuntarily within the attentional system.  Further these 
findings suggest that conscious awareness of threat may override the mechanisms responsible 
for detecting threat at preconscious levels.  
Chapter Summary 
The findings of Study 2.1 suggest that HTA individuals selectively attend to 
schematic pictures of threatening faces relative to happy faces but only when they are 
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unaware of the semantic content of the stimuli and only under conditions of low arousal. The 
findings of Study 2.2 suggest that when conscious awareness to threat is primed these effects 
disappear. These findings offer mixed support for the theoretical positions described in 
Chapter 1. First, the findings of Study 2.1 support the theoretical position of Clark and Beck 
(2010) who place emphasis on trait anxiety in moderating attentional biases to threat in 
anxiety. These data are inconsistent with Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) theoretical position 
proposing that if the value of threat increases both HTA and LTA individuals should 
selectively attend to threat stimuli. These finding are also inconsistent with Öhman and 
Mineka’s (2001) theoretical view which places emphasis on state anxiety in moderating these 
effects.  Of central importance, these finding are at odds with Öhman (1993) theoretical view 
proposing that priming is a precursor for eliciting pre-attentive processing of threat.  
 In Summary, Studies 1, 2.1 and 2.1 employed the emotional Stoop colour naming 
task.  Despite the effectiveness of this task at investigating attentional patterns in anxiety (see 
Chapter 2), from an ecological perspective, it is unlikely that a person will be asked to ignore 
a threat stimulus when looking directly at it.  Alternatively, the flanker task controls for this 
limitation by spatially separating the to-be-attended to and the to-be-ignored stimuli (see 
Chapter 2).  This task was employed across the remaining two studies.  
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Chapter 6 
Automaticity of Attentional Bias to Pictorial Threat in Anxiety: Flanker Task 
 This chapter continues to examine the central assumptions proposed by the theoretical 
models described in Chapter 1 (Clark & Beck, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998 and Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001).  The central purpose of this chapter was to investigate the role of awareness 
in processing of pictorial threat on a more ecologically valid Flanker task, where the to-be-
attended (probes) and the to-be-ignored (faces) stimuli are spatially separated. Although the 
emotional Stroop is a widely used paradigm for the purpose of investigating attentional 
patterns in anxiety (see Chapter 2), from an ecological perspective, it is unlikely that a person 
will be asked to ignore a threat stimulus when looking directly at it.  Alternatively, the 
Flanker task corrects for this limitation by spatially separating the central task from the 
threatening information (see Chapter 2).  
Flanker Task 
 The structure of the Flanker task employed here was such that, participants were 
presented with a fixation cue (+++) in the centre of a computer screen for one second, the 
screen was blanked for 250 msec and a digit between 2 and 9 (inclusive) was presented in the 
area formerly occupied by the cue. Each participant used a clearly labelled button box to 
identify the status of the digit as odd or even, as quickly and accurately as possible. Once the 
computer software detected the participant’s response, the screen was blanked for 250 msec. 
A pair of schematic faces depicting happy, neutral or threat related expressions appeared on 
the screen, one below and one above the fixation cue, while simultaneously, a small probe 
(triangle or square) appeared in the left and right periphery of the screen, approximately 100 
mm on either side of the fixation cue.  The participants’ task was to verbally classify the 
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probe (triangle or square) as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the facial 
expression on the schematic faces.   
The digit classification task was employed to ensure that all participants were 
attending to the centre of the computer screen prior to the onset of the experimental 
interference task.  The Flanker task was employed to overcome a number of limitations 
associated with the probe detection tasks (e.g, choosing to attend to one side of the computer 
screen prior to responding to the central task; see Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and other 
paradigms (see Chapter 2). 
 Fox (1996, Experiment 1) employed a similar task (see Chapter 2) and found 
attentional biases for masked threat in the HTA individuals.  However, the present 
methodology differed from that employed by Fox in a number of ways. First, the current 
study employed happy, neutral and threat schematic faces as stimuli, whereas Fox employed 
words as stimuli. The importance of conducting the current paradigm with schematic faces is 
that it is not known whether HTA and LTA participants would demonstrate differential threat 
processing patterns for schematic faces that are spatially separated from the central task.  
Second, Fox manipulated state anxiety by testing participants in close proximity to end of 
term examinations (high state anxiety) but did not include a low state anxiety manipulation 
for comparison. The current study included the presence of an acute stressor (electric shock), 
such that half the participants were tested under the threat of shock condition whereas the 
other half were tested under a shock safe condition. Third, in the current study participants 
responded to the central task via a vocal response, whereas Fox employed a button press.  
The vocal response was employed to allow for comparison with colour naming studies 
reported previously in this thesis. Lastly, Fox required participants to perform a single task 
focussing on a single task relevant location, whereas the current task required participants to 
direct their attention between tasks and relevant locations.  
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Studies 3.1 and 3.2 employed the Flanker task with masked and unmasked happy, 
neutral and threat schematic faces that were either blocked (Study 3.1) or intermixed (Study 
3.2) on exposure mode. The blocked exposure mode consisted of presenting half the 
participants with two blocks of masked trials followed by two blocks of unmasked trials, 
whereas the other half received the reverse order. Blocking on exposure was an important 
variable for assessing Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis.  The intermixed exposures 
consisted of presenting masked and unmasked trials in a quasi-randomized order. To control 
for the possibility of incidental priming, on blocked trials, the SOAs between the target and 
the mask were set at 15 msec in Study 3.1 and were individually determined for each 
participant in Study 3.2. Awareness checks were carried out following the completion of the 
experimental trials to ensure that participants did not become aware of masked content during 
the experiments.  As with the studies described in Chapters 4 and 5, the assignment to trait 
anxiety groups was done on the basis of questionnaire scores, and state anxiety was 
manipulated through the threat of electric shock. A state anxiety manipulation was included, 
such that half of the HTA and half of the LTA participants performed under the threat of 
shock, whereas the other half performed under shock safe conditions.  This methodology 
therefore allowed for a number of investigations: (1) attentional bias for spatially separated 
pictorial threat faces in HTA and LTA individuals; (2) attention to pictorial threat without 
volition; (3) attention to pictorial threat without awareness; (4) the relative contribution of 
state and trait anxiety on selective processing of pictorial threat; and (5) the role of priming in 
moderating pre-attentive processing of pictorial threat.  
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Study 3.1 
Individual Differences in Attention for Blocked Masked and Unmasked Emotionally 
Toned Faces in Anxiety with and without the Threat of Shock on the Flanker Task 
The findings of the studies reported in the present thesis employing the emotional 
Stroop task revealed that attentional biases for verbal threat were evidenced across all anxiety 
groups irrespective of state anxiety manipulation, exposure mode and exposure mode 
presentation order  (Study 1). Further, when schematic faces were used as stimuli and masked 
and unmasked trials were blocked on exposure, HTA participants demonstrated an attentional 
bias toward masked threat faces irrespective of exposure mode presentation order, but only 
while performing under shock safe conditions (Study 2.1); however, when exposure of 
stimuli was intermixed, the data failed to reveal any significant threat processing effects 
(Study 2.2).  
Aim of Study  
The central aims of the present study are to: (1) investigate the role of awareness in 
selective attention for emotionally toned schematic faces in HTA and LTA participants, and 
(2) to investigate the role of priming in moderating pre-attentive processing of pictorial threat 
by presenting masked and unmasked trials blocked on exposure. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the models of Mogg and Bradley (1998), Clark and Beck (2010) and Öhman 
and Mineka (2001), the following predictions were made: (1) if priming is needed to elicit 
masked threat processing effects, then in line with Öhman (1993) it was predicted that HTA 
relative to LTA participants would be slower to classify probes that were presented with 
masked threat faces relative to masked neutral faces but only when performing under the 
threat of shock and only when unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials. 
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However, if priming is not needed, these patterns of responding will occur  irrespective of 
whether masked or unmasked trials were presented first;  (2) If the schematic threat faces do 
carry more threat value than threat words, then in line with Mogg and Bradley (1998) and 
Öhman and Mineka (2001) it was predicted that HTA and LTA participants would be slower 
to classify probes presented with masked and unmasked threat faces relative to neutral or 
happy faces but only when performing under the threat of shock, and only when unmasked 
trials were presented before the masked trials. 
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 168 Bond University students, staff and Gold Coast community 
volunteers participated in the study. Chapter 3 details the incentives for participating and 
screening criteria. Of those who met the initial screening criteria, three participants were 
excluded due to high depression scores and 14 due to high social desirability scores. They 
were thanked, given their incentive, a handout detailing the nature of the study, and released.   
Of those included in the experimental phase, data from a further two participants were 
excluded on the basis of age (both were over the age of 65). A further three participants were 
excluded due to software failure and data from a further 18 participants was excluded on the 
basis of their performance on the final awareness check. 
One hundred and twenty eight participants, 40 male and 88 female, aged 18 years to 
65 years (M = 30.61 years; SD = 14.98) made up the final sample. Participants were allocated 
to a Trait Anxiety Group (64 LTA, 64 HTA) following the same procedure used in Study 1. 
That is, those who scored 36 or below on the STAI-T were assigned to the LTA group and 
those who scored 37 and above were assigned to the HTA group. Based on their order of 
170 
 
arrival at the laboratory half of the participants within each anxiety group were randomly 
allocated to the shock threat (n = 64) and shock safe (n = 64) conditions, and half the 
participants in these groups were randomly allocated to the presentation order conditions 
(masked first, n = 64 vs. unmasked first, n = 64) which resulted in 16 participants allocated to 
each experimental group.  
Apparatus  
 Details for the experimental hardware, software and electric shock stimulus used in 
Study 3.1 are discussed in Chapter 3 above. 
Materials 
Stimuli.  Details of the face, non-face, mask and probe stimuli used in the practice 
trials, experimental trials and final awareness check trials in Study 3.1 are discussed in 
Chapter 3 above.  
Psychometric Measures 
 All participants completed the STAI, BDI, MCSDS and ARQ. Chapter 3 provides a 
description of each questionnaire, including psychometric properties and scoring.  
Design 
A 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design was used for the study. The within subjects factors 
were valence (happy, neutral, threat face) and exposure mode (masked vs. unmasked). The 
between subjects factors were trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA), shock condition (shock 
threat vs. shock safe) and presentation order (masked first vs. unmasked first). The dependent 
variables were probe classification reaction times and probe classification errors.  
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Procedure 
All participants provided voluntary informed consent, answered participant eligibility 
related questions and completed the questionnaires. Participants within each trait anxiety 
group were then randomly allocated to a shock threat and shock safe condition, and half of 
these groups were randomly allocated to a presentation order condition (masked first vs. 
unmasked first). After allocation to groups, they then underwent shock intensity setting (if in 
the shock threat group), practice and experimental procedures, and the final awareness check 
trials. In line with Study 2.1, the SOA was pre-set at 15 msec.  
 Shock intensity setting. In line with Studies 1, 2.1 and 2.2, after the initial threshold 
setting procedure was completed, participants who were assigned to the shock threat group 
underwent a procedure to determine the shock intensity (see Study 1 for procedural details). 
   Practice trials. Prior to the practice trials, all participants received standard 
instructions. They were informed that that they would be presented with two tasks:  a digit 
classification task (which was implemented to increase the likelihood that participants were 
attending to the centre of the screen) and a probe classification task. On the digit 
classification task, participants were presented with a random series of Odd/Even decision 
trials in which a digit between 2 and 9 (inclusive) appeared in the centre of the screen. The 
task required the participants to identify the digit as odd or even as quickly as possible by 
using a button press, at which time the screen was blanked.  Following the digit classification 
response, participants were presented with a probe classification task. In this task they were 
required to verbally identify a probe that was presented in the left or right periphery as a 
triangle or a square as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring any other stimuli on 
the screen. All participants underwent a practice block of 24 practice trials to familiarize 
themselves with the experimental task.  
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 On each trial, participants were presented with a row of three white crosses in the 
centre of the screen for one second.   The crosses served as a fixation point for the digit 
stimuli.  The screen was then blanked for 250 msec at which point it was replaced by a 
random computer generated odd or even digit, ranging from 2 to 9 (inclusive), in the space 
formerly occupied by the crosses.  Participants were instructed to make a button press in 
response to classify the digit as even by pressing the left arrow or as odd by pressing the right 
arrow. The response initiated the offset of the digit, which was immediately followed by a 
pair of non-faces. In order to control for potential priming effects, six non-faces were used for 
the practice block. Research (e.g., Miller & Patrick, 2000) has shown that pre-exposing 
participants to emotional stimuli can potentially reduce the attentional responses over a large 
number of trials.  One non-face appeared above and below the location formerly occupied by 
the crosses, while either a triangle or a square, appeared on the left or right periphery of the 
screen. The probes were presented approximately 100 mm on either side of the central 
fixation point. Once the initial verbal response was recorded the screen was blanked.  Once 
the experimenter coded the responses the next trial was initiated with an average four second 
inter-trial interval.  
All stimuli were counterbalanced and governed by the parameters that no more than 
two consecutive trials with the same face type were presented in a block of 24 trials. Each 
non-face was presented eight times in the block of 24 trials, each of the six non-face types 
presented four times in a block of 24 trials masked and four times in a block of 24 trials 
unmasked, and each of the four masks was presented three times in a block of 24 trials. On 
half of the trials the status of the digit was odd whereas for the other half it was even. The 
status of the digit was randomised but no more than four trials of the same status were 
presented in succession. On half of the trials the non-face stimuli were presented masked 
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whereas for the other half the non-faces were presented unmasked. The exposure mode was 
randomly intermixed but no more than two trials of the same exposure mode occurred in 
succession. Each probe type was presented 6 times to the left of the screen and six times to 
the right of the screen. The same non-face type, mask, probe type, or probe location were not 
presented on more than two consecutive trials. The combination of the same non-faces, 
masks, probe types and probe locations never appeared more than once within the practice 
block. All stimuli were presented in black colouring. 
Half of the stimuli were presented unmasked and half were presented masked.  On the 
unmasked trials, the non-face would remain on the screen until the participants’ first vocal 
response to the probe was recorded by the experimental software. On the masked trials, the 
non-face was presented at a 15 msec SOA and at the offset, replaced by a pattern mask.  The 
mask remained on the screen until the participant’s first vocal response was recorded. The 
experimenter recorded the participant’s response on a separate computer (VDU).  Any initial 
responses that clearly indicated the status of the probe were coded as “correct”, and 
“incorrect” if the initial response was not a clear or accurate classification of the probe (e.g., 
if the participant stuttered or if the participant reported the wrong probe). Initial responses 
that failed to be recorded by the experimental software were coded as a “microphone failure”.  
After the experimenter coded the responses the next trial was initiated with an inter-trial 
interval of approximately four seconds.   
Following the practice trials, all participants received a three minute rest period.  
Those in the shock threat group had the electrode re-attached, and were informed that the 
computer would deliver between five and seven electric shocks,  at random,  across the 
remaining four blocks of experimental trials.  Shocks were delivered at the same intensity 
previously set during the shock intensity setting procedure. In reality, the experimenter 
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delivered the shocks and only five electric shocks were administered for the remainder of the 
experiment. The first electric shock was administered approximately 15 seconds prior the 
first experimental probe detection trial.  This was done to ensure that participants believed the 
instructions given to them.  
Experimental trials. Prior to the first block of experimental probe classification 
trials, participants completed the ARQ for the first time.  Four blocks of 24 probe 
classification trials were administered. In line with the practice block, each trial consisted of 
the same two tasks: (1) digit classification task and (2) probe classification task. The 
experimental procedure relating to the participants’ standard task demands, instructions and 
recoding and scoring of responses was the same as in the practice trials.  
 All stimuli were quasi-randomized and governed by the following parameters. The 
same face type, probe and mask did not appear on more than two consecutive trials. Each 
face appeared in a block of 24 trials eight times and presented with each probe type four 
times (probe on left twice and on right twice) and never on more than two consecutive trials. 
Probe position and type were counterbalanced across the face types within each block of 
trials but were never presented on more than two trials of the same type in the same 
combination.  On the masked blocks, four masks were employed and the face types and 
masks were combined to occur an equal number of times. Each probe type was paired with 
each face an equal number of times in each block. Each mask was presented with each face 
twice in each block of 24 trials and fully counterbalanced across all trials and participants, 
such that each mask appeared with each face type, probe and probe location twice across all 
trials.   The status of the items for the digit classification task were counterbalanced with face 
type, probe type and probe position. On half of the trials within each block, the status of the 
digit was odd, whereas for the other half it was even. The digit items were randomized and 
the same item never appeared on more than three consecutive trials.  
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Consistent with the practice trials, on each trial, participants were presented with the 
digit classification task and probe classification task. Participants who were assigned to the 
unmasked first condition received two blocks of 24 unmasked trials first followed by two 
blocks of masked trials.  The masked first group received the opposite presentation order. On 
the unmasked trials, the face would remain on the screen until the participants’ first vocal 
response to the probe was recorded by the experimental software, at which time the screen 
was blanked.  On the masked trials, the face was presented for 15 msec and replaced by a 
pattern mask.  The mask remained on the screen until the participant’s first vocal response 
was recorded after which the screen was immediately blanked. The experimenter recorded 
the participant’s response on a separate computer (VDU).  Any initial responses that clearly 
indicated the status of the probe were coded as “correct”, and “incorrect” if the initial 
response was not a clear or accurate classification of the probe (e.g., if the participant 
stuttered or if the participant reported the wrong probe). Initial responses that failed to be 
recorded by the experimental software were coded as a “microphone failure”. After the 
experimenter coded the responses the next trial was initiated.  
Participants in the shock threat group received a second shock immediately after they 
indicated their final response in the first block. All participants completed the second ARQ 
during the rest time between Blocks 1 and 2 and those in the shock threat group received their 
third shock at this time. Block 2 commenced once participants completed the questionnaire. 
During the rest period between Block 2 and Block 3 participants filled out the third ARQ.  
Approximately 15 seconds prior to block 3 those in the shock threat group received their 
fourth electric shock.   The fifth and final electric shock was administered immediately 
following the participant’s vocal response for the final trial in Block 3.  At this stage 
participants were anticipating up to two more shocks, when in reality this was the final shock 
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to be administered. Participants completed the final ARQ at this time after which the final 
block of trials was initiated.  Once the final block was completed, those in the shock threat 
group had the electrode removed.    
Awareness check trials. Following the completion of the four blocks of probe 
classification trials, each participant completed one block of 48 awareness check trials to 
ensure they were unaware of the masked stimulus content at the end of the experiment. The 
task demands on the awareness check trials consisted of each participant completing two 
tasks: a digit classification task and a face-status task.  The digit classification task was 
identical to the one employed in the probe classification task and governed by the same 
parameters.   Following the digit classification response, participants were presented with a 
face/non-face decision trial in which two faces or two non-faces of the same type were briefly 
presented above and below the fixation point and were quickly replaced by a pattern mask. 
The centre-to-centre separation of the facial stimuli was approximately 70 mm.  The digit 
classification trials were governed by the same parameters employed the probe classification 
task.  Participants were first instructed to indicate whether an odd or even digit occurred 
followed by a face or non-face prior to the onset of the mask by pressing the left arrow on 
their keyboard for even/face and right arrow for odd/non-face. The SOA between the face 
type and the mask was set at 15 msec for all participants. If participants were unsure of the 
stimulus they were instructed to guess.  Once the response was made the screen was blanked.  
The experimental software coded the participant’s responses.  Participants were made 
familiar with the face/non-face exemplars via a printout prior this task. 
All odd/even, face/non-face and mask stimuli were counterbalanced within the block 
of 48 awareness check trials. The same face type (face vs. non-face) never appeared on more 
than two consecutive trials.  Four different masks were presented in the block of 48 trials; the 
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same mask was presented six times but never on more than two consecutive trials, and each 
mask was only assigned to the same face type twice. On half of the trials the digit was odd 
and on the other half it was even and the same status never appeared on more than four 
consecutive trials within the block. 
Only data from those participants who scored 27 or fewer correct responses on the 
awareness check trials was retained because they were considered to have remained unaware 
of the masked stimuli during the experimental colour naming trials.  The data for those who 
scored 28 or more correct responses was not included in the final analysis. At the conclusion 
of the task, all participants were thanked, debriefed and released. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Validation was sought to ascertain that groups differed on trait anxiety and to verify 
the effectiveness of experimental manipulations prior to statistical analysis of the probe 
classification reaction time data.  Table 6.1 presents the data for all person variables.  
Validity of trait anxiety group status.  To verify that the HTA and LTA participants 
significantly differed on self-reported trait anxiety and to confirm that trait anxiety did not 
systematically vary between the other factors, the STAI-T scores were subjected to a 2 X 2 X 
2 ANOVA with trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA), shock condition (shock safe vs. shock 
threat) and presentation order (unmasked first vs. masked first) as the between subject 
variables and STAI-T scores as the dependent variable. The results revealed a significant 
main effect of trait anxiety group, F (1, 120) = 181.73, MSE = 36.47, p <. 001, p
2 
= 602, 
with the LTA group (M = 29.72; SE = .76) reporting lower trait anxiety than the HTA group 
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(M = 44.11; SE = 0.76).  There were no other main effects or interactions, all F < 2.15, p > 
.148 ns. 
To assess for differences in self-reported state anxiety, depression, social desirability 
and age the data were subject to four separate 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs with trait anxiety group, 
shock condition and presentation order as the between subject variables and STAI-S, DASS, 
MCSDS scores and age of participants as the dependent variables.  On the STAI-S measure, 
the results revealed a significant main effect of trait anxiety group, F (1, 120) = 51.46, MSE = 
56.67, p < .001, p
2 
= .300, with the HTA group (M = 38.69; SE = .94) reporting higher state 
anxiety compared to their LTA counterparts (M = 29.14; SE = .94). There was also a 
significant main effect of Trait Anxiety Group on the depression measure, F (1, 120) = 58.15, 
MSE = 19.2, p < .001, p
2 
= .326, with the HTA participants (M = 8.06.; SE = .55) reporting 
higher depression compared to their LTA counterparts (M = 2.16; SE = .55).  There were no 
other main effects or interactions, all F < .86, p > .150 ns.   There was also a significant main 
effect of presentation order on the MCSDS measure, F (1, 120) = 5.10, MSE = 3.68, p = .026, 
p
2 
= .041, with those in the unmasked first condition (M = 6.83; SE = .24) responding more 
honestly with fewer socially desirable statements than those in the masked first condition, (M 
= 6.06; SE = .24). There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all F < .64, p 
>.291 ns. The groups were all comparable on age, all F < 2.10, all p > .150 ns. A chi square 
analysis revealed that gender was proportionately distributed among the trait anxiety groups, 
2 (1) = .58, p = .446 ns. However, gender was not proportionately distributed among the 
shock safe condition (males = 28; females = 36) and the shock threat condition (males = 12; 
females = 52), 2 (1) = 9.31, p < .05.  See Table 6.1 for means and standard deviations of 
person variables. 
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Table 6.1 
Study 3.1 Means and Standard Variations for Questionnaire and Age Variables 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age (years) 29.56 (15.02)  27.38 (14.81)  29.87 (15.48)  27.88 (12.99) 
STAI-T 30.44 (4.50)  27.94 (7.95)  31.25 (3.36)  29.25 (5.53) 
STAI-S 28.44 (6.75)  29.69 (5.39)  29.75 (6.12)  28.69 (7.47) 
DASS-D 2.38 (2.94)  1.75 (2.41)  2.38 (3.88)  2.13 (3.62) 
MCSDS 6.81 (2.17)  6.25 (2.49)  6.5 (1.55)  5.50 (1.51) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age (years) 29.25 (14.23)  34.13 (16.99)  36.31 (16.40)  30.50 (14.70) 
STAI-T 43.13 (5.26)  45.19 (5.33)  45.88 (4.99)  42.25 (9.24) 
STAI-S 36.19 (6.72)  39.44 (7.19)  39.75 (10.12)  39.38 (9.29) 
DASS-D 8.63 (4.54)  8.75 (6.28)  8.25 (4.67)  6.63 (5.40) 
MCSDS 7.25 (1.39)  6.19 (1.83)  6.75 (1.84)  6.31 (2.27) 
 
Validity of state anxiety manipulation. The data were analysed using an equivalent 
design to that used in assessing the validity of trait anxiety group status with shock intensity 
as the dependent variable. There were no significant main effects or interactions, all F < 1 ns, 
suggesting that shock intensity was comparable across all conditions.  In line with Study 1 
and 2.2, the effectiveness of the threat of shock as an anxiety induction method was validated 
by examining the HTA and LTA participants’ responses on the ARQ with and without the 
threat of shock in the unmasked first and masked first presentation order conditions. As with 
the previous studies, a single index on each dimension of the ARQ was obtained by averaging 
nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness responses over three blocks of trials.  Means and 
standard deviations of each scale on the ARQ for HTA and LTA groups under the threat of 
shock and in the shock safe condition are reported below in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 
Study 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Responses for HTA and LTA Participants on 
Three Dimensions of the Arousal Rating Questionnaire Under Shock Safe and Shock Threat 
Conditions for Masked First and Unmasked First Presentation Order Conditions. 
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 1.55 (1.56)  1.48 (1.18)  0.14 (1.45)  0.31 (0.97) 
Fearful - Fearless 1.92 (1.33)  1.77 (1.09)  0.52 (1.03)  0.92 (1.14) 
Anxious – Relaxed 1.67 (1.50)  1.25 (1.23)  -0.8 (1.54)  0.53 (1.09) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 0.84 (1.31)  0.63 (1.44)  0.00 (1.38)  -0.25 (1.46) 
Fearful - Fearless 0.83 (1.19)  1.09 (1.01)  0.03 (1.43)  -0.23 (1.32) 
Anxious – Relaxed 0.61 (1.28)  0.53 (1.37)  -0.48 (1.17)  -0.36 (1.42) 
Note:  Negative Scores reflect greater nervousness, fearfulness and anxiety, whereas positive 
scores reflect the opposite.  
The ARQ data was analysed using  separate 2 X 2 X 2  ANOVAs, with trait anxiety 
(LTA vs. HTA), shock condition (shock safe vs. shock threat)  and presentation order 
(unmasked first  vs. masked first ) as the between groups factors and the nervousness, 
fearfulness and anxiousness dimensions as the dependent variables. The results revealed that 
the HTA participants reported  significantly more nervousness (M = .31; SE = .17), F (1, 120) 
= 5.58, MSE = 1.84, p = .020, p
2 .
= .044, fearfulness (M = .43; SE = 15),  F (1, 120) = 16.06, 
MSE = 1.45 , p < .001, p
2 
=.118, and anxiousness (M = .07; SE = 17),  F (1, 120) = 10.67, 
MSE = 1.78 , p = .001, p
2 
=.082  compared to their LTA counterparts (nervousness, M = .87 
SE = 17; fearfulness, M = 1.28 SE = 17; anxiousness, M = .84, SE = .17).  Those in the shock 
threat condition reported more nervousness (M = .05; SE = .17),  F (1, 120) = 20.06, MSE = 
1.84, p  <  .001, p
2 
=.143, fearfulness (M = .31; SE  = .17) , F (1, 120) = 26.49, MSE = 1.45,  
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p < .001, p
2 
=  .181, and anxiousness (M = -.10; SE = .17),  F (1, 120) = 22.34, MSE = 1.78, 
p < .001, p
2 
= .157 compared to their shock safe counterparts (nervousness, M = 1.13, SE = 
17; fearfulness, M =  1.40, SE = .17 and anxiousness, M = 1.02, SE = 17).  There were no 
other main effects or interactions, all F < .80, p > .193 ns. These data suggest that the threat 
of electric shock was an effective procedure for elevating participants’ state anxiety.  
Validity of masking procedure in preventing awareness. As in Study 2.1, the SOA 
between the target and the mask was set at 15 msec for the masked trials. This procedure was 
employed to control for priming effects and to ensure that participants remained unaware of 
stimulus content on masked trials. The final awareness check data was subject to a 2 X 2 X 2 
ANOVA with trait anxiety group,  shock condition and presentation order as the between 
subject variables and percent of correct responses as the dependent variable. Table 6.3 shows 
the mean percentage of correct response on the final awareness check trials for all groups. 
The groups were comparable on the final awareness check trials, F < 1 ns, and the 
performance of these groups as a whole (M = 23.46; SD = 2.88) did not differ from that 
expected by chance (24; i.e., 50 %), z = .19 ns.   The data suggest that participants were 
unaware of the stimuli in the masked condition.  
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Table 6.3. 
Study 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations of SOA in Milliseconds and Percentage of Correct 
Responses on Final Awareness Check Trials For the LTA and HTA Participants in the Shock 
Safe and Shock Threat Conditions of the Unmasked First and Masked First Trials.  
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Correct Responses (%)  49.09 (5.84)  46.09 (7.60)  50.78 (5.37)  48.70 (6.22) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Correct Responses (%) 48.57 (5.14)  51.04 (5.74)  48.18 (6.36)  48.57 (5.79) 
 
Data Reduction 
Prior to statistical analysis, the colour naming reaction time data was cleaned in four 
stages. Trials containing the following were excluded from analysis:  (a) microphone failures 
(3.22 %); (b) probe classification errors (2.86 %); (c) responses less than 300 msec or greater 
than 3000 msec after stimulus (0.47 %) and  (d) trials more than 2 SD from each individual’s 
cell means (4.29 % of trials). 
Error data. The percentage of errors in each experimental condition is shown in 
Table 6.4.  Probe classification error data were analysed using a 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed 
design ANCOVA with valence (happy, neutral and threat faces) and exposure mode (masked 
vs. unmasked) as the within subject variables and trait anxiety group (LTA vs. HTA), shock 
condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) and presentation order (unmasked first vs. masked 
first) as the between group variables. Depression scores were entered as the covariate. The 
errors in probe classification served as the dependent variable.  The results did not reveal any 
significant main effects or interactions, all F < 1 ns. 
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Reaction Time Data   
 Mean probe classification reaction times for each experimental condition were 
calculated and are shown below in Table 6.5. All latency data was analysed using an 
equivalent design to that employed for the error data. 
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Table 6.4 
 
Study 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Error Percentages for Probe Classification 
Reaction Time Data for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for HTA 
and LTA Participants in the Shock Safe and Shock Threat Groups in the Masked First and 
Unmasked First Presentation Order. 
  
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 3.16 (3.23)  2.73 (3.20)  5.08 (6.54)  1.95 (2.99) 
Neutral Faces 1.95 (3.76)  1.95 (3.76)  2.73 (3.93)  2.73 (4.55) 
Threat Faces 2.34 (4.49)  2.34 (3.87)  3.13 (5.10)  3.52 (5.09) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 3.23 (5.59)  3.91 (5.04)  2.34 (3.87)  1.56 (3.61) 
Neutral Faces 2.73 (5.58)  1.95 (3.76)  4.69 (5.82)  3.52 (5.09) 
Threat Faces 3.52 (5.09)  0.78 (2.13)  3.52 (5.78)  2.73 (3.93) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 1.56 (3.61)  1.56 (3.61)  3.52 (4.55)  2.73 (6.83) 
Neutral Faces 2.34 (3.13)  1.95 (2.99)  2.34 (5.04)  1.17 (2.52) 
Threat Faces 3.91 (5.53)  1.17 (2.52)  3.13 (4.56)  1.56 (3.61) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 3.52 (5.09)  2.34 (3.13)  3.91 (6.80)  3.13 (5.60) 
Neutral Faces 2.34 (4.49)  1.56 (2.80)  5.86 (7.76)  2.73 (3.93) 
Threat Faces 2.73 (3.93)  1.95 (2.99)  4.69 (5.82)  6.64 (7.73) 
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Table 6.5 
 
Study 3.1. Means and Standard Deviations of Probe Classification Reaction Times in 
Milliseconds for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for Low Trait 
Anxious and High Trait Anxious Participants in the Shock Safe and Threat of Shock 
Condition for Masked First and Unmasked First Presentation Order  
 
  Low Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 861 (132)  799 (74)  857 (141)  841 (75) 
Neutral Faces 874 (104)  789 (86)  857 (116)  840 (91) 
Threat Faces 863 (123)  791 (78)  860 (138)  834 (67) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 867 (142)  828 (95)  870 (141)  845 (81) 
Neutral Faces 863 (109)  820 (81)  867 (156)  842 (78) 
Threat Faces 865 (114)  822 (97)  851 (159)  829 (83) 
  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
  Unmasked First  Masked First  Unmasked First  Masked First 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Masked            
Happy Faces 868 (126)  885 (122)  896 (130)  856 (137) 
Neutral Faces 853 (105)  843 (128)  903 (161)  823 (140) 
Threat Faces 851 (103)  858 (142)  896 (126)  866 (140) 
            
Unmasked            
Happy Faces 847 (108)  843 (121)  888 (152)  838 (135) 
Neutral Faces 850 (112)  857 (123)  870 (126)  820 (152) 
Threat Faces 861 (106)  842 (101)  889 (143)  848 (117) 
  
The only effect to emerge was a significant Exposure X Trait Anxiety interaction, F 
(1, 120) = 6.58, MSE = 2745.78, p = .012, p
2 
= .052. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, averaged 
over valence, shock condition and presentation order, the interaction reflects the fact that for 
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the LTA participants’ probe classification reaction time was not influenced by the exposure 
mode, F (1, 126) = 2.62, p = .108, p
2  .
=.020 ns.  For the HTA participants however, longer 
probe classification reaction times were associated with the masked (M = 866 msec, SE = 
14.26) compared to unmasked stimuli (M = 854, SE = 14.38), F (1, 126) = 5.07, p =.026, p
2 
= 
.039. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all F < 2.74, p > .068 ns.  
 
Figure 6.1 .Study 3.1.  Mean probe classification reaction times in milliseconds for LTA and 
HTA groups on masked and unmasked trials, averaged over valence, shock condition and 
presentation order. Vertical bars represent the standard errors of the mean. 
Discussion 
The aims of present study were to (1) investigate the role of awareness in selective 
attention for emotionally toned schematic faces in HTA and LTA participants, and (2) to 
investigate the role of priming in moderating pre-attentive processing of pictorial threat by 
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presenting masked and unmasked trials blocked on exposure. It was predicted that: (1) if 
priming is not needed to elicit preconscious threat processing effects, then in line with Clark 
and Beck (2010), HTA relative to LTA participants would be slower to classify probes that 
are presented with masked and unmasked threat faces relative to non-threat faces irrespective 
of whether masked or unmasked trials were presented first but only while performing under 
the threat of shock. However, if priming is needed, then in line with Öhman (1993) these 
finding would only emerge when unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials 
and; (2) if the schematic threat faces do carry more threat value than threat words, then in line 
with Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) it was predicted that HTA and 
LTA participants would be slower to classify probes presented with masked and unmasked 
threat faces relative to neutral or happy faces but only when performing under the threat of 
shock and only when unmasked trials were presented before the masked trials. 
The current study failed to reveal any significant findings, suggesting that on the 
Flanker task, when the central task is spatially separated from the valenced stimuli, anxiety 
was not characterized by an automatic attentional bias toward threat. Others employing a 
similar methodology with pictorial stimuli found that both HTA (e.g., Mogg, Falla & 
Hamilton, 1998) and LTA participants (e.g., Bradley, Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) were 
vigilant for pictorial threat.  The discrepant findings between the current study and those 
mentioned above could be attributed to the difference in stimuli used, that is, the studies 
mentioned above employed pictures of human faces as stimuli, whereas the current study 
employed schematic representations of human faces.  It may be that schematic 
representations of human faces do not carry as much threat value as photographs of human 
faces depicting angry expressions. Alternatively, the findings may suggest that perhaps 
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intermixing masked and unmasked presentation is necessary to reveal threat processing 
biases on this task because intermixing primes both masked and unmasked trials. 
Alternatively, the lack of significant finding of the present study may suggest that 
selective threat processing in anxiety does not occur counter to intent. That is, studies 
employing the dot probe methodology that found evidence for attentional biases to threat as a 
function of anxiety cannot make predictions on the involuntary nature of this behaviour 
because the dot probe task is not capable of assessing competition for attention.  Furthermore, 
others (e.g., Putman, Hermans & van Honk, 2004; van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout 
& Stam , 2001) employing the emotional Stroop colour naming task interference paradigms 
in an attempt to assess for the involuntary nature of attentional biases to threat in anxiety,  
have also failed to produce significant findings. These data suggest that attentional biases to 
pictorial threat in anxiety may not be an involuntary phenomenon.  
The present study also failed to find evidence for the “without awareness” component 
of the automaticity hypothesis. These findings are consistent with Mogg and Bradley (2002) 
who employed a masked version of the dot probe task with trait and socially anxious 
participants and found that trait anxious participants did not demonstrate a differential 
processing of valenced pictures of faces when the stimuli were presented outside of conscious 
awareness, whereas the socially anxious participants did demonstrate an attentional bias 
toward threat faces without conscious awareness. These findings may suggest that attentional 
bias to threat for pictorial stimuli when presented counter to awareness is unique to socially 
anxious individuals.  Perhaps socially anxious individuals are more sensitive to detecting 
threatening faces because facial features are a vital social signal (Öhman, 1986).  
The current data are at discord with Mogg and Bradley (1999a) who presented HTA 
and LTA participants with masked stimuli followed by unmasked stimuli and found that both 
groups were vigilant for threat faces when presented counter to awareness.   Others (e.g., Lee 
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& Knight, 2009) presented participants with an intermixed sequence of masked and 
unmasked trials and also found evidence for vigilance to threat at preconscious levels.   
In an attempt to understand the discordant finding all manipulation checks were 
reviewed. The data confirmed that the HTA group reported significantly more trait anxiety, 
state anxiety and depression compared to the LTA group. Care was taken to control for 
depression during statistical analysis on the reaction time data. The findings further revealed 
that all groups were comparable on age and that shock intensity was comparable between the 
shock threat groups. State anxiety manipulation was also successful with the shock threat 
group reporting more nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness than their shock safe 
counterparts. Further, given that all participants were exposed to masked stimuli at 15 msec 
SOA and awareness checks confirmed that participants did not become aware of masked 
stimuli throughout the experiment, these findings confirm effective experimental control.  
In sum, the lack of significant findings in the current study is puzzling.  Perhaps when 
a more ecologically valid paradigm is employed and the stimuli are blocked on exposure the 
automaticity of selective processing of threat in anxiety is not evident. These data do not 
provide evidence for the theoretical predictions under investigation. That is, the data did not 
provide evidence for selective processing of pictorial threat in anxiety. Second, the data did 
not provide evidence for the automaticity hypothesis proposed by all models described in 
Chapter 1. That is, the data failed to produce evidence for the involuntary and without 
awareness component of selective attention to threat in anxiety. The data further failed to 
provide evidence for the priming hypothesis as proposed by Öhman (1993). In an attempt to 
further evaluate the role of awareness in selective processing of threat in anxiety, the 
following study employed masked and unmasked stimuli intermixed.  
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Study 3.2 
Individual Differences in Attention for Intermixed Masked and Unmasked Emotionally 
Toned Faces in Anxiety with and without the Threat of Shock on the Flanker Task. 
The findings of the previous studies employing the emotional Stroop task revealed 
that, attentional biases for verbal threat were evidenced across all anxiety groups irrespective 
of state anxiety manipulation, exposure mode and exposure mode presentation order  (Study 
1). When schematic faces were used as stimuli and masked and unmasked trials were blocked 
on exposure, HTA participants demonstrated an attentional bias toward masked threat faces 
irrespective of exposure mode presentation order, but only while performing under shock safe 
conditions (Study 2.1). However, when masked and unmasked trials were intermixed, the 
data failed to reveal any significant differential processing of pictorial threat (Study 2.2).  
When schematic faces were spatially separated from the central task and presented blocked 
on exposure, the data also failed to reveal any significant threat processing effects (Study 
3.1).  
Aim of Study  
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether threat priming was a 
necessary precondition to reveal selective processing biases in HTA individuals on tasks in 
which threat is presented in a task irrelevant region on the visual display.  The present study 
employed the same task and stimuli as study 2.1 but the mode of presentation was such that 
masked and unmasked trials were presented in an intermixed sequence.  
Hypothesis 
The present study set out to test the following predictions. In line with Beck and Clark 
(2010) and Öhman and Mineka (2001) it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA participants 
would be slower to classify probes presented with masked and unmasked threat faces relative 
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to non-threat faces but only while performing under the threat of shock. However if the 
schematic threat faces do carry more threat value than threat words than in line with Mogg 
and Bradley (1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001), it was predicted that HTA and LTA 
participants will show similar patterns of threat processing.  
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 114 Bond University students, staff and Gold Coast community 
volunteers participated in this study. Chapter 3 describe the incentives for participating and 
screening criteria. Of those who met the initial screening criteria, one participant was 
excluded due to high depression scores and 10 due to high social desirability scores. They 
were thanked, given their incentive, a handout detailing the nature of the study, and released.   
Of those included in the experimental phase, data from a further four participants were 
excluded. One participant failed to disclose a cardiac condition during the initial screening 
stage, two were coughing during the experimental procedure, and one participant did not 
bring their corrective lenses with them to the laboratory. A further 6 participants were 
excluded due to software failure and data from a further 29 participants was excluded on the 
basis of their performance on the final awareness check. 
 Sixty-four participants, 21 males and 43 females, aged 18 years to 65 years (M = 
36.59 years; SD = 15.97) made up the final sample.  Participants were allocated to a trait 
anxiety group (32 LTA, 32 HTA) following the same procedure used in Study 1. That is, 
those who scored 36 and below on the STAI-T were assigned to the LTA group and those 
who scored 37 and above were assigned to the HTA group.  Based on their order of arrival at 
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the laboratory, half of the participants within each trait anxiety group were randomly 
allocated to either the shock threat or shock safe conditions.  
Apparatus  
 Details for the experimental hardware, software and electric stimulus used in Study 
3.2 are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Materials 
 Stimuli.  Details on the face, non-face, mask and probe stimuli used in the initial 
threshold setting trials, practice trials, colour naming trials and final awareness check trials in 
Study 3.2 are discussed in Chapter 3.  
Psychometric Measures 
 All Participants completed the STAI, BDI, MCSDS and Arousal Rating 
Questionnaires.  Chapter 3 details a description of each questionnaire including, 
psychometric properties, scoring and inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
Design 
A 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design was used for the study. The within subjects factors 
were valence (happy face vs. neutral face, vs. threat face) and exposure mode (masked vs. 
unmasked). The between subjects factors were trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA) and shock 
condition (shock threat vs. shock safe). The dependent variables were probe classification 
reaction times and probe classification errors.  
Procedure  
 All participants provided voluntary informed consent, answered participant eligibility 
related questions, completed the questionnaires, were assigned to trait anxiety and shock 
conditions groups prior to completing the SOA threshold setting procedure. Following the 
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SOA setting procedure, participants allocated to the shock condition underwent the shock 
intensity setting, all participants then completed the practice trials, experimental trials and the 
final awareness check trials. 
 SOA threshold setting.  Each participant was required to complete two tasks; a digit 
classification task and a face-status task were identical to Study 3.1 and governed by the same 
parameters.  In the first block of trials the SOA between the face/non-face and the mask 
started at 80 msec and was systematically shortened and procedure was in line with 
parameters employed in Study 2.2. 
All odd/even, face/non-face and mask stimuli were quasi-randomized and governed 
by the following parameters. Six faces and six no faces were presented in a block of 12 trials.  
The same face type (face vs. non-face) never appeared on more than two consecutive trials.  
Each of the four masks appeared six times across 24 trials and assigned to each face type 
twice, but never on more than 2 consecutive trials. On half of the trials within status of the 
digit was odd and on the other half it was even and the same status never appeared on more 
than 3 consecutive trials within the block. 
Shock intensity setting.  In line with Studies 1, 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1, those in the shock 
threat group underwent a shock intensity setting procedure which was set individually for 
each participant.  See Study 1 for shock intensity setting procedural details.  
Practice trials. The procedure and stimuli on the practice trials were the same as 
those used in Study 3.1 (See Study 3.1 for details). 
Probe classification trials. The procedure and stimuli on the probe classification 
trials in Study 3.2 was consistent with the procedure employed in Study 3.1 with the 
exception that in the current study, SOA were individually determined during the SOA 
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threshold setting procedure and the unmasked and masked trials were presented intermixed 
over the four blocks of 24 trials.  
Stimulus counterbalancing ensured that the same combination of face, digit, exposure 
mode and mask did not on more than two consecutive trials. Each face type appeared in each 
block of 24 trials eight times but never on more than two consecutive trials.  Each face type 
appeared in each block four times masked and four times unmasked. Each mask was 
presented with each face once in each block. Each mask was presented six times across two 
blocks of 24 trials and never appeared more than twice with each face type.  On half of the 
trials within each block the status of the digit was odd and on the other half it was even and 
the same status never appeared on more than four consecutive trials within each block. The 
status of the digits were counterbalanced with each face type, exposure mode, and probe type 
and probe position. Each probe type was paired with each face an equal number of times in 
each exposure mode within the blocks. Probe position and types were counterbalanced across 
exposure mode and face type within each block of trials and no more than two trials of the 
same type occurred in succession. 
Awareness check trials.  Following the completion of the four blocks of 
experimental probe classification trials, each participant completed a block of 48 awareness 
check trials. This procedure followed the same parameters as for Study 3.1.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
As with studies 1, 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1 validation was sought to confirm that groups 
differed on trait anxiety and to verify the effectiveness of experimental manipulations prior to 
statistical analysis of the probe classification reaction time data.  See Table 6.6 for person 
variable details.  
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 Validity of trait anxiety group status. To verify that the HTA and LTA participants 
significantly differed on self-reported trait anxiety, the STAI-T scores were subjected to a 2 
X 2 ANOVA with trait anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA) and shock condition (shock safe vs. 
shock threat) as the between subject variables and STAI-T scores as the dependent variable. 
The results revealed a significant main effect of trait anxiety, with the LTA group (M = 
30.28; SE = 0.93) reporting lower trait anxiety than the HTA group (M = 44.97; SE = 0.93), F 
(1, 60) = 124.17, MSE = 27.80, p < .001, p
2 
= .647.  This main effect was further qualified 
by a significant Trait Anxiety group X Shock Condition interaction, F (1, 60) = 8.37, MSE = 
27.8, p = .005, p
2 
=.122.  The interaction reflected the fact that in the LTA group there was 
no significant difference in self-reported trait anxiety between the shock safe group (M = 
29.00; SD = 4.08) and the shock threat group (M = 31.56; SD = 4.73), F (1, 30) = 2.46, p = 
.128, p
2
= .979 ns,  in the HTA group, those in the shock safe group (M = 47.50; SD = 6.35) 
reported significantly higher trait anxiety than those in the shock threat group (M = 42.44; SD 
= 5.30), F (1, 30) = 6.00, MSE = 34.20, p = .020, p
2 
= .167. 
  To assess for group differences in self-reported state anxiety, depression, social 
desirability and age the data were subject to 4 separate 2 X 2 ANOVA with Trait Anxiety 
Group and Shock Condition as the between subject variables and STAI-S, DASS,  MCSDS 
scores and age of participants as the dependent variables. On the STAI-S measure, a 
significant main effect of trait anxiety group emerged, with the LTA group (M = 25.81; SE = 
1.27) reporting lower state anxiety than the HTA group (M = 38.56; SE = 1.27), F (1, 60) = 
50.10, MSE = 51.92, p < .001, p
2 
=. 455. There were no other main effects or interactions, all 
F < .53, p > .469 ns. 
An analysis of the depression scale of the DASS scores revealed a significant main 
effect of trait anxiety group, with the LTA group (M = 2.25; SE = .89) reporting lower 
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depression than the HTA group (M = 7.72; SE = .89), F (1, 60) = 18.73, MSE = 25.55, p < 
.001, p
2 
= 238. There was no effect of shock condition and the interaction was not 
significant, all F < 3.82 ns.  Further analysis revealed that social desirability as measured by 
the MCSDS and age of participants were equally distributed among the groups, both F < 
1.65, p > .205 ns.  A chi square analysis revealed that gender was proportionately distributed 
among the anxiety groups, 2 (3) = .1.35, p = .718 ns.  
Table 6.6 
Study 3.2 Means and Standard Variations for Questionnaire and Age Variables 
  Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Age (years) 36.50  (16.83)  41.00  (15.42)  32.44  (14.78)  36.44  (17.12) 
STAI-T 29.00  (4.08)  31.56  (5.11)  47.50  (6.35)  42.44  (5.30) 
STAI-S 26.00  (3.27)  25.63  (4.30)  39.69  (7.91)  37.44  (10.76) 
DASS-D 2.00  (2.07)  2.50  (4.53)  9.94  (7.33)  5.50  (4.87) 
MCSDS 6.63  (1.41)  6.00  (1.90)  7.06  (1.91)  6.75  (2.11) 
  
Validity of state anxiety manipulation. A t-test revealed that the shock intensity for 
the LTA group (M = 18.75 V; SD = 23.52) was comparable to the HTA group (M = 16.56 V; 
SD = 20.89), t < 1 ns. The effectiveness of the threat of shock as an anxiety induction method 
was validated by examining the HTA and LTA participants’ responses on the ARQ with and 
without the threat of shock. Following study 1, 2.1 and 2.2, a single index on each dimension 
of the ARQ was obtained by averaging nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness responses 
over three blocks of trials.  Means and SDs of each scale on the ARQ for HTA and LTA 
groups under the threat of shock and in the shock safe condition are reported in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7 
Study 3.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Responses for HTA and LTA Participants on the 
Nervousness, Fearfulness and Anxiousness Dimensions of the Arousal Rating Questionnaire 
under Shock Safe and Shock Threat Conditions.  
 
 Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Nervous – Calm 1.45  (1.36)  1.22  (1.41)  0.63  (1.57)  0.20  (1.72) 
Fearful - Fearless 1.98  (1.34)  1.47  (1.26)  0.88  (1.52)  0.20  (1.71) 
Anxious – Relaxed 1.25  (1.47)  1.23  (1.46)  0.13  (1.39)  -0.14  (1.66) 
 
Note:  Negative Scores reflect greater nervousness, fearfulness and anxiety, whereas positive 
scores reflect the opposite.  
Following Study 2.1, The ARQ data was analysed using 2 X 2 ANOVA, with trait 
anxiety group (LTA vs. HTA) and shock condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the 
between groups factors and the nervousness, fearfulness and anxiousness scores as the 
dependent variables.  For all three dimensions the only significant result to emerge was a 
main effect of Trait Anxiety.  The HTA participants reported more nervousness, (M = .41; SE 
= .27),  F (1, 60) = 5.88, MSE = 2.31, p = .018, p
2.
= .089, fearfulness, participants (M = .54; 
SE = .26), F (1, 60) = 10.49, MSE = 2.15, p = .002, p
2 
= .149 and anxiousness (M = .-01; SE 
= .27), F (1, 60) = 10.19, MSE = 2.24, p = .002, p
2 
= 145 than their LTA counterparts (M = 
1.34, SE = .27; M = 1.73,  SE = .26; M = 1.19; SE = .27, respectively). There were no other 
main effects or interactions, all F < 1 ns.  
Validity of masking procedure in preventing awareness.  As in Study 2.2, to 
validate that the SOA on masked trials were comparable between groups, the data were 
subject to a 2 X 2 ANOVA with anxiety group  (LTA vs. HTA) and shock condition (shock 
safe vs. shock threat) as the between group variable and SOA as the dependent variable.  The 
results revealed comparable SOA between all groups, al F < 1 ns. See Table 6.8, for SOA 
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means and standard deviation for each group. The groups were comparable on the final 
awareness check trials and the performance of these groups as a whole (M = 23.73; SD = 
2.62) did not differ from that expected by chance (24; i.e., 50 %), z = .10 ns. The data suggest 
that participants were unaware of the stimuli in the masked condition.  
Table 6.8  
Study 3.2.  Means and Standard Deviations of Masked Exposure Duration (msec) and 
Correct Responses (%) on the Final Awareness Check Trial for HTA and LTA Groups in the 
Shock Safe and Shock Threat Conditions.  
  Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
  Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
SOA (msec) 71.25 (12.58)  71.56 (16.71)  72.5 (14.38)  66.56 (21.03) 
Correct Responses (%)  48.57 (4.79)  48.70 (6.03)  49.22 (6.22)  51.30 (4.68) 
 
Data Reduction 
Prior to statistical analysis the data were reduced in the following stages, (a) 
microphone failures (1.84 %); (b) probe classification errors (0.75 %); (c) responses less than 
300 msec or more than 3000 msec (0.54 %) and;  (d) trials more than 2 SD for each 
individuals cell means (4.72 % of trials) were removed. 
Error data. The percentage of errors in each experimental condition is shown in 
Table 6. 9. Probe classification error data were analysed using a 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design 
ANCOVA with valence (happy, neutral and threat faces) and exposure mode (masked vs. 
unmasked) as the within subject variables and trait anxiety group (LTA vs. HTA) and shock 
condition (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the between group variables.  The depressions 
scores were entered as the covariate. The errors in probe classification were entered as the 
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dependent variable.  The data did not reveal any significant main effects or interactions, all F 
< 2.15, p > .148 ns. 
Table 6.9. 
Study 3.2. Means and Standard Deviations of Error Percentages Probe Classification 
Reaction Times for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for HTA and 
LTA Participants in The Shock Safe and Shock Threat Groups.  
 
    Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
    Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Masked                
Happy Faces 2.73  (5.58)  2.34  (5.04)  2.34  (5.04)  2.34  (5.53) 
Neutral Faces 2.34  (3.13)  2.34  (3.87)  3.12  (6.85)  2.34  (5.04) 
Threat Faces 1.95  (3.76)  2.34  (4.49)  1.17  (2.52)  0.78  (2.13) 
                
Unmasked                
Happy Faces 2.34  (3.13)  1.95  (4.40)  2.34  (3.87)  2.73  (4.55) 
Neutral Faces 2.34  (3.87)  3.52  (5.09)  1.17  (3.40)  2.34  (3.87) 
Threat Faces 2.34  (3.87)  4.30  (3.76)  1.56  (3.61)  3.51  (6.83) 
Reaction Time Data 
Latency data for each experimental condition were calculated and are shown below in 
Table 6.10.  All probe classification latencies were analysed using an equivalent design to 
that used in the error data.   
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Table 6.10. 
Study 3.2.  Means and Standard Deviations for Probe Classification Reaction Times in 
Milliseconds for Masked and Unmasked Happy, Neutral and Threat Faces for LTA and HTA 
Participants in the Shock Safe and Threat of Shock Condition. 
 
    Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
    Shock Safe  Shock Threat  Shock Safe  Shock Threat 
Variable  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD)  M  (SD) 
Masked                
Happy Faces 937  (135)  842  (86)  892  (121)  871  (141) 
Neutral Faces 954  (151)  843  (84)  902  (140)  853  (154) 
Threat Faces 928  (149)  838  (90)  867  (112)  859  (142) 
                
Unmasked                
Happy Faces 890  (117)  831  (81)  862  (108)  869  (157) 
Neutral Faces 914  (133)  839  (63)  861  (99)  855  (112) 
Threat Faces 912  (113)  824  (99)  870  (102)  853  (137) 
 
The results revealed a  significant main effect of Exposure Mode,  with longer probe 
classification  reaction times on the masked trials (M = 882.12 msec; SE = 15.62) than on the 
unmasked trials (M = 865.15 msec; SE = 13.38) , F (1, 59) = 3.94, MSE = 1849.29, p = .003, 
p
2  
= .144.   This main effect was further qualified by a significant Exposure Mode X Shock 
Condition interaction F (1, 59) = 7.06, MSE = 1849.29, p = 0.010, p
2 
=.107 and a higher 
order Exposure Mode X Valence X Shock Condition interaction,  F (2, 118) = 3.17, MSE = 
1371.24, p = .046, p
2  
= .051. To decompose this interaction, the data were collapsed over 
trait anxiety and analysed separately at each level of exposure mode. As can be seen in the 
left panel of Figure 6.2, on the unmasked trials there were no significant  main effects of 
valence or shock condition and no interaction involving both variables,  all F < 1.57 all p > 
.143 ns. On the masked trials a significant main effect of valence, F (1, 124) = 3.87, MSE = 
1104.05, p = .023, p
2 
= .059 and a main effect of shock condition, F (1, 62) = 4, MSE = 
46564.07, p = .049, p
2 
= .061 were qualified by a significant higher order Valence X Shock 
Condition interaction, F (1, 124) =3.67, MSE = 1104.05, p = .028, p
2 
= .056. This interaction 
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reflects the fact that there was no difference in probe classification reactions times in the 
shock threat condition, F < 1 ns.  However, when performing under shock safe conditions 
different pattern of responding was noted, F (2, 61) = 6.36, p = .003, p
2 
= .172.   A series of 
repeated measures t tests revealed longer probe classification reaction times for the masked 
neutral faces (M = 928 msec; SD = 146) compared to the threat faces (M = 897 msec; SD = 
133.32), t (31) = 3.38, p = .002, with masked happy (M = 914 msec; SD = 128.07) falling 
between the other two and not differing from either,  t (31) = 1.76, p = .088 msec or threat 
faces t (31) = 1.82, p = .079 ns.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.2.  Study 3.2. Mean probe classification reaction times in milliseconds for happy, 
neutral and threat faces in the mask and unmasked exposure mode condition in the shock safe 
groups and shock threat conditions averaged over trait anxiety. Vertical bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
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Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether threat priming was necessary 
to reveal selective processing biases in anxiety on a task in which threat is presented in a task 
irrelevant region on the visual display. Consistent with Beck and Clark (2010) and Öhman 
and Mineka’s  (2001) theoretical models,  it was predicted that HTA relative to LTA 
participants would be slower to classify probes presented with masked and unmasked threat 
faces relative to non-threat faces in the shock threat condition. Alternatively, if the schematic 
threat faces do carry more threat valued than threat words than in line with Mogg and Bradley 
(1998) and Öhman and Mineka (2001), it was predicted that both anxiety groups would 
demonstrate this threat processing behaviour.  
The data from the present study failed to provide support for the predictions. In the 
current study, HTA and LTA participants took longer to classify the status of the probe on 
neutral face trials compared to threat faces. This effect was restricted to when the stimuli 
were masked, and only when performing under shock safe conditions.  Consistent with Study 
3.1, these findings are also in opposition to the bias for unmasked threat observed in HTA 
(Mogg et al., 1998) and masked and unmasked threat processing in LTA participants 
(Bradley et al., 2003) on the dot probe task .  
The lack of significant threat processing biases in the current study and in Study 3.1 
may suggest that, attentional bias to threat is only evident when the attended and ignored 
information are spatially inseparable and this effect is dependent on priming. Furthermore, 
when employing a task capable of assessing for the involuntary nature of selective processing 
of pictorial threat, based on the current pattern of data, the finding of Study 3.1, data from 
van Honk et al. (2001) and Putman, Hermans and van Honk (2004) the findings suggest that 
attentional biases to threat in trait anxious individuals may not be an involuntary phenomenon 
and thus inconsistent with the theoretical models under review.   In addition, the findings to 
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date suggest that, attentional bias for more ecologically valid threat in anxious individuals 
does not operate counter to intention.  
Further, given that a number of studies found evidence for selective processing of 
threat faces in socially anxious individuals but not in trait anxious individuals (e.g, Pishyar, 
Harris & Menzies, 2004; Putman et al., 2004), it may be the case that attentional biases for 
threat faces is a unique function of social rather than trait anxiety. In summary, the current 
pattern of data does not provide support for the theoretical models described in Chapter 1.   
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion 
 
 The present thesis reported research investigating the selective attention to threatening 
information in anxiety.  In Chapter 1, the theories of Clark and Beck (2010), Mogg and 
Bradley (1998), and Öhman and Mineka (2001) were discussed.  The review evaluated the 
common predictions made by each model. In summary, all models predicted that (1) anxiety 
is characterised by an attentional bias for threatening information and (2) attentional bias to 
threat is automatic in that it is (a) involuntary and (b) occurs outside of conscious awareness.  
The differences between the models include: (1) the emphasis on the role of  awareness in 
moderating preattentive biases to threat in anxiety; (2) evolutionary relevance and threat 
value of stimuli (e.g., faces vs. words) and; (3) the emphasis on the influence of state and trait 
anxiety on moderating the attention bias to threat.  
Clark and Beck (2010) suggest that attentional biases favouring threatening 
information are most prominent in those with a predisposition to anxiety (trait anxiety) 
whereas, Öhman and Mineka, (2001) propose it is current anxiety (state anxiety) that is most 
significant factor in predicting this phenomenon.  Mogg and Bradley (1998) on the other 
hand propose a hypothesis that stresses the importance of both trait and state anxiety in 
moderating selective processing of threat.  They propose that with elevated state anxiety, high 
trait anxious (HTA) individuals will direct their attention toward the source of threat whereas 
low trait anxious (LTA) individuals will direct their attention away from the source of threat, 
but only for stimuli evaluated as low in threat value. As for high threat value stimuli, both 
HTA and LTA individuals are expected to attend toward the source of threat. However, when 
state anxiety is low, no difference in threat processing is expected between the HTA and LTA 
individuals.  
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These models also differ in their emphasis on the role of awareness in activating 
selective attention toward threatening stimuli in anxious individuals. For example, Öhman 
(1993) places importance on priming of threat during conscious processes to elicit selective 
attention at preattentive levels, whereas, Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Clark and Beck 
(2010) do not specify the need for conscious awareness of stimuli in order to activate 
attentional biases toward threat that are presented outside of conscious awareness.     
Chapter 2 provided a thorough investigation of the empirical literature that has 
contributed to the development of the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 1.  The 
review identified a number of methodological limitations that did not allow for a complete 
acceptance of all predictions made by the theoretical models. The methodological limitations 
identified were as follows:  (1) the traditional versions of the dot probe task are unable to 
investigate whether the attentional bias to threat occurs without volition because these task do 
not allow for an investigation of competition for attention;  (2) the procedures employed to 
investigate whether attentional bias to threat occurs without awareness were not sufficiently 
controlled to ensure that participant remained unaware of subliminally presented stimuli nor 
were they capable of assessing the role of priming in moderating attentional biases to threat at 
pre-attentive levels; (3) limited studies have employed interference paradigms to assess for  
the role of awareness in selective processing of pictorial threat and no studies have 
investigated threat processing on an interference task whereby the to-be-attended-to and to-
be-ignored stimuli are spatially separated; (4) the inclusion of clinical studies in assessing the 
attentional biases to threat as a function of state and trait anxiety were problematic because 
clinically anxious participants are characterized as being high on both state and trait anxiety; 
(5) non-clinical studies are capable of investigating the separate effects of state and trait 
anxiety on moderating the attentional bias to threat but a number of studies failed to 
manipulate state anxiety in their non-clinical sample and; (6) although not without exception,  
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most researchers have manipulated state anxiety with a future oriented stressor,  which is 
incompatible to the current stress experienced by clinically anxious participants. 
To overcome the interpretational limitations associated with the aforementioned 
methodological concerns, the present thesis included interference paradigms, capable of 
assessing for both the volitional and awareness components of the automaticity hypothesis.  
To investigate whether attentional bias to threat occurs without volition, participants were 
instructed to perform a central task while ignoring distracting information. The extent to 
which the distracting information interfered with participant’s performance on the central 
tasks, was taken as an index of the extent to which these distractors were capable of 
recruiting attention counter to intention. To assess whether attentional biases to threat operate 
outside of conscious awareness, backward masked procedures were employed. To ensure that 
participants were unaware of content on the masked trials, individual exposure threshold 
levels were determined prior to the experimental procedure in three studies, and awareness 
checks were conducted at the end of each experiment to ensure they remained unaware of 
item content.  To ensure that participant’s responses on the masked trial were not primed by 
previous presentations of unmasked stimuli, three of the present series of studies blocked on 
exposure mode presentation order. 
To investigate the separate effects of state anxiety and trait anxiety, a sample of 
participants varying on trait anxiety levels were included in these studies and state anxiety 
was manipulated by an immediate threat of an electric shock.  The procedures allowed for an 
investigation of the attentional patterns of clinically anxious, high trait anxious (HTA) under 
high stress conditions (i.e., threat of shock) and low stress conditions (i.e., no threat of shock) 
and low trait anxious (LTA) participants under high stress and low stress conditions.  To 
investigate the attentional bias to verbal threat, the study reported in Chapter 4 included threat 
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and non-threat words as stimuli. To investigate the attentional biases to pictorial threat the 
studies reported in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 employed schematic representations of emotional 
(i.e., happy, threat, neutral) faces.  
With these procedures in place, 5 studies were conducted to investigate attentional 
biases for masked and unmasked verbal threat with clinically anxious participants and 
pictorial threat in non-clinical HTA and LTA participants, half of which performed under 
treat of electric shock. For each experiment the data were interpreted and discussed in 
accordance to the theoretical models of attention and anxiety described in Chapter 1. The 
following section will provided a general discussion of the data for each study with respect to 
the current empirical literature. The discussion is structured in accordance with the 
component of the theoretical models under review including any limitations associated with 
the present series of studies and recommendations for the direction of future research. To 
conclude, suggestions will be made for treatment consideration of anxiety disorder.  
Automaticity: Selective Attention for Threat without Volition and Awareness 
An important component of all models described in Chapter 1 is that attentional 
biases for threat are automatic in that they are (1) involuntary and (2) occurs outside of 
conscious awareness. The present thesis investigated these components of the automaticity 
hypothesis. Numerous studies employing dot probe detection ask have suggested that anxious 
individual selectively attend to threat information (see Chapter 2 for review) as evidenced by 
spatial allocation of attention to the source of threat. However, these methodologies cannot 
suggest that this biased attention to threat occurs counter to intention because these 
methodologies did not employ parameters requiring competition for attention (see Chapter 2 
for review). To address these limitations, the current series of studies employed interference 
paradigms capable of assessing the without volition component of automaticity.  These 
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interference paradigms are better suited than the dot probe methodology at addressing this 
issue because in this methodology participants are instructed to ignore any distracting 
information while attending to a central task. Thus, attentional bias to threat is a function of 
the extent to which threat related, relative to non-threat related stimuli interfere or facilitate 
task performance.  
To assess for the second component of the automaticity hypothesis, attentional bias to 
threat operates without conscious awareness, backward masking procedures were employed. 
Studies employing backward masking procedures with anxious participants have found that 
anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias to threat and that this bias occurs outside of 
conscious awareness. However, given a number of limitations identified with the 
aforementioned studies, it is unclear whether participants remained unaware of stimuli on 
masked trials (see Chapter 2).  
To ensure that participants remain unaware of all subliminal material, the present 
studies set conservative (i.e., 15 msec) stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) on blocked 
studies (Study 2.1 and Study 3.1) while individually determined SOAs were employed in 
Study 1 and on intermixed studies (Study 2.2 and; Study 3.2). To ensure that participants did 
not become aware of masked content through the experiment, all of the present studies 
employed awareness check trials, consisting of a lexical decision task (e.g., word/non word) 
in Study 1, and a conceptually equivalent face status task (i.e., face/non-face) in Study 2.1, 
Study 2.2, Study 3.1 and Study 3.2 (see Chapter 4 for a description of this task). To ensure 
the integrity of the data, any participant who exceeded criterion performance on the 
awareness check trial was excluded. On the basis of these procedures, these studies were able 
to investigate both the without volition and without awareness component of automaticity.  
In the current series of studies, when verbal information was presented unmasked, that 
is when participants had conscious access to the content. The data revealed that clinically 
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anxious participants and their non-clinical, HTA and LTA, counterparts demonstrated an 
attention bias for threat words relative to neutral words (Study 1). In this experiment all 
participants were slower to respond to the central task (e.g., colour naming) in the presence of 
threatening information (e.g., threat words) relative to neutral information (e.g., neutral 
words).   
When information was presented outside of conscious awareness the findings of a 
number of studies demonstrated that both clinical and non-clinical individuals will selectively 
attend to threat relative to non-threat content despite being unaware of the stimuli. For 
example, the data from Study 1 indicated that clinical and non-clinical participants 
demonstrated an attentional bias toward threat words relative to neutral words irrespective of 
whether the words were presented masked first or unmasked first. Similar patterns have been 
found elsewhere in clinical studies (e.g., Harvey et al., 1996).  Study 2.1 also found vigilance 
for masked threat faces in the HTA group.  These results suggest that under some conditions, 
HTA individuals will demonstrate an attentional bias to subliminal threat.  Importantly, these 
masked effects were observed irrespective of whether masked trials or unmasked trials were 
presented first.  These data suggests that priming is not needed to elicit attentional biases for 
threat content in conditions that restrict awareness, but are limited to conditions in which the 
to-be-ignored and to-be-attended to information are spatially inseparable.  
These data have a number of significant implications for the theories described in 
Chapter 1 and for the treatment of anxiety disorders.  First, all models propose that anxiety is 
characterized by an attentional bias for threat and that this bias is automatic in that it is 
involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness. The current data provides mixed 
support for this prediction. Study 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 failed to produce any significant support for 
selective processing of masked or unmasked threat stimuli in either HTA or LTA groups. The 
data from Study 1 revealed that all participants demonstrated a selective bias to masked and 
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unmasked threat while Study 2.1 only found evidence for masked threat processing, however, 
these finding were evidenced across all participants. Further, Study 1 and Study 2.1 revealed 
that priming was not a precursor for eliciting selective processing of threat at preconscious 
levels. These findings are in opposition to the theory proposed by Öhman (1993) and the 
findings of Fox (1996) and Edwards et al. (2010b) who suggest that priming is needed to 
elicit masked effects.  Alternatively, the findings of Study 1 and 2.1, are in line with Mogg 
and  Bradley (1999a, Experiment 1 and 3) who found evidence for selective processing of 
masked threat faces in their control sample (only presented masked trials).   
 These findings suggest that individuals may attend to threat relevant content when it 
is presented outside of their conscious awareness irrespective of whether these processes are 
activated within the cognitive system. However, a limitation of Mogg and Bradley’s (1999a) 
series of studies is that they employed a dot probe procedure, which cannot assess for the 
involuntary component of automaticity and they not include an awareness check procedure. 
Therefore, it is not known whether the participants were unaware of stimulus content on the 
masked trials.  To date, there were no known studies that have employed masked faces on the 
emotional Stroop task while implementing tight measures to control for awareness, and future 
research should address this gap in literature.  In summary, there is some evidence from two 
studies (Study 1 and Study 2.1) to suggest that attentional bias to threat is automatic in that it 
is involuntary and occurs outside of conscious awareness irrespective of whether masked 
trials or unmasked trials were presented first. However, these findings do not limit this 
phenomenon to elevated trait anxiety because these findings were observed across all 
participants.  
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Unmasked Trials with Verbal Material 
Consistent with the theoretical models described in Chapter 1, selective attention for 
unmasked verbal threat stimuli was evidenced in Study 1.  The data however, revealed that 
vigilance for threat words was evidenced across all anxiety groups (clinical, HTA and LTA) 
and irrespective of shock conditions (shock threat and shock safe). Although these findings 
provide support for the predictions made by the models, they are puzzling in several ways. 
First, verbal stimuli are relatively low in threat value, thus the selective attention for threat 
words across all anxiety groups is problematic for the theory proposed by Clark and Beck 
(2010), who place the importance of trait anxiety, Öhman and Mineka (2001), who stress the 
importance of state anxiety, and for Mogg and Bradley (1998), who propose that for low 
threat materials, only HTA individuals would demonstrate this effect.  Overall, the findings 
of Study 1 suggests that attentional biases for verbal threat are not moderated by either state 
or trait anxiety.  
Masked Trials with Verbal Material 
The data for the masked word trials in Study 1 were at discord with the models under 
investigation. In Study 1, vigilance for masked threat words was observed across all anxiety 
groups (clinical, HTA and LTA), and irrespective of shock condition (shock threat and shock 
safe).  Of theoretical importance, the data do not support Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis 
which states that the mechanisms responsible for eliciting threat processing at preconscious 
levels must first be consciously primed.  Although these data provide support for the 
prediction that anxious individuals would demonstrate a preconscious bias toward threat, 
these data suggest that this bias for masked verbal does not rely on priming to activate the 
mechanisms responsible for selective processing of threat at preconscious levels and are not 
restricted to anxious individuals.     
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Unmasked Trials with Pictorial Material 
 The data across all studies employing pictorial stimuli (Study 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2) did 
not reveal any significant unmasked threat processing effects and thus, failed to provide 
evidence for frameworks described in Chapter 1. Given that the emotional Stroop and the 
flanker task were capable of assessing for competition of resources (both interference tasks) 
the findings suggest that for selective processing of pictorial threat may not be an involuntary 
phenomenon. The lack of significant finding on the flanker tasks (Study 3.1 and 3.2) may 
also suggest that threat biases are not evident when attended to and ignored information are 
spatially separated.  
Masked Trials with Pictorial Material 
The theoretical positions investigated in the current thesis propose that attentional 
biases to threat are automatic in that they occur outside of conscious awareness. One study 
found support for this prediction. The findings from Study 2.1 revealed that attentional biases 
to pictorial threat operate at a preconscious level within the cognitive system. In this study, 
HTA participants demonstrated vigilance toward threat faces while performing under shock 
safe conditions. These findings hold significant relevance for Öhman’s (1993) priming 
hypotheses. That is, this pattern emerged irrespective of whether masked trials or unmasked 
trials were presented first, therefore suggesting the phenomenon does not rely on priming.  
These findings are discordant with Clark and Beck’s (2010) model, because processing biases 
were observed across all participants in Study 1, for Öhman and Mineka’s model (2001) 
because these findings were observed in the low state anxious conditions (Study 1 and 2.1) 
and for Mogg and Bradley (1998) who place emphasis on both state and trait anxiety in 
moderating these effects.  
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Blocked Exposure Presentations vs. Intermixed Exposure Presentations 
Öhman (1993) suggests that preconscious threat processing will only occur if the 
mechanisms responsible for preconscious processing have been primed by way of previous 
exposure to consciously perceived threat.  The data from two studies revealed selective 
processing of threat effects on blocked presentation modes for masked and unmasked verbal 
stimuli (Study 1) and masked pictorial stimuli (Study 2.1). The data from Study 1 did not 
support Öhman’s (1993) priming hypothesis because the masked threat processing effects 
were evidenced irrespective of priming by way of conscious awareness and the verbal stimuli 
employed in this study were low in threat value and were not evolutionarily prepared. These 
findings suggest that priming is not a precursor for preconscious processing of threat in 
anxiety. However, given that both HTA and LTA demonstrated this pattern of responding, 
the results are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions described in Chapter 1.  Further, in  
Study 2.1 employing  pictorial stimuli irrespective of whether masked or unmasked trials 
were presented first, HTA participants demonstrated attentional biases for masked threat 
faces, but only while performing under shock safe conditions.  These data therefore suggest 
that priming is not a precursor for selective processing of threat at preattentive levels and are 
not restricted to anxious individuals.  
Verbal Threat Material vs. Pictorial Threat Material 
 Assessing threat processing for low threat valued stimuli (e.g, threat words) vs. more 
ecologically valid threat stimuli (e.g, threat faces) is significant for Mogg and Bradley’s 
(1998) model. They propose that with elevated state anxiety HTA individuals will direct their 
attention toward the source of threat whereas LTA individuals will direct their attention away 
from the source of threat, but only for stimuli evaluated as low it threat value. As for high 
threat value stimuli, both HTA and LTA individuals are expected to attend toward the source 
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of threat. However, when state anxiety is low, no difference in threat processing is expected 
between the HTA and LTA individuals. The findings of the present series of studies provided 
mixed support for this theory. For example, Study 1 employed words as stimuli and found 
that all participants irrespective of trait anxiety (i.e., clinical, HTA and LTA) and irrespective 
of state anxiety (i.e., clinical, high state anxiety and low state anxiety) demonstrated an 
attentional bias toward both masked and unmasked threat words.  For higher threat value 
stimuli (i.e., faces) only HTA participants demonstrated an attentional bias toward masked 
threat faces under low stress conditions (Study 2.1). These findings are similar to those 
observed by Mogg et al., 1999a). No significant threat processing biases were observed in 
Study 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2. The limited masked effects and failure to find unmasked effects for 
pictorial threat stimuli are in line with one other study (e.g., van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan et al., 
2001).  
Spatially Integrated vs Spatially Separated Stimuli  
Only two (Study 1 and Study 2.1) of the five studies reported here found evidence for 
selective processing of threat stimuli. Study 1 and 2.1 employed the emotional Stroop task 
and blocked on mode of exposure. On this task, the attended to and ignored information were 
spatially integrated. The studies differed in a number of ways.  Study 1 employed words as 
stimuli and individually determined SOA, whereas Study 2.1 employed schematic faces as 
stimuli and SOAs were set at 15msec.  The findings also differed in a number of ways. First, 
in Study 1, selective processing for verbal threat was observed across all anxiety groups, 
irrespective of state anxiety manipulation and exposure mode, whereas in study 2.1 these 
findings were only observed for HTA individuals on masked trials while performing under 
shock safe conditions. Given that all other variables were held constant across both studies, 
the differences in findings can be attributed to the stimuli employed and/or SOAs. Of central 
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importance, the failure two produce significant threat processing biases in study 3.1 and 3.2, 
may suggest that attentional bias to threat is only evident when attended and ignored stimuli 
are spatially integrated. The findings may also suggest that when stimuli are spatially 
separated, selective attention for pictorial threat in anxiety is not an involuntary phenomenon.  
Clinical vs. Non-Clinical HTA and LTA  
Study 1 found evidence for selective processing of masked and unmasked threat 
words across all clinical and non-clinical HTA and LTA participants.  However, these 
findings were not moderated by either state or trait anxiety and therefore are at odds with the 
theoretical models under review. These findings suggest that, when the to-be-ignored and to- 
be-attended to stimuli are spatially integrated, selective processing of verbal threat associated 
wiht both clinical and non-clinical samples.  Study 2.1, employing the emotional Stroop task 
with more ecological valid stimuli (schematic faces), the data revealed evidence for selective 
processing of masked threat faces in non-clinical, HTA participants but only under low stress 
conditions (shock safe). These findings therefore do not support the Öhman and Mineka’s 
(2001) model, which stress the importance of elevated state anxiety in eliciting these effects. 
These findings are in accord with Clark and Beck’s (2010) model. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
A number of limitations were noted with the current series of studies that can prove 
difficult for generalization to real world applications and for comparison with previous 
findings. First, the current series of studies employing pictorial stimuli were not identically 
representative of human faces but rather a schematic representation and therefore, these 
findings cannot generalize to the attentive processes toward more biologically prepared 
stimuli (i.e., photographs of human faces). Nonetheless, according to Öhman, Ludvist and 
Esteves (2001) these stimuli are better suited to overcome a number of limitations associated 
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with using words as stimuli and photographic pictures of human faces. Moreover, given that a 
number of studies found evidence for selective processing of threat faces in socially anxious 
individuals but not in trait anxious individuals (e.g, Pishyar, Harris & Menzies, 2004), it may 
be that attentional biases for threat faces is a function of social rather than trait anxiety and 
thus it may be useful to employ assessment protocols to aid in data analysis.  
A further limitation is related to the methodology employed. As noted in Chapter 1, 
the emotional Stroop task is not without limitations particularly in terms of the unknown 
nature of the mechanisms that underlie the Stroop effect. For example, Mogg and Bradley 
(1998) suggest that this task does not discriminate between the encoding bias and the 
response bias, whereas the interference for colour naming has been suggested to be a result of 
participants trying to ignore the semantic content of stimuli (e.g. MacLeod, 1996). Despite 
these possibilities, similar patterns of threat processing have been noted across other 
experimental paradigms such as the visual search (e.g., Rinck, Becker, Kellerman, Walton & 
Roth, 2003), spatial cueing (e.g., Amir, Elias, Klumpp & Przewroski, 2003) and dot probe 
tasks (e.g., Amir, Najmi & Morrison, 2009). Nonetheless, the importance of the emotional 
Stoop paradigm is that it allows for assessment of the extent to which attentional biases occur 
counter to intention.  
Implication for the Treatment of Anxiety Disorders 
The models described in Chapter 1, suggest that attentional biases for threat may be 
attributed to the maintenance of anxious pathology and  others (e.g., Mathews, Mogg, 
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Miller & White, 1995) suggest that anxious 
individuals who demonstrated these attentional patterns prior to treatment do not display 
them once recovered after treatment. Therefore, if anxious pathology is characterized by an 
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attentional bias toward threatening information then treatment interventions should focus on 
therapeutic strategies that are capable of targeting these behaviours.  
A difficulty with developing treatment strategies that can account for restructuring 
these selective threat biases is that they are suggested to occur automatically in that they are 
involuntary and occur outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Study 1, Study 2.1; see for 
review, e.g., Bar-Haim et al, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Therefore traditional therapies that employ consciously moderated 
strategies would not be able to intervene in such processes. Importantly, the data reported in 
Study 1 and Study 2.1 confirm that priming is not a necessary precondition for these biases to 
emerge, and further confirm the encapsulated nature of the phenomenon why anxiety is often 
insensitive to verbally mediated therapeutic strategies. However, Mogg and Bradley (1998) 
suggest that the mechanisms responsible for threat appraisal may be moderated by individual 
differences in trait anxiety. On the basis of their model, individuals with anxious traits are 
seen to demonstrate a vigilance-avoidance pattern in attending to threat. That is, individuals 
may initially attend to the source of threat but then apply coping strategies that result in the 
avoidance of that threat.  When taking this into account, the attentional bias patterns may be 
intervened by exposure therapies. That is, training individuals to experience any anxiety 
provoking situations or events in an attempt to deploy the association of the stimulus and the 
anxious response. On a further note, because some of these attentional biases do not appear to 
be restricted to processes that are presented counter to awareness, cognitive behavioural 
therapies appear to be a valid intervention strategy because individual can be trained to 
modify their cognitive distortions in the presence of anxious triggers (Fox, 1996) which is an 
effective method in the treatment of anxiety disorders (Salkoviskis, Clark & Hackmann, 
1996) and the removal of preattentive bias effects (Mogg et al 1995). 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This research has provided a number of observations that are summarized as follows: 
(1) clinically anxious and non-clinical HTA and LTA individuals demonstrate vigilance for 
verbal threat that is presented within and outside of conscious awareness, (2) similarly, HTA 
and LTA individuals demonstrate vigilance for verbal threat  irrespective of state anxiety, (3) 
under some conditions, when more ecologically valid stimuli are introduced, HTA but not 
LTA individuals will selectively attend to threat that is presented outside of their conscious 
awareness but only when performing under low stress conditions;  (4) vigilance for threat is 
not evident when to be ignored and to be attended to stimuli are spatially separated; (5) 
priming is not a necessary precondition for eliciting attentional biases for subliminal threat. 
These data suggest anxiety may be characterized by a maladaptive attention pattern for mild 
and more biologically relevant threat. Of importance, because there is some evidence to 
suggest that these attentional patterns occur both within and outside of conscious awareness, 
cognitive therapies involving verbally moderated strategies may be appropriate for the 
intervention of the behaviours that appear to underpin anxious pathology.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961)
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Appendix B 
The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
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Appendix C1 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Form Y1 
(STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). 
A number of statements that people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement carefully and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate 
how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. The scoring key is indicated below. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend much time on any one statement but give the answer that seems 
to describe your current feelings best. 
 
  Not at all Almost 
Never 
Very Much 
So 
Almost 
Always 
  1 2 3 4 
      
1 I feel calm 1 2 3 4 
2 I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
3 I am tense 1 2 3 4 
4 I feel strained 1 2 3 4 
5 I feel at ease 1 2 3 4 
6 I feel upset 1 2 3 4 
7 I am presently worried over possible 
misfortunes 
1 2 3 4 
8 I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4 
9 I feel frightened 1 2 3 4 
10 I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
11 I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 
12 I feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
13 I am jittery 1 2 3 4 
14 I feel indecisive 1 2 3 4 
15 I am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16 I feel content 1 2 3 4 
17 I am worried 1 2 3 4 
18 I feel confused 1 2 3 4 
19 I feel steady 1 2 3 4 
20 I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix C2 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Form Y2 
(STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). 
A number of statements that people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement carefully and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate 
how you generally feel. The scoring key is indicated below. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend much time on any one statement but give the answer that seems to describe how you 
generally feel. 
 
  Almost 
never 
Sometime
s  
Often  Almost 
always 
  1 2 3 4 
      
21 I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
22 I feel nervous and restless 1 2 3 4 
23 I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 
24 I wish I could be as happy as others seem to 
be 
1 2 3 4 
25 I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4 
26 I feel rested 1 2 3 4 
27 I am “calm, cool and collected” 1 2 3 4 
28 I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I 
cannot overcome them 
1 2 3 4 
29 I worry too much over something that does 
not really matter 
1 2 3 4 
30 I am happy 1 2 3 4 
31 I have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4 
32 I lack self-confidence 1 2 3 4 
33 I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
34 I make decisions easily 1 2 3 4 
35 I feel inadequate 1 2 3 4 
36 I am content 1 2 3 4 
37 Some unimportant thought runs through my 
mind and bothers me 
1 2 3 4 
38 I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t 
put them out of my mind 
1 2 3 4 
39 I am a steady person 1 2 3 4 
40 I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think 
over my recent concerns or interests 
1 2 3 4 
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Appendix D 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale – Form XI 
(MCSDS – Form XI; Marlowe & Crowne, 1960; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). 
 
Listed below are a series of statements that may or may not apply to you. It is important that you read 
the statements carefully. If you believe that the statement applies to you, then circle T for TRUE. 
Alternatively if you feel that the statement has never applied to you, then circle F for FALSE. 
 
 
 
  True False 
16 I am always willing to admit it when I make a mistake T F 
17 I always try to practice what I preach T F 
25 I never resent being asked to return a favour T F 
26 I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my 
own 
T F 
33 I have never deliberately said something to hurt someone’s feelings T F 
11 I like to gossip at times T F 
15 There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone T F 
19 I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget T F 
22 At times I have really insisted on having things my own way T F 
23 There have been occasions when I have really felt like smashing things T F 
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Appendix E 
Arousal Rating Questionnaire 
 
 
 
1.    Right now, at this moment, I feel: 
 
 very quite slightly neither/nor slightly quite very  
Nervous 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 Calm 
Fearful 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 Fearless 
Anxious 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 Relaxed 
  
         
         
         
         
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
